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2016-02-24 14:00:00 | Operation BlockBuster unveils the actors behind the Sony attacks (lien direct) | Today, a coordinated coalition involving AlienVault and several other security companies led by Novetta is announcing Operation BlockBuster. This industry initiative was created to share information and potentially disrupt the infrastructure and tools from an actor named the Lazarus Group. The Lazarus Group has been responsible for several operations since at least 2009, including the attack that affected Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014.Part of our research on this actor was presented at the Kaspersky Security Analyst Summit (SAS) in Tenerife, Spain on February 9th, 2016 as a joint talk between AlienVault and Kaspersky’s Global Research and Analysis Team.In the research that AlienVault and Kaspersky collaborated on, we attributed several campaigns to this actor. Armed with some of the indicators that US-CERT made public after the Sony attack, we continued to analyze different campaigns in 2015 that we suspected were being launched by the same actor. Eventually we were also able to attribute previous activity to the same attackers including:Sony Pictures Entertainment - 2014Operation DarkSeoul - 2013Operation Troy - 2013Wild Positron / Duuzer - 2015Besides several campaigns were the Lazarus group has utilized wipers to perform destructive attacks, they have also been busy using the same tools to perform data theft and cyber espionage operations.Today, as part of the Operation BlockBuster release, we want to share some of our findings and TTP’s from the Lazarus Group that allowed us to link and attribute all the campaigns and tools into the same cluster of activity. We highly recommend that you read the comprehensive report Novetta published today that includes details on the project’s scope and the more than 45 malware families identified, and includes signatures and guidance to help organizations detect and stop the group’s actions.Encryption/Shared keysOne of the key findings that gave us the opportunity to link several families to the same actors was finding a dropper that the attackers use. This dropper contains a compressed resource (ZIP) with the name “MYRES” that is protected by a password. The attackers have reused the same password in different occasions and we were able to find droppers containing different families used by the group. This actor also reuses the code libraries they utilize to perform RSA encryption. We were also able to find the exact same public key in multiple variants.Batch scriptsThis actor often uses BAT files that share the same skeleton in order to delete the initial files after infection. We have seem them reuse this technique across multiple droppers and payloads.Obfuscation functionsThe Lazarus Group uses a few different methods to obfuscate API functions and dynamically load them. One of them consist on using a simple XOR schema. |
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2013-09-09 00:21:11 | Sandbox MIMIng. CVE-2012-0158 in MHTML samples and analysis (lien direct) |  WikipediaUpdate - Sept 4, 2013I added more descriptions and changed NjRat / Backdoor.LV to Vidgrab - in the traffic communications are similar to NjRat/Backdoor;lv but it does not use base64 and sends initial request starting with ...3 (0x01 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x33) followed by null bytes - it does not start with lv|I am still looking for names for a few other backdoors below, so if you recognize them, please let me know. Recently, my custom sandbox has been trying to open some Word attachments in a browser because the filetype fingerprint service detected them as MIME HTML files. Browsers are usually the default applications for such types and they did contain the CVE-2012-0158 exploit. A quick Google lookup yielded a May 2013 report from the Chinese company Antiy "The Latest APT Attack by Exploiting CVE-2012-0158 Vulnerability", which described this new exploit vector.Antiy noted that these MHTML files evade antivirus and indeed only half of vendors represented on Virustotal detect. However, many companies rely on their automated tools, inline and standalone sandboxes not just Antivirus to determine if the file is malicious.I checked how these files (file without any extension) were processed by other commercial and open source mailboxes. 3 out of 5 well known commercial and open source mail scan and web sandbox vendors returned no output or informed me that that filetype was not supported. While writing this post, I noticed that Malwaretracker also mentioned the rise in this vector usage in his post on Friday, so I am sure the sandbox vendors are fixing the issue as we speak.I checked 25 MHTML CVE-2012-0158 files and compared their targets (at least those I could obtain) and payload. The analysis showed a good variety of trojans and predominantly human rights (Tibet, Uyghur) activists. I will post a month worth of these files.CVE #CVE-2012-0158The (1) ListView, (2) ListView2, (3) TreeView, and (4) TreeView2 ActiveX controls in MSCOMCTL.OCX in the Common Controls in Microsoft Office 2003 SP3, 2007 SP2 and SP3, and 2010 Gold and SP1; Office 2003 Web Components SP3; SQL Server 2000 SP4, 2005 SP4, and 2008 SP2, SP3, and R2; BizTalk Server 2002 SP1; Commerce Server 2002 SP4, 2007 SP2, and 2009 Gold and R2 |
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