What's new arround internet
| Src | Date (GMT) | Titre | Description | Tags | Stories | Notes |
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2024-05-13 07:18:13 | Mémoire de sécurité: des millions de messages distribuent un ransomware noir Lockbit Security Brief: Millions of Messages Distribute LockBit Black Ransomware (lien direct) |
Que s'est-il passé & nbsp; À partir du 24 avril 2024 et en continuant quotidiennement pendant environ une semaine, Proofpoint a observé des campagnes à volume élevé avec des millions de messages facilités par le botnet Phorpiex et la livraison de ransomware Black Lockbit.C'est la première fois que des chercheurs ont observé des échantillons de ransomwares noirs Lockbit (AKA Lockbit 3.0) livrés via Phorphiex dans des volumes aussi élevés.L'échantillon Black Lockbit de cette campagne a probablement été construit à partir du constructeur de lockbit qui a été divulgué au cours de l'été 2023. & nbsp; & nbsp; Les messages provenaient de «Jenny Green» avec l'adresse e-mail de Jenny @ GSD [.] Com.Les e-mails contenaient un fichier zip joint avec un exécutable (.exe).Cet exécutable a été observé en téléchargeant la charge utile Black Lockbit à partir de l'infrastructure de botnet Phorpiex.& nbsp; De: «Jenny Green» Jenny @ gsd [.] Com & nbsp; Sujet: Votre document et NBSP; Pièce jointe: document.zip & nbsp; Exemple de message de «Jenny Green». & Nbsp; Les e-mails ont ciblé les organisations dans plusieurs verticales à travers le monde et semblaient opportunistes par rapport à spécifiquement ciblé.Bien que la chaîne d'attaque de cette campagne n'était pas nécessairement complexe par rapport à ce qui a été observé sur le paysage de la cybercriminalité jusqu'à présent en 2024, la nature à volume élevé des messages et l'utilisation du ransomware comme charge utile de première étape sont notables.& nbsp; La chaîne d'attaque nécessite l'interaction de l'utilisateur et démarre lorsqu'un utilisateur final exécute l'exécutable compressé dans le fichier zip joint.Le binaire .exe initiera un appel de réseau à l'infrastructure de botnet Phorphiex.En cas de succès, l'échantillon Black Lockbit est téléchargé et fait exploser sur le système final de l'utilisateur \\ où il présente un comportement de vol de données et saisit le système, cryptant des fichiers et terminant les services.Dans une campagne antérieure, le ransomware a été directement exécuté et aucune activité de réseau n'a été observée, empêchant les détections ou les blocs de réseau. & NBSP; Note de rançon de l'échantillon noir Lockbit. & Nbsp; Attribution et NBSP; La recherche sur les menaces de preuves n'a pas attribué cette campagne à un acteur de menace connu.Phorpiex est un botnet de base conçu pour offrir des logiciels malveillants via des campagnes d'email à haut volume.Il fonctionne comme un logiciel malveillant en tant que service et a recueilli un grand portefeuille de clients d'acteurs de menace plus d'une décennie de fonctionnement (des versions antérieures ont été observées pour la première fois dans le paysage des menaces vers 2011).Depuis 2018, le botnet a été observé pour effectuer des activités d'exfiltration de données et de livraison de ransomwares.Malgré les efforts de perturbation au fil des ans, le botnet persiste. & Nbsp; & nbsp; ProofPoint a observé un groupe d'activités utilisant le même alias «Jenny Green» avec des leurres liés à «votre document» livrant des logiciels malveillants Phorpiex dans les campagnes de messagerie depuis au moins janvier 2023. & nbsp; & nbsp; Lockbit Black (AKA Lockbit 3.0) est une version de Lockbit Ransomware qui a été officiellement publié avec des capacités améliorées par les affiliés des ransomwares en juin 2022. En septembre 2022, le constructeur de ransomware confidentiel a été divulgué via Twitter.À l'époque, plusieurs parties ont revendiqué l'attribution, mais les affiliés de Lockbit ont affirmé que le constructeur avait été divulgué par un développeur mécontent.La fuite permet à quiconque d'adopter la configuration des versions personnalisées. & Nbsp; & nbsp; Pourquoi c'est important et NBSP; Le ransomware en tant que charge utile de première étape attachée aux campagnes de menace par e-mail n'est pas quelque chose que le point de preuve a observé en volumes élevé de | Ransomware Malware Threat | ||
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2024-05-08 06:00:27 | Comment les attaquants utilisent-ils des e-mails usurpés pour détourner vos communications commerciales?4 scénarios de risque How Do Attackers Use Spoofed Email to Hijack Your Business Communications? 4 Risk Scenarios (lien direct) |
