This is the RSS 2.0 feed from www.secnews.physaphae.fr. IT's a simple agragated flow of multiple articles soruces. Liste of sources, can be found on www.secnews.physaphae.fr. 2024-06-16T02:31:01+00:00 www.secnews.physaphae.fr ProjectZero - Blog de recherche Google There are recent public examples of third-party drivers containing serious vulnerabilities that are exploited on Android. While there exists a well-established body of public (and In-the-Wild) security research on Android GPU drivers, other chipset components may not be as frequently audited so this research sought to explore those drivers in greater detail.Driver Enumeration: Not as Easy as it Looks This research focused on three Android devices (chipset manufacturers in parentheses): - Google Pixel 7 (Tensor) - Xiaomi 11T (MediaTek) - Asus ROG 6D (MediaTek) In order to perform driver research on these devices I first had to find all of the kernel drivers that were accessible from an unprivileged context on each device; a task complicated by the non-uniformity of kernel drivers (and their permissions structures) across different devices even within the same chipset manufacturer. There are several different methodologies for discovering these drivers. The most straightforward technique is to search the associated filesystems looking for exposed driver device files. These files serve as the primary method by which userland can interact with the driver. Normally the “file” is open’d by a userland process, which then uses a combination of read, write, ioctl, or even mmap to interact with the driver. The driver then “translates” those interactions into manipulations of the underlying hardware device sending the output of that device back to userland as warranted. Effectively all drivers expose their interfaces through the ProcFS or DevFS filesystems, so I focused on the /proc and /dev directories while searching for viable attack surfaces. Theoretically, evaluating all the userland accessible drivers should be as simple as calling find /dev or find /proc, attempting to open every file discovered, and logging which open]]> 2024-06-13T11:03:53+00:00 https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2024/06/driving-forward-in-android-drivers.html www.secnews.physaphae.fr/article.php?IdArticle=8516986 False Tool,Vulnerability,Threat,Patching,Mobile,Technical None 3.0000000000000000 ProjectZero - Blog de recherche Google Pixel 8 / Pixel 8 Pro handsets, there\'s finally a production handset that allows you to enable MTE! The ability of MTE to detect memory corruption exploitation at the first dangerous access is a significant improvement in diagnostic and potential security effectiveness. The availability of MTE on a production handset for the first time is a big step forward, and I think there\'s real potential to use this technology to make 0-day harder. I\'ve been running my Pixel 8 with MTE enabled since release day, and so far I haven\'t found any issues with any of the applications I use on a daily basis1, or any noticeable performance issues. Currently, MTE is only available on the Pixel as a developer option, intended for app developers to test their apps using MTE, but we can configure it to default to synchronous mode for all2 apps and native user mode binaries. This can be done on a stock image, without bootloader unlocking or rooting required - just a couple of debugger commands. We\'ll do that now, but first:Disclaimer This is absolutely not a supported device configuration; and it\'s highly likely that you\'ll encounter issues with at least some applications crashing or failing to run correctly with MTE if you set your device up in this way.  This is how I\'ve configured my personal Pixel 8, and so far I\'ve not experienced any issues, but this was somewhat of a surprise to me, and I\'m still waiting to see what the first app that simply won\'t work at all will be...Enabling MTE on Pixel 8/Pixel 8 Pro ]]> 2023-11-03T10:04:59+00:00 https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2023/11/first-handset-with-mte-on-market.html www.secnews.physaphae.fr/article.php?IdArticle=8405411 False Tool,Mobile None 2.0000000000000000