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| Src | Date (GMT) | Titre | Description | Tags | Stories | Notes |
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2024-06-05 14:00:00 | Phishing pour l'or: cyber-menaces auxquelles sont confrontés les Jeux olympiques de Paris 2024 Phishing for Gold: Cyber Threats Facing the 2024 Paris Olympics (lien direct) |
Written by: Michelle Cantos, Jamie Collier
Executive Summary Mandiant assesses with high confidence that the Paris Olympics faces an elevated risk of cyber threat activity, including cyber espionage, disruptive and destructive operations, financially-motivated activity, hacktivism, and information operations. Olympics-related cyber threats could realistically impact various targets including event organizers and sponsors, ticketing systems, Paris infrastructure, and athletes and spectators traveling to the event. Mandiant assesses with high confidence that Russian threat groups pose the highest risk to the Olympics. While China, Iran, and North Korea state sponsored actors also pose a moderate to low risk. To reduce the risk of cyber threats associated with the Paris Olympics, organizations should update their threat profiles, conduct security awareness training, and consider travel-related cyber risks. The security community is better prepared for the cyber threats facing the Paris Olympics than it has been for previous Games, thanks to the insights gained from past events. While some entities may face unfamiliar state-sponsored threats, many of the cybercriminal threats will be familiar. While the technical disruption caused by hacktivism and information operations is often temporary, these operations can have an outsized impact during high-profile events with a global audience. Introduction The 2024 Summer Olympics taking place in Paris, France between July and August creates opportunities for a range of cyber threat actors to pursue profit, notoriety, and intelligence. For organizations involved in the event, understanding relevant threats is key to developing a resilient security posture. Defenders should prepare against a variety of threats that will likely be interested in targeting the Games for different reasons: Cyber espionage groups are likely to target the 2024 Olympics for information gathering purposes, due to the volume of government officials and senior decision makers attending. Disruptive and destructive operations could potentially target the Games to cause negative psychological effects and reputational damage. This type of activity could take the form of website defacements, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, the deployment of wiper malware, and operational technology (OT) targeting. As a high profile, large-scale sporting event with a global audience, the Olympics represents an ideal stage for such operations given that the impact of any disruption would be significantly magnified. Information operations will likely leverage interest in the Olympics to spread narratives and disinformation to target audiences. In some cases, threat actors may leverage disruptive and destructive attacks to amplify the spread of particular narratives in hybrid operations. Financially-motivated actors are likely to target the Olympics in v |
Ransomware Malware Threat Studies Mobile Cloud Technical | APT 15 APT 31 APT 42 | ★★ |
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2024-05-22 14:00:00 | Extinction de l'IOC?Les acteurs de cyber-espionnage de Chine-Nexus utilisent des réseaux orbes pour augmenter les coûts des défenseurs IOC Extinction? China-Nexus Cyber Espionage Actors Use ORB Networks to Raise Cost on Defenders (lien direct) |
Written by: Michael Raggi
Mandiant Intelligence is tracking a growing trend among China-nexus cyber espionage operations where advanced persistent threat (APT) actors utilize proxy networks known as “ORB networks” (operational relay box networks) to gain an advantage when conducting espionage operations. ORB networks are akin to botnets and are made up of virtual private servers (VPS), as well as compromised Internet of Things (IoT) devices, smart devices, and routers that are often end of life or unsupported by their manufacturers. Building networks of compromised devices allows ORB network administrators to easily grow the size of their ORB network with little effort and create a constantly evolving mesh network that can be used to conceal espionage operations. By using these mesh networks to conduct espionage operations, actors can disguise external traffic between command and control (C2) infrastructure and victim environments including vulnerable edge devices that are being exploited via zero-day vulnerabilities. These networks often use both rented VPS nodes in combination with malware designed to target routers so they can grow the number of devices capable of relaying traffic within compromised networks. Mandiant assesses with moderate confidence that this is an effort to raise the cost of defending an enterprise\'s network and shift the advantage toward espionage operators by evading detection and complicating attribution. Mandiant believes that if network defenders can shift the current enterprise