One Article Review
| Source |  Kovrr |
|---|---|
| Identifiant | 8393610 |
| Date de publication | 2020-07-27 00:00:00 (vue: 2023-10-10 07:25:35) |
| Titre | Cyber Black Swansgaining Visibility dans les événements de queue lors de la gestion des portefeuilles de cyber-assurance. Cyber Black SwansGaining visibility into tail events when managing cyber insurance portfolios.Read More (Recyclage) |
| Texte | Gaining visibility into tail events when managing cyber insurance portfoliosâIn March 2011, a powerful earthquake hit off the coast of TÅhoku, Japan, generating a devastating tsunami that overwhelmed all flood defenses. Up until then, scientists did not expect an earthquake in that region beyond magnitude eight but this specific event exceeded all accepted scientific predictions and expectations with a magnitude nine. The event was unanticipated, caused major financial impact, and called upon scientists to review their understanding of subduction zones. Events like this have come to be known as black swans. Cyber is a relatively new peril in the insurance landscape; companies have limited experience in underwriting and modeling the risk, and the risk itself has evolved in line with the advances of technology. Moreover, cyber insurance is still a developing market:scope of coverage is not very consistent, and policy terms are evolving rapidly. Against this backdrop, the industry is still interrogating itself about what a cyber black swan might look like, and how much it would cost.Black swans were first discussed by Nassim Nicholas Taleb in his 2001 book Fooled by Randomness, which aptly concerned financial events. His definition was based on three main characteristics: unexpected; causing a major impact; and most importantly, explainable, event hough only in hindsight. Black swans are particularly undesirable events in the financial sector. Actuaries and exposure managers aim to avoid black swans, or to put it another way avoid unexpected volatility of losses. To be prepared for this kind of occurrence is key not only for an insurance companyâs survival but also for its success.Insurance professionals need to be as proficient at understanding cyber risk as they are with other types of risk. The need stems mainly from three forces at play. Firstly, the risk already resides in insurance companiesâ books in a non-affirmative form, for example claims from cyber events could affect property and casualty policies. Secondly, cyber insurance buyers are becoming more sophisticated and demanding coverage fit for their risk management needs, including limits commensurate with the potential loss. Lastly, since economies with high insurance penetration recover more quickly after a catastrophe, insurance companies have an important role to play in enhancing resilience to large cyber events in the economies where they operate.âThe Footprint of a Cyber EventAn effective solution for cyber risk management allows practitioners to identify drivers of lossârisks in the portfolio that are most likely to contribute to an event. Solutions need to properly capture the correlation within a portfolio, in order to distinguish which risks will be affected, and to what extent those risks will incur serious financial loss. For natural hazards, correlation is determined by geographic proximity. For example, in an earthquake, the most affected properties will be the ones closest to the epicenter. In cyber, geographic proximity is not enough because events propagate through computer connections.To better illustrate the problem, letâs consider a major bug in a very popular technology. For example, the type of vulnerability that might allow remote code execution, that is the ability for a malicious threat actor to take control of a server or any other endpoint. Millions of businesses, all around the world, are potentially at risk. A campaign exploiting this type of vulnerability will start with the specific aim of maximizing the return for the threat actors involved, meaning an initial target will be identified based on the industry sector and country the attack is most likely to succeed in. All these factors can be modeled, using a combination of game theory and cyber security knowledgeâhowever, pinpointing exactly which company will be targeted first is a challenge.Often in such cases, several companies are targeted as starting points for the cyber event. Each of these initial |
| Envoyé | Oui |
| Condensat | $1m $2m 100 1980s 1990s 2001 2011 ability able about above acceptable accepted according accordingly account accumulationsâcrimzon⢠accuracy accurate across actor actors actually actuarial actuaries additional additive adequacy adjust advances affect affected affecting affirmative after against aim all allow allows alone already also although always among amount analysis analyzed annual another answer any applicable aptly are around aspects assess assume assuming assumptions attachment attack attacked attacks audience available average avoid avoiding back backdrop balance based basics because become becoming been begin behind being believed bernoulli best better beyond biggest binomial black book books both bug build building buildings business businesses but buyers calculate called campaign can capable capital capture capturing case cases casualty catalog cataloghazard catastrophe cause caused causes causing cautious cedantsâ certain chain challenge challenging chance characteristics characteristics: characterized claims classic clear click closest coast code coded coding combination combined combining come commensurate common commonly companies companiesâ company companyâs comparable compare compared comparison complete completely complex complexity components computed computer concerned conclusioncyber