Source |
AlienVault Lab Blog |
Identifiant |
8604836 |
Date de publication |
2024-11-01 19:39:00 (vue: 2024-11-01 22:07:07) |
Titre |
Ngioweb reste actif 7 ans plus tard Ngioweb Remains Active 7 Years Later |
Texte |
Executive Summary
Seven years after its first appearance, the proxy server botnet Ngioweb continues its impactful presence on the internet with barely any relevant changes in its original code. Threat actors have continued to actively use Nbioweb extensively to scan for vulnerable devices (including a new arsenal of exploits) which can be turned into new proxies. All infected systems are then sold in the black market for pennies as residential proxies via Nsocks.
Key Takeaways:
Nsocks offers 30,000 IPs globally and sells them for prices under $1.50 for 24hours of access.
The main targets are residential ISP users, representing more than 75% of the infected users.
The threat actors behind Ngioweb are using dedicated scanners per vulnerability/device to avoid exposing their whole arsenal.
Linear eMerge, Zyxel routers, and Neato vacuums are some of the most targeted devices, but there are many other routers, cameras, and access control systems being targeted.
Ngioweb Background
In August 2018, Check Point published a report and deep analysis on a new multifunctional proxy server botnet named Ngioweb. The proxy service was being loaded by the banking malware family Ramnit. In their report, Check Point reported that the first sample was observed in the second half of 2017.
After the publication of that initial report, additional articles were released. Netlab wrote two blogs that took a deep-dive into the available Ngioweb samples, describing the domain generating algorithm (DGA), communication protocols, command and control (C&C) infrastructure, exploited CVEs for D-Link and Netgear devices, its updated features, and more. For details on the nature of Ngioweb, read Netlab’s blog which includes coverage that remains valid today.[t1] [PA2]
Most recently, in 2024 TrendMicro reported how cybercriminals and nation states are leveraging residential proxy providers to perform malicious actions. For example, one of these nation-state actors, Pawn Storm, had been using a network of hundreds of small office and home office (SOHO) routers through January 2024, when the FBI neutralized part of the botnet. During TrendMicro’s investigation of several EdgeOS infected systems, they identified that in addition to Pawn Storm, the Canadian Pharmacy gang and a threat actor using Ngioweb malware were also abusing the infected device.
Malware Analysis
This last spring 2024, LevelBlue Labs identified scanning activity on vulnerable devices and those devices were carrying Ngioweb as the delivered payload. Depending on the targeted system, the exploit used a downloader for several CPU architectures or directly contained the specific payload for the targeted system.
One of the samples obtained during 2024 (be285b77211d1a33b7ae1665623a9526f58219e20a685b6548bc2d8e857b6b44) allowed LevelBlue Labs to determine that the Ngioweb trojan our researchers identified works very similarly to how Ngioweb worked in 2019, with only a few, slight modifications to Ngioweb’s original code added to elude detections or nosy security researchers.
DGA domains
Domain generation algorithms (DGA) aren’t new to Ngioweb (they have been identified as present in previous reports, specifically when Netlab sinkholed several domains). The Ngioweb sample LevelBlue Labs analyzed uses a very similar algorithm to those that have been identified in the past. The DGA selects domains from a pool of thousands, depending on the malware configurations, and it will then start trying to connect to all of them until it finds a resolving domain. However, in an attempt to avoid the first stage C&C being sinkholed by researchers, the threat actors using the sample LevelBlue Labs analyzed have included a sanity check. All active C&C communications carry a unique and encrypted TXT response that acts as a signature of its authenticity. This response carries |
Notes |
★★★
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Envoyé |
Oui |
Condensat |
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