One Article Review
| Source |  Kovrr |
|---|---|
| Identifiant | 8393608 |
| Date de publication | 2021-02-02 00:00:00 (vue: 2023-10-10 07:25:35) |
| Titre | Mélanges clés de la montée des ransomwares en 2020: Ransomware-as-a-service et double extorse. Key Drivers of Rise of Ransomware in 2020: Ransomware-as-a-Service and Double ExtortionThe key drivers in the rise of ransomware have been double extortion and RaaS.Read More (Recyclage) |
| Texte | Ransomware-as-a-Service and Double ExtortionâRansomware has been a known method for cyber attacks for more than 30 years and has significantly evolved within this timespan. The growth in the number of ransomware attacks in 2020 has marked a pivotal milestone in the ransomware evolution. According to a Check Point study, Global Surges in Ransomware Attacks, in Q3 2020 the daily average of ransomware attacks has increased by 50%, and has specifically increased by 98.1% in the United States. Additionally, the average amount of money requested by attackers in Q3 2020 increased by 178% compared to Q4 of 2019. Supporting this trend, Coalitionâs Cyber Insurance Claims Report stated that more than 40% of the cyber incident claims in Q1 and Q2 2020 were due to ransomware attacks. âTaking into account these statistics, Kovrr has conducted research that included monitoring the activity of trending threats actors, the attacks they were involved with and the victims of these operations through 2020. The research included data from various proprietary and third party data sources including leaked data from the dark web. The research revealed that ransomware attacks have evolved in the following two areas:âMethodology - unlike ransomware attacks witnessed in the past, the last half year of 2020 was characterized by adoption of a new attack method which includes - stealing the companyâs data along with encrypting the attacked companyâs data. This practice is also known as âDouble Extortionâ because the attacker not only encrypts the data but also threatens to publish the companyâs stolen data.  Ransomware as - a - service (RaaS) - a method that recently became popular, which enables potential attackers to purchase already existing ransomware and use it for their desired purposes. âKovrr has researched 16 active âdouble extortionâ ransomware attack campaigns in the last year. Of the campaigns studied, 75% use social engineering (phishing emails) to propagate, while 25% of them involve exploiting a vulnerability in remote access software. In order to fully understand the effect of the ransomware campaigns, Kovrr applied the CRIMZON⢠framework to better analyze and report findings of the research. CRIMZON are an easy to use open framework to measure and understand cyber risk exposure that focus on the minimal elements needed to describe cyber risk accumulation. Elements of the CRIMZON include location, industry, and entity size. Applying the CRIMZON framework to the ransomware campaign research found the top 5 CRIMZON exposed were: âUS_NY_I_S [United States_New York_Services_Small Company]GB_I_S [Great Britain_Services_Small Company] CA_I_S [Canada_Services_Small Company] CA_E_S [Canada_Transportation & Communications_Small Company] US_CA_I_S [United States_California_Services_Small Company]âMost of the attacked companies are located in the U.S. (more than 50% of the targets), followed by Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany and France. Within the U.S., the main states affected were California, Texas, Florida and New York. The industries to which most of the attacked companies belong to are Services (20% of the services category is attributed to educational services), Transportation and Communication, and Manufacturing. âThese findings have a significant impact on the cyber insurance market both in terms of rising claim numbers and entity of the amount claimed. The increase in attacks is more concentrated in particular combinations of location, industry, and entity size (CRIMZON), meaning certain CRIMZON are more susceptible to an attack than others. This paper addresses new ransomware trend characteristics by providing an overview of two major ransomware campaigns encountered in the research; provides examples of ways in which a portfolio can be influenced as a result of the wide a |
| Envoyé | Oui |
| Condensat | 10â 178 2019 2020 2020: about above abs access accessibility accommodate according accordingly account accumulation accumulations actions:identify active activity actors addition additional additionally addresses adds adjust adjusting adjustments adoption adverse affect affected affecting after aggregate aggregations all allowances allowing allows along already also although american amount analysis analyze any applied applying are areas:âmethodology arisen assumed assumptions attachment attack attacked attacker attackers attacks attributed attritional australian authorities automatically avaddon average avoid aware backing backups bank banks barrier based became because become becomes been before begins being belong better both brass breach britain broken bublil building business but calculations california campaign campaigns can canada capable capital card carriers case cases catastrophe catastrophic category cause caused ceded certain change changed changes characteristics characterized check claim claimed claims clicking closed coalitionâs code collecting combination combinations communication communications companies companiesâ company companyâs compared complex compliance components componentsâ composition concentrated conducted configure conglomerate conservative consider consideration considered consisted constantly construction consultant