defense paradigm away from treating adversary infrastructure like indicators of compromise (IOCs) and instead toward tracking ORB networks like evolving entities akin to APT groups, enterprises can contend with the rising challenge of ORB networks in the threat landscape. IOC Extinction and the Rise of ORB Networks The cybersecurity industry has reported on the APT practice of ORB network usage in the past as well as on the functional implementation of these networks. Less discussed are the implications of broad ORB network usage by a multitude of China-nexus espionage actors, which has become more common over recent years. The following are three key points and paradigm shifting implications about ORB networks that require enterprise network defenders to adapt the way they think about China-nexus espionage actors: ORB networks undermine the idea of “Actor-Controlled Infrastructure”: ORB networks are infrastructure networks administered by independent entities, contractors, or administrators within the People\'s Republic of China (PRC). They are not controlled by a single APT actor. ORB networks create a network interface, administer a network of compromised nodes, and contract access to those networks to multiple APT actors that will use the ORB networks to carry out their own distinct espionage and reconnaissance. These networks are not controlled by APT actors using them, but rather are temporarily used by these APT actors often to deploy custom tooling more conventionally attributable to known China-nexus adversaries. ORB network infrastructure has a short lifesp |
Malware Tool Vulnerability Threat Prediction Cloud Commercial | APT 15 APT 5 APT 31 | ★★★ |
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2022-03-24 07:00:00 | Mwise: une évolution du sommet de la cyber-défense mandiante mWISE: An Evolution of Mandiant Cyber Defense Summit (lien direct) |
J'ai commencé à travailler dans la cybersécurité il y a plus de 20 ans - je faisais partie de la sécurité RSA, et j'étais responsable du marketing sortant pour les Amériques, ainsi qu'un événement peu connu à laTemps appelé RSA Conference (RSAC).Après ma première année, j'ai élargi l'attention et j'ai aidé à développer l'événement à l'échelle mondiale, atteignant un pic de 50 000 participants.
Avant de rejoindre Mandiant, j'ai vu la société comme unique et axée sur la mission pour rendre le monde plus sûr des menaces.En particulier, l'industrie a vraiment pris note des activités néfastes de l'État-nation avec la recherche en profondeur Mandiant publié en 2013 sur Apt1
I started working in cyber security over 20 years ago-I was part of RSA Security, and was responsible for outbound marketing for the Americas, as well as a little-known event at the time called RSA Conference (RSAC). After my first year, I expanded the focus and helped to grow the event globally, reaching a peak of 50,000 attendees. Before joining Mandiant, I saw the company as unique and mission-focused-aspiring to make the world safer from threats. In particular, the industry really took notice of nefarious nation-state activities with the deep research Mandiant published in 2013 on APT1 |
Conference | APT 1 | ★★★ |
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2018-09-13 11:00:00 | APT10 ciblant les sociétés japonaises à l'aide de TTPS mis à jour APT10 Targeting Japanese Corporations Using Updated TTPs (lien direct) |
Introduction
En juillet 2018, les appareils FireEye ont détecté et bloqué ce qui semble être une activité APT10 (Menupass) ciblant le secteur des médias japonais.APT10 est un groupe de cyber-espionnage chinois que Fireeye a suivi depuis 2009, et ils ont une histoire de ciblant les entités japonaises .
Dans cette campagne, le groupe a envoyé des e-mails de phishing de lance contenant des documents malveillants qui ont conduit à l'installation de la porte dérobée Uppercut.Cette porte dérobée est bien connue dans la communauté de la sécurité comme Anel , et il venait en bêta ou en RC (candidat à la libération) jusqu'à récemment.Une partie de cet article de blog discutera du
Introduction In July 2018, FireEye devices detected and blocked what appears to be APT10 (Menupass) activity targeting the Japanese media sector. APT10 is a Chinese cyber espionage group that FireEye has tracked since 2009, and they have a history of targeting Japanese entities. In this campaign, the group sent spear phishing emails containing malicious documents that led to the installation of the UPPERCUT backdoor. This backdoor is well-known in the security community as ANEL, and it used to come in beta or RC (release candidate) until recently. Part of this blog post will discuss the |
Technical | APT 10 APT 10 | ★★★★ |
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2017-06-06 17:30:00 | Privilèges et références: phisés à la demande de conseil Privileges and Credentials: Phished at the Request of Counsel (lien direct) |
Résumé
En mai et juin 2017, Fireeye a observé une campagne de phishing ciblant au moins sept sociétés mondiales de droit et d'investissement.Nous avons associé cette campagne à APT19, un groupe que nous évaluons est composé de pigistes, avec un certain degré de parrainage par le gouvernement chinois.