When you hear the term “spoofed” email, does business email compromise (BEC) come to mind? It does for many people-especially security leaders. BEC is a form of email fraud, and it has been a top concern for chief information security officers for years. BEC scams are a costly problem. The latest Internet Crime Report from the FBI\'s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) notes that adjusted losses from BEC were $2.9 billion last year. Since 2013, accumulated financial losses due to BEC have reached nearly $53 billion. Spoofing is impersonation, and it is the essence of email fraud. It is also one of the most common techniques used in other types of attacks like phishing and ransomware. Your business, like many, probably focuses on stopping spoofed emails before they can reach employees\' inboxes. However, there is more to worry about. Spoofed email has the potential to damage your brand reputation and jeopardize your business ecosystem, too. In this post, we will explore various impersonation risk scenarios. But first, let\'s look at some common tactics. Impersonation tactics Here are some common methods bad actors use to impersonate others so they can further their attacks. Display name spoofing. The display name appears in the “From:” field of an email. It is the easiest email identifier to manipulate. Attackers forge email headers so that client software displays the fraudulent sender, which most users take at face value. Domain spoofing. Bad actors will use an exact match of an organization\'s domain to launch this type of fraud attack. Attackers who engage in domain spoofing will attempt to imitate the sending server or sending domain. Lookalike domains. Third parties can register lookalike domains and send email that appears to have come from a trusted source. Compromised supplier accounts. In some advanced attacks, attackers will compromise an account from a supplier that works with the business that they want to target. They will use the compromised supplier account to hijack the email communication between their target and its supplier. Eventually, attackers are in a position to launch an attack or solicit fraudulent payment or sensitive data. Attack scenarios Now, let\'s dive into how attackers can use spoofed emails to exploit the trusted relationships you have with your customers, business partners, suppliers and employees. Scenario 1: Impersonate you to target your employees You are probably most familiar with the first scenario, where attackers pretend to be someone within your company, like your CEO or manager. The scam often starts with a simple lure that seems to be a benign message like: How is your day? Are you at your desk? Can you help me with something urgent? Once attackers get a victim to engage, the conversation evolves. The bad actor may request the victim to purchase gift cards for them, proceed with a fraudulent payment, or share confidential data. Not only can attackers impersonate executives, but they can also pretend to be general employees asking human resources to redirect their payrolls. In short, it doesn\'t matter what a victim\'s role is. Anyone can be impersonated to target anyone within an organization. An example of a simple lure where the attacker used display name spoofing to impersonate Ken, the CEO. Another example of a BEC lure where an attacker used a lookalike domain of Watertronics (vs. waltertronics, in the example) to spoof their CEO. Scenario 2: Exploit your suppliers or business partners to target your employees The most common theme in this scenario is supplier invoicing fraud. Bad actors will exploit a company\'s suppliers using tactics such as malicious lookalike domains of suppliers or compromised supplier accounts to either send a fake invoice or request the victim to redirect the payment to a bank account that the attackers control. (Sometimes, we see multiple | Ransomware Malware Tool Threat Cloud | ★★★ | |
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2024-05-06 05:52:32 | La sécurité des e-mails est désormais redéfinie avec des capacités de protection des menaces adaptatives dans toute la chaîne de livraison Email Security is Now Redefined with Adaptive Threat Protection Capabilities Across the Entire Delivery Chain (lien direct) |