continues contribute contributed contributing cost costs could counting coverage covered credit crimzon crimzon⢠crippling crisis currently customers customersâ customization cyber daily damage dark data deciding decisive dedicated define demanded depending derived describe desired desktop desktopâs despite detected deterioration development develops different direct directly discusses distributed diverse doesnât done double down dramatically driven drivers due dynamic each easily easy educational efco effect effects efforts elements emails enabled enables encountered encrypted encrypting encryption encrypts engage engineering entity entrants entry especially estimate event events evidence evolution evolved examples executed existing expectations expected expenses exploiting exposed exposure external extortion extortionthe extortionâransomware extortionâ extortionâ extra eyewear facto factors:the failure fall far feel fell filed files finally financial findings fines firm first florida focus followed following forensics found framework frameworks france fraud free frequency frequencyin from full fully future gaining generally germany gershovich getting giant given gives global good grasp great group grow grown growth had half has have hazard higher highlighted how however identification identified identify identity image impact impacted impactsâ implications important incentive incident include include:â notifications include:â â extortion included includes including income increase increased increases increasing incurred independently individuals industries industry industry: influence influenced information inquiry insight institutions insurance insured insurers interested interruption investigate involve involved italian june jurisdiction keep key kingdom known kovrr kovrrâs landscape landscaperesearch large largest last law lead leading leads leakage leaked leaking leaks least led legal less levels leverage likely limit limited limits linked list located location longer look looked loss losses lost lower luxottica made main major majority make malicious management managers manufacturing many map march marked market material materially may meaning means measure medium mentioned method methods metric metrics might milestone mind minimal mitigate mitigation model modeled money monitoring more moreover most mostly much multiple naomi nature nearly necessary need needed needs nefilim negative new not note notifying now number numbers occur offered ofâ one ones only open opening operation operations option order other others out outset over overlap overview own paid paper parameters particular p |
| Tags | Ransomware Data Breach Tool Vulnerability Threat Prediction |
| Stories | |
| Notes | ★★★ |
| Move | 
|
Les reprises de l'article (1):
| Source | Kovrr |
|---|---|
| Identifiant | 8393611 |
| Date de publication | 2020-03-31 00:00:00 (vue: 2023-10-10 07:25:35) |
| Titre | Cyber Risk - du péril au produit adoptant une nouvelle approche pour gérer le cyber-risque silencieux Lire la suite Cyber Risk - From Peril to ProductTaking a New Approach for Managing Silent Cyber RiskRead More |
| Texte | A New Approach for Managing Silent Cyber RiskâCyber is a multifaceted peril that is both a threat and an opportunity for the insurance industry: an opportunity because of the ever-evolving needs of coverage for businesses of any size, and a threat because of the systemic risk arising from its potential for overlap with other lines of business. Silent cyber refers to covered losses triggered by cyber events in P&C policies that were not specifically designed to cover cyber risk. Affirmative cyber refers to coverages specifically provided to protect policyholders against cyber events and presents a premium growth opportunity for insurance companies. As exposures to cyber continue to grow, insurance companies need tools to quantify the impact on allocated capital for cyber risk, regardless of whether the risk is silent or affirmative.With some estimates for accumulation across commercial lines running in the hundreds of billions, exposure managers are under pressure to more accurately estimate the potential impact of cyber events to ensure appropriate capital is held for this risk and enable decision makers, investors and regulators to quantify financial returns on a risk adjusted basis. Additionally, they are being forced to provide more transparency into methods used for measuring and controlling cyber accumulations. With various stakeholders and types of practitioners involved, the topic of cyber risk often presents seemingly conflicting priorities around managing capital at risk, estimating potential losses in existing lines of business, and finding new ways to market, through pricing new cyber specific business.Cyber events across different lines of business share a common trait. The key is to build tools capable of estimating realistic losses for both silent and affirmative cyber based on these shared traits. The focus of cyber risk for insurers should be gaining unique insights into events that truly matter -events capable of generating equity depleting losses. Measuring the impact of cyber events on capital is a three step process: identify, quantify and manage.Lately, the insurance industry seeks to consolidate most cyber risk into one dedicated line of business by implementing exclusion clauses in existing policies and inviting policy holders to âbuy backâ coverage. Several different wordings for such exclusions and endorsements have been introduced to the market. While intending to clearly define the scope of a cyber event and the coverage provided, the introduction of some of these clauses has produced unintended consequences. One example of this would be coverage for damage to a server due to flooding. In this example, the common expectation would be for the physical damage to the server as well as recovery of the data to be covered under flood insurance, however, the latest trend suggests data recovery might be excluded, as it relates to âdataâ, leaving a gap in coverage for property which some sources consider excessive.