APT19 a utilisé trois techniques différentes pour tenter de compromettre les cibles.Début mai, les leurres de phishing ont exploité les pièces jointes RTF qui ont exploité la vulnérabilité Microsoft Windows décrite dans CVE 2017-0199.Vers la fin de mai, APT19 est passé à l'utilisation de documents Microsoft Excel (XLSM) compatibles avec macro.Dans le
Summary In May and June 2017, FireEye observed a phishing campaign targeting at least seven global law and investment firms. We have associated this campaign with APT19, a group that we assess is composed of freelancers, with some degree of sponsorship by the Chinese government. APT19 used three different techniques to attempt to compromise targets. In early May, the phishing lures leveraged RTF attachments that exploited the Microsoft Windows vulnerability described in CVE 2017-0199. Toward the end of May, APT19 switched to using macro-enabled Microsoft Excel (XLSM) documents. In the |
Vulnerability | APT 19 | ★★★★ |
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2017-04-06 14:00:00 | APT10 (Menupass Group): Nouveaux outils, la dernière campagne de la campagne mondiale de la menace de longue date APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat (lien direct) |
APT10 Background
APT10 (Menupass Group) est un groupe de cyber-espionnage chinois que Fireeye a suivi depuis 2009. Ils ont historiquement ciblé la construction et l'ingénierie, l'aérospatiale et les sociétés de télécommunications et les gouvernements aux États-Unis, en Europe et au Japon.Nous pensons que le ciblage de ces industries a soutenu les objectifs de sécurité nationale chinoise, notamment l'acquisition de précieuses informations militaires et de renseignement ainsi que le vol de données commerciales confidentielles pour soutenir les sociétés chinoises.Pwc et Bae ont récemment publié un blog conjoint >
APT10 Background APT10 (MenuPass Group) is a Chinese cyber espionage group that FireEye has tracked since 2009. They have historically targeted construction and engineering, aerospace, and telecom firms, and governments in the United States, Europe, and Japan. We believe that the targeting of these industries has been in support of Chinese national security goals, including acquiring valuable military and intelligence information as well as the theft of confidential business data to support Chinese corporations. PwC and BAE recently issued a joint blog detailing extensive APT10 activity. |
Threat Technical | APT 10 APT 10 | ★★★★ |
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2015-07-13 08:31:00 | Démontrant Hustle, les groupes de l'APT chinois utilisent rapidement une vulnérabilité zéro-jour (CVE-2015-5119) après une fuite d'équipe de piratage Demonstrating Hustle, Chinese APT Groups Quickly Use Zero-Day Vulnerability (CVE-2015-5119) Following Hacking Team Leak (lien direct) |
Le Fireeye en tant qu'équipe de service a détecté des campagnes de phishing indépendantes menées par deux groupes de menace persistante avancés chinois (APT) que nous suivons, APT3 et APT18.Chaque groupe de menaces a rapidement profité d'une vulnérabilité zéro-jour (CVE-2015-5119), qui a été divulguée dans la divulgation des données internes de l'équipe de piratage.Adobe a publié un patch pour la vulnérabilité le 8 juillet 2015. Avant ce patcha été publié, les groupes ont lancé des campagnes de phishing contre plusieurs sociétés de l'aérospatiale et de la défense, de la construction et de l'ingénierie, de l'éducation, de l'énergie
The FireEye as a Service team detected independent phishing campaigns conducted by two Chinese advanced persistent threat (APT) groups that we track, APT3 and APT18. Each threat group quickly took advantage of a zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2015-5119), which was leaked in the disclosure of Hacking Team\'s internal data. Adobe released a patch for the vulnerability on July 8, 2015. Before that patch was released, the groups launched phishing campaigns against multiple companies in the aerospace and defense, construction and engineering, education, energy |
Vulnerability Threat | APT 18 APT 3 | ★★★★ |
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2014-10-27 03:00:42 | Malware APT28: une fenêtre sur les opérations de cyber-espionnage de la Russie? APT28 Malware: A Window into Russia\\'s Cyber Espionage Operations? (lien direct) |
Le rôle des acteurs de l'État-nation dans les cyberattaques a peut-être été le plus largement révélé en février 2013 lorsque mandiant href = "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/mandiant-expose-apt1-chinas-cyber-espionage-units" cible = "_ Blank"> Rapport APT1, en Chine.Aujourd'hui, nous publions un nouveau rapport: apt28:Une fenêtre sur les opérations de cyber-espionnage de la Russie?
