This is the RSS 2.0 feed from www.secnews.physaphae.fr. IT's a simple agragated flow of multiple articles soruces. Liste of sources, can be found on www.secnews.physaphae.fr. 2025-05-11T20:55:04+00:00 www.secnews.physaphae.fr ProjectZero - Blog de recherche Google In this example, Application.exe is a desktop program calling the documented RegCreateKeyEx function, which is exported by KernelBase.dll. The KernelBase.dll library implements RegCreateKeyEx by translating the high-level API parameters passed by the caller (paths, flags, etc.) to internal ones understood by the kernel. It then invokes the NtCreateKey system call through a thin wrapper provided by ntdll.dll, and the execution finally reaches the Windows kernel, where all of the actual work on the internal registry representation is performed. ]]> 2024-10-25T10:30:02+00:00 https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2024/10/the-windows-registry-adventure-4-hives.html www.secnews.physaphae.fr/article.php?IdArticle=8601741 False Tool,Vulnerability,Threat,Legislation,Technical APT 17 3.0000000000000000 Contagio - Site d infos ransomware 2024 -08 -30 truesec : disséquant la cigale (ransomware ) & nbsp; ESXi ransomware cicada3301, un groupe de ransomware d'abord d'aborddétecté en juin 2024, semble être une version rebaptisée ou dérivée du groupe Ransomware AlphV, utilisant un modèle Ransomware-as-a-Service (RAAS).Le ransomware, écrit en rouille, cible les environnements Windows et Linux / Esxi, en utilisant Chacha20 pour le cryptage.L'analyse technique révèle plusieurs similitudes clés avec AlPHV: les deux utilisent des structures de commande presque identiques pour arrêter les machines virtuelles et supprimer des instantanés, et partager une convention de dénomination de fichiers similaire.Le binaire de Ransomware \\ est un fichier ELF, avec son origine de rouille confirmée par des références de chaîne et une enquête de la section .comment. Les paramètres clés incluent Sleep , qui retarde l'exécution de Ransomware \\, et ui , qui affiche la progression du chiffrement à l'écran.Le paramètre clé est crucial pour le déchiffrement;S'il n'est pas fourni ou incorrect, le ransomware cessera de fonctionner.La fonction principale, linux_enc , démarre le processus de chiffrement en générant une clé aléatoire à l'aide de osrng .Les fichiers supérieurs à 100 Mo sont chiffrés en pièces, tandis que les fichiers plus petits sont chiffrés entièrement à l'aide de Chacha20.La clé chacha20 est ensuite sécurisée avec une clé publique RSA et ajoutée, ainsi qu'une extension de fichier spécifique, à la fin du fichier crypté. L'accès initial semble être facilité par le botnet Brutus, avec des acteurs de menace utilisant des informations d'identification volées ou forcées pour accéder via ScreenConnect.L'adresse IP associée à cette attaque est liée au botnet Brutus, ce qui augmente la possibilité d'une connexion directe entre les opérateurs de botnet et CICADA3301.Le ransomware dispose également d'une routine de vérification de décryptage, où une note de ransomware codée et cryptée stockée dans le binaire est décryptée à l'aide de la clé fournie, validant le décryptage correct. Télécharger Télécharger.(Envoyez-moi un e-mail si vous avez besoin du schéma de mot de passe) ]]> 2024-09-07T17:31:39+00:00 https://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2024/09/2024-08-30-cicada-esxi-ransomware-sample.html www.secnews.physaphae.fr/article.php?IdArticle=8572211 False Ransomware,Threat,Technical APT 10 2.0000000000000000 Mandiant - Blog Sécu de Mandiant   Executive Summary  Mandiant assesses with high confidence that the Paris Olympics faces an elevated risk of cyber threat activity, including cyber espionage, disruptive and destructive operations, financially-motivated activity, hacktivism, and information operations.  Olympics-related cyber threats could realistically impact various targets including event organizers and sponsors, ticketing systems, Paris infrastructure, and athletes and spectators traveling to the event.  Mandiant assesses with high confidence that Russian threat groups pose the highest risk to the Olympics. While China, Iran, and North Korea state sponsored actors also pose a moderate to low risk. To reduce the risk of cyber threats associated with the Paris Olympics, organizations should update their threat profiles, conduct security awareness training, and consider travel-related cyber risks. The security community is better prepared for the cyber threats facing the Paris Olympics than it has been for previous Games, thanks to the insights gained from past events. While some entities may face unfamiliar state-sponsored threats, many of the cybercriminal threats will be familiar. While the technical disruption caused by hacktivism and information operations is often temporary, these operations can have an outsized impact during high-profile events with a global audience. Introduction  The 2024 Summer Olympics taking place in Paris, France between July and August creates opportunities for a range of cyber threat actors to pursue profit, notoriety, and intelligence. For organizations involved in the event, understanding relevant threats is key to developing a resilient security posture. Defenders should prepare against a variety of threats that will likely be interested in targeting the Games for different reasons:  Cyber espionage groups are likely to target the 2024 Olympics for information gathering purposes, due to the volume of government officials and senior decision makers attending. Disruptive and destructive operations could potentially target the Games to cause negative psychological effects and reputational damage. This type of activity could take the form of website defacements, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, the deployment of wiper malware, and operational technology (OT) targeting. As a high profile, large-scale sporting event with a global audience, the Olympics represents an ideal stage for such operations given that the impact of any disruption would be significantly magnified.  Information operations will likely leverage interest in the Olympics to spread narratives and disinformation to target audiences. In some cases, threat actors may leverage disruptive and destructive attacks to amplify the spread of particular narratives in hybrid operations. Financially-motivated actors are likely to target the Olympics in v]]> 2024-06-05T14:00:00+00:00 https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/cyber-threats-2024-paris-olympics/ www.secnews.physaphae.fr/article.php?IdArticle=8513588 False Ransomware,Malware,Threat,Studies,Mobile,Cloud,Technical APT 15,APT 31,APT 42 2.0000000000000000 Mandiant - Blog Sécu de Mandiant ciblant les entités japonaises . Dans cette campagne, le groupe a envoyé des e-mails de phishing de lance contenant des documents malveillants qui ont conduit à l'installation de la porte dérobée Uppercut.Cette porte dérobée est bien connue dans la communauté de la sécurité comme Anel , et il venait en bêta ou en RC (candidat à la libération) jusqu'à récemment.Une partie de cet article de blog discutera du