confidence confirm connections consider considered consistent consisting contract contribute contributing contributions contributor contributors control coordinate copula core correct correlated correlation cost could country couples coverage coverages crimzon crucially currently curve curvein cyber damage data decisions deeply defenses define defined defining definition demanding depending deploy described describes describing description desirable destroyed determine determined determining deterministic devastating develop developed developers developing devise dfa did difference different digit directly discussed disruption distinguish distribution distributions distributions:1 diversification does down drill driver drivers due dynamic each earthquake earthquakes economies effect effective efficiently efforts eight either elements emanate employing enable enables end ending endpoint energy enhancing enough ensures entity enumerate enumeration epicenter essential estimate estimated estimating even event event: event; eventan events every evolved evolving exactly example exceedance exceeded exclusively execution executives existing expect expectations experience explainable exploited exploiting exposure exposures extent extreme facing fact factor factors facultative fail falls fashion fast features financial finding first firstly fit fix flexible flock flood focused fooled footprint forces form formally fortunately forward four frame framework frequency from full fully function gaining game generated generating geocode geocoding geographic geography given goal going gone good grasp ground growing guidelines had has have having hazard hazards hence here high higher hindsight his historical hit hough how however human identical identification identified identify identifying ignores illustrate impact impact; impacted implementing important importantly impossible inaccurate include included including incur incurring independent industry infected information informed initial insights instance instead insurance insurers intended intensity interaction interactionsâfor interconnectedness interdependencies intermediate interrogating introduced involved irrespective isa its itself itâs japan joint just justify keep key kind knowledge knowledgeâhowever known kovrr kovrrâs lack landscape; large lastly least leaves less letâs level levels lies like likely limitations limitations:deterministic limited limits line lines link links list local location longer look looking loses loss losses lossvalue lossârisks madethe magnitude magnitudes main mainly major majority make makes making malicious man management managers managing many map mapped mapping march market:scope markets ma |
| Tags | Ransomware Tool Vulnerability Threat |
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| Notes | ★★★ |
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Les reprises de l'article (1):
| Source | Kovrr |
|---|---|
| Identifiant | 8393611 |
| Date de publication | 2020-03-31 00:00:00 (vue: 2023-10-10 07:25:35) |
| Titre | Cyber Risk - du péril au produit adoptant une nouvelle approche pour gérer le cyber-risque silencieux Lire la suite Cyber Risk - From Peril to ProductTaking a New Approach for Managing Silent Cyber RiskRead More |
| Texte | A New Approach for Managing Silent Cyber RiskâCyber is a multifaceted peril that is both a threat and an opportunity for the insurance industry: an opportunity because of the ever-evolving needs of coverage for businesses of any size, and a threat because of the systemic risk arising from its potential for overlap with other lines of business. Silent cyber refers to covered losses triggered by cyber events in P&C policies that were not specifically designed to cover cyber risk. Affirmative cyber refers to coverages specifically provided to protect policyholders against cyber events and presents a premium growth opportunity for insurance companies. As exposures to cyber continue to grow, insurance companies need tools to quantify the impact on allocated capital for cyber risk, regardless of whether the risk is silent or affirmative.With some estimates for accumulation across commercial lines running in the hundreds of billions, exposure managers are under pressure to more accurately estimate the potential impact of cyber events to ensure appropriate capital is held for this risk and enable decision makers, investors and regulators to quantify financial returns on a risk adjusted basis. Additionally, they are being forced to provide more transparency into methods used for measuring and controlling cyber accumulations. With various stakeholders and types of practitioners involved, the topic of cyber risk often presents seemingly conflicting priorities around managing capital at risk, estimating potential losses in existing lines of business, and finding new ways to market, through pricing new cyber specific business.Cyber events across different lines of business share a common trait. The key is to build tools capable of estimating realistic losses for both silent and affirmative cyber based on these shared traits. The focus of cyber risk for insurers should be gaining unique insights into events that truly matter -events capable of generating equity depleting losses. Measuring the impact of cyber events on capital is a three step process: identify, quantify and manage.Lately, the insurance industry seeks to consolidate most cyber risk into one dedicated line of business by implementing exclusion clauses in existing policies and inviting policy holders to âbuy backâ coverage. Several different wordings for such exclusions and endorsements have been introduced to the market. While intending to clearly define the scope of a cyber event and the coverage provided, the introduction of some of these clauses has produced unintended consequences. One example of this would be coverage for damage to a server due to flooding. In this example, the common expectation would be for the physical damage to the server as well as recovery of the data to be covered under flood insurance, however, the latest trend suggests data recovery might be excluded, as it relates to âdataâ, leaving a gap in coverage for property which some sources consider excessive.