Ce rapport se concentre sur un groupe de menaces que nous avons désigné comme APT28.Alors que les logiciels malveillants d'APT28 \\ sont assez connus dans la communauté de la cybersécurité, notre rapport détaille des informations supplémentaires exposant des opérations en cours et ciblées qui, selon nous, indiquent un sponsor gouvernemental basé à Moscou.
dans
The role of nation-state actors in cyber attacks was perhaps most widely revealed in February 2013 when Mandiant released the APT1 report, which detailed a professional cyber espionage group based in China. Today we release a new report: APT28: A Window Into Russia\'s Cyber Espionage Operations? This report focuses on a threat group that we have designated as APT28. While APT28\'s malware is fairly well known in the cybersecurity community, our report details additional information exposing ongoing, focused operations that we believe indicate a government sponsor based in Moscow. In |
Malware Threat | APT 28 APT 28 APT 1 | ★★★★ |
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2014-09-03 18:00:29 | Le groupe APT préféré de Darwin \\ Darwin\\'s Favorite APT Group (lien direct) |
Introduction
Les attaquants appelés APT12 (également connu sous le nom d'Ixeshe, Dyncalc et DNSCALC) ont récemment lancé une nouvelle campagne ciblant les organisations au Japon et à Taïwan.L'APT12 serait un groupe de cyber-espionnage qui aurait des liens avec l'armée de libération du peuple chinois.Les objectifs d'APT12 \\ sont conformes aux objectifs de la République de Chine (PRC) de la République de Chine (PRC).Les intrusions et les campagnes menées par ce groupe sont en ligne avec les objectifs de la RPC et l'intérêt personnel à Taïwan.De plus, les nouvelles campagnes que nous avons révélées mettent davantage met en évidence la corrélation entre les groupes APT qui cessent et réoulèvent
Introduction The attackers referred to as APT12 (also known as IXESHE, DynCalc, and DNSCALC) recently started a new campaign targeting organizations in Japan and Taiwan. APT12 is believed to be a cyber espionage group thought to have links to the Chinese People\'s Liberation Army. APT12\'s targets are consistent with larger People\'s Republic of China (PRC) goals. Intrusions and campaigns conducted by this group are in-line with PRC goals and self-interest in Taiwan. Additionally, the new campaigns we uncovered further highlight the correlation between APT groups ceasing and retooling |
Technical | APT 12 | ★★★★ |
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2013-02-19 07:00:45 | Mandiant expose APT1 & # 8211;L'une des unités de cyber-espionnage de Chine et libère 3 000 indicateurs Mandiant Exposes APT1 – One of China\\'s Cyber Espionage Units & Releases 3,000 Indicators (lien direct) |
Aujourd'hui, le Mandiant & Reg;Intelligence Center ™ a publié un rapport sans précédent Exposer la campagne d'espionnage informatique de l'APT1 \\ à l'échelle de l'entreprise.APT1 est l'une des dizaines de groupes de menaces, des pistes mandiantes du monde entier et nous le considérons comme l'un des plus prolifiques en termes de quantité d'informations qu'elle a volée.
Les faits saillants du rapport incluent:
Preuve liant APT1 au 2e Bureau de la Chine de la Chine du Département général de l'Armée de libération (PLA) \'s (GSD) 3e département (désignateur de couverture militaire 61398).
Une chronologie de l'espionnage économique de l'APT1 réalisée depuis 2006
Today, The Mandiant® Intelligence Center™ released an unprecedented report exposing APT1\'s multi-year, enterprise-scale computer espionage campaign. APT1 is one of dozens of threat groups Mandiant tracks around the world and we consider it to be one of the most prolific in terms of the sheer quantity of information it has stolen. Highlights of the report include: Evidence linking APT1 to China\'s 2nd Bureau of the People\'s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department\'s (GSD) 3rd Department (Military Cover Designator 61398). A timeline of APT1 economic espionage conducted since 2006 |
Threat | APT 1 | ★★★★ |
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