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2024-06-03 14:00:00 | Ransomwares rebonds: la menace d'extorsion augmente en 2023, les attaquants s'appuient sur les outils accessibles au public et légitimes Ransomware Rebounds: Extortion Threat Surges in 2023, Attackers Rely on Publicly Available and Legitimate Tools (lien direct) |
Written by: Bavi Sadayappan, Zach Riddle, Jordan Nuce, Joshua Shilko, Jeremy Kennelly
A version of this blog post was published to the Mandiant Advantage portal on April 18, 2024. Executive Summary In 2023, Mandiant observed an increase in ransomware activity as compared to 2022, based on a significant rise in posts on data leak sites and a moderate increase in Mandiant-led ransomware investigations. Mandiant observed an increase in the proportion of new ransomware variants compared to new families, with around one third of new families observed in 2023 being variants of previously identified ransomware families. Actors engaged in the post-compromise deployment of ransomware continue to predominately rely on commercially available and legitimate tools to facilitate their intrusion operations. Notably, we continue to observe a decline in the use of Cobalt Strike BEACON, and a corresponding increase in the use of legitimate remote access tools. In almost one third of incidents, ransomware was deployed within 48 hours of initial attacker access. Seventy-six percent (76%) of ransomware deployments took place outside of work hours, with the majority occurring in the early morning. Mandiant\'s recommendations to assist in addressing the threat posed by ransomware are captured in our Ransomware Protection and Containment Strategies: Practical Guidance for Hardening and Protecting Infrastructure, Identities and Endpoints white paper. Introduction Threat actors have remained driven to conduct ransomware operations due to their profitability, particularly in comparison to other types of cyber crime. Mandiant observed an increase in ransomware activity in 2023 compared to 2022, including a 75% increase in posts on data leak sites (DLS), and an over 20% increase in Mandiant-led investigations involving ransomware from 2022 to 2023 (Figure 1). These observations are consistent with other reporting, which shows a record-breaking more than $1 billion USD paid to ransomware attackers in 2023. This illustrates that the slight dip in extortion activity observed in 2022 was an anomaly, potentially due to factors such as the invasion of Ukraine and the leaked CONTI chats. The current resurgence in extortion activity is likely driven by various factors, including the resettling of the cyber criminal ecosystem following a tumultuous year in 2022, new entrants, and new partnerships and ransomware service offerings by actors previously associated with prolific groups that had been disrupted. This blog post provides an overview of the ransomware landscape and common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) directly observed by Mandiant in 2023 ransomware incidents. Our analysis of TTPs relies primarily on data from Mandiant incident response engagements and therefore represe |
Ransomware Data Breach Spam Malware Tool Vulnerability Threat Legislation Prediction Medical Cloud Commercial | ★★★ | |
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2024-05-22 14:00:00 | Extinction de l'IOC?Les acteurs de cyber-espionnage de Chine-Nexus utilisent des réseaux orbes pour augmenter les coûts des défenseurs IOC Extinction? China-Nexus Cyber Espionage Actors Use ORB Networks to Raise Cost on Defenders (lien direct) |
Written by: Michael Raggi
Mandiant Intelligence is tracking a growing trend among China-nexus cyber espionage operations where advanced persistent threat (APT) actors utilize proxy networks known as “ORB networks” (operational relay box networks) to gain an advantage when conducting espionage operations. ORB networks are akin to botnets and are made up of virtual private servers (VPS), as well as compromised Internet of Things (IoT) devices, smart devices, and routers that are often end of life or unsupported by their manufacturers. Building networks of compromised devices allows ORB network administrators to easily grow the size of their ORB network with little effort and create a constantly evolving mesh network that can be used to conceal espionage operations. By using these mesh networks to conduct espionage operations, actors can disguise external traffic between command and control (C2) infrastructure and victim environments including vulnerable edge devices that are being exploited via zero-day vulnerabilities. These networks often use both rented VPS nodes in combination with malware designed to target routers so they can grow the number of devices capable of relaying traffic within compromised networks. Mandiant assesses with moderate confidence that this is an effort to raise the cost of defending an enterprise\'s network and shift the advantage toward espionage operators by evading detection and complicating attribution. Mandiant believes that if network defenders can shift the current enterprise defense paradigm away from treating adversary infrastructure like indicators of compromise (IOCs) and instead toward tracking ORB networks like evolving entities akin to APT groups, enterprises can contend with the rising challenge of ORB networks in the threat landscape. IOC Extinction and the Rise of ORB Networks The cybersecurity industry has reported on the APT practice of ORB network usage in the past as well as on the functional implementation of these networks. Less discussed are the implications of broad ORB network usage by a multitude of China-nexus espionage actors, which has become more common over recent years. The following are three key points and paradigm shifting implications about ORB networks that require enterprise network defenders to adapt the way they think about China-nexus espionage actors: ORB networks undermine the idea of “Actor-Controlled Infrastructure”: ORB networks are infrastructure networks administered by independent entities, contractors, or administrators within the People\'s Republic of China (PRC). They are not controlled by a single APT actor. ORB networks create a network interface, administer a network of compromised nodes, and contract access to those networks to multiple APT actors that will use the ORB networks to carry out their own distinct espionage and reconnaissance. These networks are not controlled by APT actors using them, but rather are temporarily used by these APT actors often to deploy custom tooling more conventionally attributable to known China-nexus adversaries. ORB network infrastructure has a short lifesp |
Malware Tool Vulnerability Threat Prediction Cloud Commercial | APT 15 APT 5 APT 31 | ★★★ |
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2024-02-21 00:00:00 | Dévoiler l'évaluation de l'échéance du programme d'intelligence de cyber-menace de Maniant Unveiling Mandiant\\'s Cyber Threat Intelligence Program Maturity Assessment (lien direct) |
Dans le cadre de l'engagement continu de Google Cloud \\ à améliorer l'état global de cybersécurité pour la société, Mandiant publie aujourd'hui publiquement un Discovery des capacités d'intelligence basées sur les web (ICD) pour aider les organisations commerciales et gouvernementales à évaluerLa maturité de leur programme d'intelligence cyber-menace (CTI).La CIM est conçue pour fournir aux praticiens de la cybersécurité et aux dirigeants du renseignement des menaces une estimation de la façon dont le programme CTI \\ de l'organisation crée un impact organisationnel positif et réduit le risque pour l'entreprise.La CIM joue un critique
As part of Google Cloud\'s continuing commitment to improving the overall state of cybersecurity for society, today Mandiant is publicly releasing a web-based Intelligence Capability Discovery (ICD) to help commercial and governmental organizations evaluate the maturity of their cyber threat intelligence (CTI) program. The ICD is designed to provide cyber security practitioners and threat intelligence leaders with an estimate of how effectively and efficiently the organization\'s CTI program is creating a positive organizational impact and reducing risk for the business. The ICD plays a critical |
Threat Cloud Commercial | ★★★ |
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