âSilent and AffirmativeThe issue with silent cyber, as with any circumstance presenting unexpected claims activity, is ensuring the premium charged is commensurate with the level of risk, usually referred to as pricing adequacy. Both cyber exposure and the potential impact of losses triggered by cyber perils continues to trend upwards annually. Unexpected claims lead to unexpectedly high loss ratios which clearly erode profits but can also lead to significant damage to an insurerâs financial stability.Insurance companies protect their balance sheets by purchasing reinsurance, but reinsurers face similar issues, they are also vulnerable to silent cyber. Therefore, insurers face the prospect of being denied recoveries from cyber losses and reinsurers are stepping up demands for clarity of coverage. Efforts to resolve the situation have taken two complementary directions: a conscious attempt to price for cyber risk and the introduction of increasingly restrictive exclusion clauses.âThe Status of Cyber ExclusionsCyber |
| Envoyé | Oui |
| Condensat | /group 1900s 1990s 2000s 2003 2020 ability about account accumulation accumulations accurately achievebeginning across actions activity actor actor: actorsthe adapt additionally adequacy adjusted advancedpersistent advantages affect affected affirmative affirmativethe after against aim all allocated allow allowing allows already also altering altogether amid analysis analyzed annually any appetites applies applying approach appropriate apt are are:output arising around aside aspects assets assumptions attack attacks attempt authorities authority automatically backâ balance barriers based basis because become becoming been behavior being bespoke best better between beyond billions board boltman both bottom broad bublil bugâ build building built business businesses but called campaign campaigns can capable capacity capital capture captured captures carriers case catalog catastrophe cause caused certain chain challenged charged circumstance circumstances cl380 cl380* claim claims clarity clash clauses clear clearly com commensurate commercial common community companies company compare complementary complex computational computer concepts concerns conclusioncyber confirm conflicting conscious consequences consider consideration considered considering considers consistent consolidate constraints consumed context continue continues contributed controlling correlating court cover coverage coverages coveragesaccounting covered currently cvedetails cyber damage data ddos decide decision decisions dedicated define defines definition demanding demands denied dependable dependencies:vulnerabilities depleting deploy deployment design designed develop developed developing develops devices dfa didnât differ different differs difficult diminishes direct directions: directly disasters disgruntled distinguish drivers due duty each easily easy economic effective effectively effectiveness efficiently efforts either element eliminating embedded employee empowers enable enables enabling encompass end endorsements ensure ensures ensuring entities equity erode established estimate estimates estimating etc event events ever evolving exaggerated example excessive excluded excluding exclusion exclusions exclusionscyber executed executives existing exists expectation expertiseseveral experts explain explicitly exploit exploitation exploiting exploits exposure exposures exposures*: expressed face failure failureidentify familiar far final financial finding first fit fix flood flooding focus focused focusing following follows:start forced framework frameworks from gain gaining gap general generated generating goal goals goes gosrani gov/vuln granular grow growth harm has have hazard hazards held here high holders how however https://nvd https://www hundreds hypothetical ideal identified identify ideology impact impending implemented implementing important incentives incidents include includes including incorporated increases increasingly individually industry industry: information infrastructures ingredient insights insolvency insurance insured insurers insurerâs integration intend intended intending interruption intimidation introduced introduction investors inviting involved isa isolated issue issues its january just key kovrr kovrrâs landscape large late lately latest latter lead leakage leaving less level leveraging lifespan likely line lines link lloydâs lma5400 lma5401 long longer look looking loss losses made main make makers making malicious manage managed management managers managing manifest many market markets matter may measuring mechanisms meet methods metrics/cvss metricsstress might model modeled modeling modelingexposure models modelsmain more most multifaceted multiple naomi natural need needs networks new nist non not now objective of:assessing offered often once one only operationalized opportunity order originally other others outage output overlap p&c party patch patched percentage perform performed peril perils perpetratorâs person personal phased physical please pml point points policies polic |
| Tags | Tool Vulnerability Threat Prediction |
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| Notes | ★★★ |
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