Another RSA Conference has arrived, and with it comes the gold standard report for our industry, the Verizon DBIR. And for yet another year, it concludes the same thing: the human element is central to the vast majority of breaches (76% this year), especially the ones that matter, from ransomware to BEC to data loss. The very first word of the 2024 DBIR is also not new; it\'s “phishing”. Email security has always been central to human risk: it\'s the #1 way users encounter threats, the #1 way users make mistakes, and the #1 way attackers get what they want, from credentials to wire transfers to malware infections. Proofpoint has a long history of stopping more human-targeted threats than anyone else. Our long history of firsts includes the first ML models to stop unwanted messages, the first rewriting of URLs for click-time protection, and the first connection of a malware sandbox to email. But attackers have continued to innovate and so have we – starting now, we\'re setting a new standard for protection across the entire email delivery chain. Building an Unmatched Detection Ensemble What organizations need in email security is simple to describe but hard to do: a single solution to protect against every type of threat, every time, every way a user may encounter it, using every form of detection. Our detection ensemble was already the industry\'s most effective, including threat intelligence, static analysis, sandboxing, click-time protection, and our unique set of Nexus AI models. I\'m thrilled to announce that we have now added the industry\'s first ever pre-delivery protections to stop social engineering and malicious URLs, as well as our newly integrated post-delivery behavioral AI, Proofpoint Adaptive Email Security. * New capability According to our data across more than 500,000 organizations, including 87 of the Fortune 100, attackers rely on two techniques more frequently than any others: text-based social engineering and malicious URLs. While we already detect both these threat types at the highest rates in the industry, we wanted to push the envelope – not just detecting them, but detecting them as early as possible. To make this a reality, we optimized the performance of our Nexus AI LLM-based detection model by 10X, enabling us to use semantic analysis to interpret a malicious message\'s intent (such as invoicing fraud), regardless of the words they use or even the language they write in. In parallel, we built the capability for our gateway to hold messages with suspicious URLs until they are sandboxed. The result is the most formidable set of defense in-depth measures available for organizations to prevent attacks from reaching their targets. Continuous End-to-End Detection with Proofpoint Adaptive Email Security Joining our pre-delivery enhancements is Proofpoint Adaptive Email Security, our API-based offering that integrates with Microsoft 365 and applies our broad detection ensemble to stop advanced threats, including BEC, social engineering and lateral phishing messages. Once deployed, Adaptive Email Security enriches all detections with easy-to-understand explanations about behavioral anomalies observed. Additionally, it automatically quarantines high confidence threats, while delivering real-time coaching using contextual warning banners to alert users to the risks in social engineering and BEC-type emails that don\'t contain an obvious malicious payload. Insight into a malicious message generated by Adaptive Email Security The Next Level While we\'re thrilled for you all to experience our latest set of innovations, we know we can still do more to help you protect your people. That takes two main forms: continuing to lead with Nexus AI, and deepening and strengthening our ecosystem partnerships. Nexus AI: The value of our proprietary data is enhanced by contextual insights and in-depth classification from our leading team of threat researchers and data scientists, who track adversaries, analyze evolving attacker tradecraft, profile data exfiltration pa | Ransomware Malware Threat Conference | ★★★ | |
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2024-04-17 18:00:31 | Réduire le désabonnement d'incitation avec une composition de modèle explosive Reducing Prompting Churn with Exploding Template Composition (lien direct) |
Engineering Insights is an ongoing blog series that gives a behind-the-scenes look into the technical challenges, lessons and advances that help our customers protect people and defend data every day. Each post is a firsthand account by one of our engineers about the process that led up to a Proofpoint innovation. In the nascent world of large language models (LLMs), prompt engineering has emerged as a critical discipline. However, as LLM applications expand, it is becoming a more complex challenge to manage and maintain a library of related prompts. At Proofpoint, we developed Exploding Prompts to manage the complexity through exploding template composition. We first created the prompts to generate soft labels for our data across a multitude of models and labeling concerns. But Exploding Prompts has also enabled use cases for LLMs that were previously locked away because managing the prompt lifecycle is so complex. Recently, we\'ve seen exciting progress in the field of automated prompt