One Article Review
| Source |  Anomali |
|---|---|
| Identifiant | 5325562 |
| Date de publication | 2022-06-22 13:00:00 (vue: 2022-06-22 13:07:01) |
| Titre | RSA 2022: Cyber Attacks Continue to Come in Ever-Shifting Waves |
| Texte | Supply chains, trust, and the Internet itself remain prime targets. When Russia launched wide-ranging cyber-attacks while its army invaded Ukraine, it also deployed waves of wiper malware to destroy data. The first wave targeted the data on the disks. As Ukraine fortified its defenses in that area, the second wave left the data on the disks alone and went after the metadata. The third wave bypassed the two previous targets and attacked the file systems. As depicted in global news and during sessions of the RSA conference, this was a very methodical and effective approach designed to inflict maximum amounts of damage, and it reflects the methodical, often relentless, attack approaches shaping the threat landscape. In particular, as organizations fortify their defenses, adversaries will continue to focus on trust to gain access, using your partners, your vendors, and your employees against you. What does this mean for enterprise users? As we discussed in our previous post on cyber threats, organizations must find new and novel defenses against adversaries who increasingly shift tactics. As adversaries become more nuanced, we must understand their moves and motivations to try to get one step ahead of them. Let’s Recap: Several high-profile security incidents in the recent past altogether grimly encapsulate the myriad challenges companies now face. NotPetya, the most expensive cyber incident in history, demonstrated how attackers are masquerading their efforts. NotPetya targeted a tax software company in Ukraine in 2017. At first, the effort appeared to be ransomware. However, its intent was purely destructive as it was designed to inflict damage as quickly and effectively as possible. The C Cleaner attack, a few months later, demonstrated how complex and patient actors who were focused on IP level threats had become. The targets were system administrative tools that, if compromised, already had an increased level of access. C Cleaner showed that all software supply chain attacks aren’t created equal. It’s dependent on the level of access of the systems and the users that you’re compromising. Some 3 million versions of the compromised C Cleaner software were downloaded. However, only 50 of the downloaded software received additional payloads. This was an adversary that was willing to compromise more than 3 million systems to just get a foothold into 50. This gives you a clear idea of the challenges that we face as enterprises from these types of sophisticated actors. Attackers are also being more flagrant and doing a better job of covering their tracks. In the past, nation states focused on covert activities. Olympic Destroyer, which targeted the 2018 Olympics in South Korea, showed how attacks are now being brought to the public eye. False flags, tactics applied to deceive or misguide attribution attempts, were also put into Olympic Destroyer. Six months after the attack, it was attributed to multiple different nations, because such care had been put into throwing off attribution. More recently, VPN Filter/Cyber Blink demonstrated how adversaries are targeting different types of equipment. While attacks have historically focused on office equipment, these incidents shifted to home routers, in tandem with the increase in remote work. At home, people often use combination modem routers. These devices challenge detection capabilities. A foothold into home routers also allows actors to analyze all traffic moving in and out of the network. It’s incredibly difficult to detect an attack. You have to treat a home Wi-Fi like a public Wi-Fi at a coffee shop. Threat actors are targeting the foundational infrastructure of the internet as well. Sea T |
| Envoyé | Oui |
| Condensat | 2017 2018 2019 2022: able about access accurately action activities actors adapt additional administrative adopt adversaries adversaries’ adversary after against ahead all allows alone already also altogether amounts analytics analyze anomali anybody appeared applied to approach approaches are area aren’t army attack attacked attacker’s attackers attacks attempts attributed attribution automation based because become been being believes best better blink brought buy bypassed can capabilities care chain chains challenge challenges changing cleaner clear coffee combination come companies company complex complicated compounding compromise compromised compromising conference confront constantly continue correlate could course covering covert created cyber cyberattacks cybersecurity daily damage data deceive decide deep defend defenders defense defenses delivers demonstrated dependent depicted deployed deploying designed destroy destroyer destructive detect detection detects developing devices different difficult discussed disks disposal dns does doing domains downloaded driven during effective effectively effort efforts employees enablers encapsulate enterprise enterprises environment equal equipment equipped escalate essence ever evolution expect expensive exploits eye face fact false figure file filter/cyber find fine first flagrant flags focus focused foothold fortified fortify foundational from future gain get given gives global grimly hacked had hand have help high hijacked historically history home house how however idea immediate incident incidents increase increased increasingly incredibly infiltration inflict infrastructure instead intelligence intent internet intruders invaded it’s its itself job just know korea landscape later launch launched learning left legitimate let’s level like machine maintain malware masquerading matter maximum may mean means mentioned metadata methodical million misguide modem modified months more most motivations move moves moving much multiple must myriad nation nations nature necessary need network new news next notpetya novel now nuanced off office often olympic olympics one only operations opponents opportunity organizations out outmaneuver owned panel particular partners past patient payloads people pockets pointed possible post potential predict previous previously prime proactive proactively profile protect public purely put quickly ranging ransomware rather recap: received recent recently records reflects registrants relentless relevant rely remain remote requires response risk risks routers rsa russia sea second secure security servers service sessions several shaping shift shifted shifting shop showed six software solution some sophisticated sorts south spotlight states step strategies strategy stymie such supply system systems tactics taking tandem targeted targeting targets tax techniques telemetry than them then there’s these they’ll third those threat threats throwing time today’s tools tracks traffic trained treat truly trust try trying tune turtle two types ukraine understand understanding unfold upper use users using vendors versions very vpn waiting wave waves way well went what when which who why wide will willing wiper work you’re your |
| Tags | Malware Tool Threat |
| Stories | NotPetya NotPetya |
| Notes | |
| Move | 
|
L'article ne semble pas avoir été repris aprés sa publication.
L'article ne semble pas avoir été repris sur un précédent.