âSilent and AffirmativeThe issue with silent cyber, as with any circumstance presenting unexpected claims activity, is ensuring the premium charged is commensurate with the level of risk, usually referred to as pricing adequacy. Both cyber exposure and the potential impact of losses triggered by cyber perils continues to trend upwards annually. Unexpected claims lead to unexpectedly high loss ratios which clearly erode profits but can also lead to significant damage to an insurerâs financial stability.Insurance companies protect their balance sheets by purchasing reinsurance, but reinsurers face similar issues, they are also vulnerable to silent cyber. Therefore, insurers face the prospect of being denied recoveries from cyber losses and reinsurers are stepping up demands for clarity of coverage. Efforts to resolve the situation have taken two complementary directions: a conscious attempt to price for cyber risk and the introduction of increasingly restrictive exclusion clauses.âThe Status of Cyber ExclusionsCyber |
| Envoyé | Oui |
| Condensat | /group 1900s 1990s 2000s 2003 2020 ability about account accumulation accumulations accurately achievebeginning across actions activity actor actor: actorsthe adapt additionally adequacy adjusted advancedpersistent advantages affect affected affirmative affirmativethe after against aim all allocated allow allowing allows already also altering altogether amid analysis analyzed annually any appetites applies applying approach appropriate apt are are:output arising around aside aspects assets assumptions attack attacks attempt authorities authority automatically backâ balance barriers based basis because become becoming been behavior being bespoke best better between beyond billions board boltman both bottom broad bublil bugâ build building built business businesses but called campaign campaigns can capable capacity capital capture captured captures carriers case catalog catastrophe cause caused certain chain challenged charged circumstance circumstances cl380 cl380* claim claims clarity clash clauses clear clearly com commensurate commercial common community companies company compare complementary complex computational computer concepts concerns conclusioncyber confirm conflicting conscious consequences consider consideration considered considering considers consistent consolidate constraints consumed context continue continues contributed controlling correlating court cover coverage coverages coveragesaccounting covered currently cvedetails cyber damage data ddos decide decision decisions dedicated define defines definition demanding demands denied dependable dependencies:vulnerabilities depleting deploy deployment design designed develop developed developing develops devices dfa didnât differ different differs difficult diminishes direct directions: directly disasters disgruntled distinguish drivers due duty each easily easy economic effective effectively effectiveness efficiently efforts either element eliminating embedded employee empowers enable enables enabling encompass end endorsements ensure ensures ensuring entities equity erode established estimate estimates estimating etc event events ever evolving exaggerated example excessive excluded excluding exclusion exclusions exclusionscyber executed executives existing exists expectation expertiseseveral experts explain explicitly exploit exploitation exploiting exploits exposure exposures exposures*: expressed face failure failureidentify familiar far final financial finding first fit fix flood flooding focus focused focusing following follows:start forced framework frameworks from gain gaining gap general generated generating goal goals goes gosrani gov/vuln granular grow growth harm has have hazard hazards held here high holders how however https://nvd https://www hundreds hypothetical ideal identified identify ideology impact impending implemented implementing important incentives incidents include includes including incorporated increases increasingly individually industry industry: information infrastructures ingredient insights insolvency insurance insured insurers insurerâs integration intend intended intending interruption intimidation introduced introduction investors inviting involved isa isolated issue issues its january just key kovrr kovrrâs landscape large late lately latest latter lead leakage leaving less level leveraging lifespan likely line lines link lloydâs lma5400 lma5401 long longer look looking loss losses made main make makers making malicious manage managed management managers managing manifest many market markets matter may measuring mechanisms meet methods metrics/cvss metricsstress might model modeled modeling modelingexposure models modelsmain more most multifaceted multiple naomi natural need needs networks new nist non not now objective of:assessing offered often once one only operationalized opportunity order originally other others outage output overlap p&c party patch patched percentage perform performed peril perils perpetratorâs person personal phased physical please pml point points policies polic |
| Tags | Tool Vulnerability Threat Prediction |
| Stories | |
| Notes | ★★★ |
| Move |
|
L'article ne semble pas avoir été repris sur un précédent.