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Source kovrr.webp Kovrr
Identifiant 8554065
Date de publication 2024-08-08 12:18:25 (vue: 2024-08-08 12:18:25)
Titre En savoir plus le 8 août 2024 Le coût britannique de l'incident de la crowdsstrike Le coût britannique de l'incident de la crowdsstrike: a & acirc; & Pound; 2,3b Shock
Read MoreAugust 8, 2024The UK Cost of the CrowdStrike IncidentThe UK Cost of the CrowdStrike Incident: A £2.3B Shock
Texte The UK Cost of the CrowdStrike Incident‍CrowdStrike made global headlines when an automatic update to their Falcon sensor software crashed more than 8.5 million Microsoft Windows machines globally. This incident resulted in major disruption, including supermarkets being unable to take card payments, TV broadcasters going off the air, and airlines canceling thousands of flights.‍This is a fascinating case because, although not a malicious attack, the repercussions mimic those of one that was. Moreover, this case demonstrates that a single point of failure, including third-party software, can cause outsized impacts. This impact is particularly significant when the specific third-party software is pervasive throughout an organization. An exacerbating feature of the CrowdStrike incident is the relatively small number of vendors dominating the market, which meant that when something went wrong, a large part of the market was affected. The common doomsday scenario has recently been an outage in a major cloud provider (Azure, GCP, AWS). Still, here we again see the potential for errors or attacks via third-party software to cripple businesses on a global scale. It seems that in many cases, the expensive lesson of SolarWinds, that unquestioningly accepting updates can be catastrophic, has not been learned. Hopefully, updates to security software will now get at least the same level of scrutiny as other software updates.‍Another thought-provoking side to the CrowdStrike incident is that an anti-monopoly agreement between the European Commission and Microsoft in 2009 is one of the reasons why CrowdStrike had kernel-level access to Windows, and along with other factors, allowed it to produce the infamous blue screen of death. This instance illustrates that agreements and laws made over a decade ago can have serious unforeseen consequences and that everyone may not always understand the actual risks resulting from these decisions.Economic Impact‍Estimates of the economic impact are few and far between, but Kovrr has calculated that the total cost to the UK economy will likely fall between £1.7 and £2.3 billion ($2.18 and $2.96 billion).‍This value is based upon the uptake of endpoint detection software across the market in combination with CrowdStrike’s market share and assumes an average downtime of 1 working day, 24 hours. For the downtime, we know that 97% of systems have been fixed after nine days, and CrowdStrike released a fix within 20 hours. Examples show that business-critical systems were restored on varying timescales, with Sky News going off air for only a couple of hours and American Airlines grounding 400 flights on the first day and 50 flights the following day. Clearly, fixes continue much beyond 24 hours, and IT staff are still fighting to get all systems back online. However, the later fixed systems are likely to be less business-critical in the short term, so they are unlikely to contribute significantly to business interruption costs.‍Kovrr’s estimate considers the costs associated with business interruption, the response, and post-response expenses, such as litigation, based on Kovvr’s deep understanding of system outage data from past incidents and detailed cost analysis.‍To put the financial consequences of this cyber event in context, Verisk PCS estimated that NotPetya caused a global economic impact of around $10 billion (~$13 billion inflation-adjusted), and Wannacry approximately $4 billion (~$5 billion inflation-adjusted).‍Many larger companies likely have cyber insurance, so they will not have to bear the total cost of this event. Moreover, because of the existence of these policies, the resulting impact on the cyber insurance market is still unfolding. Estimates of the global insured losses range from “mid to high single digit billion USD” and are unlikely to be material for the (re)insurance market. Beazley, the largest insurer of cyber risk in 2023
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