---

Introduction In July 2018, FireEye devices detected and blocked what appears to be APT10 (Menupass) activity targeting the Japanese media sector. APT10 is a Chinese cyber espionage group that FireEye has tracked since 2009, and they have a history of targeting Japanese entities. In this campaign, the group sent spear phishing emails containing malicious documents that led to the installation of the UPPERCUT backdoor. This backdoor is well-known in the security community as ANEL, and it used to come in beta or RC (release candidate) until recently. Part of this blog post will discuss the]]> 2018-09-13T11:00:00+00:00 https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt10-targeting-japanese-corporations-using-updated-ttps www.secnews.physaphae.fr/article.php?IdArticle=8377731 False Technical APT 10,APT 10 4.0000000000000000 Mandiant - Blog Sécu de Mandiant blog conjoint >

---

APT10 Background APT10 (MenuPass Group) is a Chinese cyber espionage group that FireEye has tracked since 2009. They have historically targeted construction and engineering, aerospace, and telecom firms, and governments in the United States, Europe, and Japan. We believe that the targeting of these industries has been in support of Chinese national security goals, including acquiring valuable military and intelligence information as well as the theft of confidential business data to support Chinese corporations. PwC and BAE recently issued a joint blog detailing extensive APT10 activity.]]> 2017-04-06T14:00:00+00:00 https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt10-menupass-group www.secnews.physaphae.fr/article.php?IdArticle=8377784 False Threat,Technical APT 10,APT 10 4.0000000000000000 Mandiant - Blog Sécu de Mandiant Introduction The attackers referred to as APT12 (also known as IXESHE, DynCalc, and DNSCALC) recently started a new campaign targeting organizations in Japan and Taiwan. APT12 is believed to be a cyber espionage group thought to have links to the Chinese People\'s Liberation Army. APT12\'s targets are consistent with larger People\'s Republic of China (PRC) goals. Intrusions and campaigns conducted by this group are in-line with PRC goals and self-interest in Taiwan. Additionally, the new campaigns we uncovered further highlight the correlation between APT groups ceasing and retooling]]> 2014-09-03T18:00:29+00:00 https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2 www.secnews.physaphae.fr/article.php?IdArticle=8377814 False Technical APT 12 4.0000000000000000