generation and black-box prompt optimization through DSPy. Black-box optimization requires hand-labeled data to generate prompts automatically-a luxury that\'s not always an option. You can use Exploding Prompts to generate labels for unlabeled data, as well as for any prompt-tuning application without a clear (or tractable) objective for optimization. In the future, Exploding Prompts could be used with DSPy to achieve a human-in-the-loop feedback cycle. We are also thrilled to announce that Exploding Prompts is now an open-source release. We encourage you to explore the code and consider how you might help make it even better. The challenge: managing complexity in prompt engineering Prompt engineering is not just about crafting queries that guide intelligent systems to generate the desired outputs; it\'s about doing it at scale. As developers push the boundaries of what is possible with LLMs, the need to manage a vast array of prompts efficiently becomes more pressing. Traditional methods often need manual adjustments and updates across numerous templates, which is a process that\'s both time-consuming and error-prone. To understand this problem, just consider the following scenario. You need to label a large quantity of data. You have multiple labels that can apply to each piece of data. And each label requires its own prompt template. You timebox your work and find a prompt template that achieves desirable results for your first label. Happily, most of the template is reusable. So, for the next label, you copy-paste the template and change the portion of the prompt that is specific to the label itself. You continue doing this until you figure out the section of the template that has persisted through each version of your labels can be improved. Now you now face the task of iterating through potentially dozens of templates to make a minor update to each of the files. Once you finish, your artificial intelligence (AI) provider releases a new model that outperforms your current model. But there\'s a catch. The new model requires another small update to each of your templates. To your chagrin, the task of managing the lifecycle of your templates soon takes up most of your time. The solution: exploding prompts from automated dependency graphs Prompt templating is a popular way to manage complexity. Exploding Prompts builds on prompt templating by introducing an “explode” operation. This allows a few single-purpose templates to explode into a multitude of prompts. This is accomplished by building dependency graphs automatically from the directory structure and the content of prompt template files. At its core, Exploding Prompts embodies the “write it once” philosophy. It ensures that every change made in a template correlates with a single update in one file. This enhances efficiency and consistency, as updates automatically propagate across all relevant generated prompts. This separation ensures that updates can be made with speed and efficiency so you can focus on innovation rather th | Malware Tool Threat Studies Cloud Technical | ★★★ | |
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2024-04-16 06:00:54 | De l'ingénierie sociale aux abus DMARC: Ta427 \\'s Art of Information Gathering From Social Engineering to DMARC Abuse: TA427\\'s Art of Information Gathering (lien direct) |
Key takeaways TA427 regularly engages in benign conversation starter campaigns to establish contact with targets for long-term exchanges of information on topics of strategic importance to the North Korean regime. In addition to using specially crafted lure content, TA427 heavily leverages think tank and non-governmental organization-related personas to legitimize its emails and increase the chances that targets will engage with the threat actor. To craftily pose as its chosen personas, TA427 uses a few tactics including DMARC abuse in concert with free email addresses, typosquatting, and private email account spoofing. TA427 has also incorporated web beacons for initial reconnaissance of its targets, establishing basic information like that the email account is active. Overview Proofpoint researchers track numerous state-sponsored and state-aligned threat actors. TA427 (also known as Emerald Sleet, APT43, THALLIUM or Kimsuky), a Democratic People\'s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) aligned group working in support of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, is particularly prolific in email phishing campaigns targeting experts for insight into US and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) foreign policy. Since 2023, TA427 has directly solicited foreign policy experts for their opinions on nuclear disarmament, US-ROK policies, and sanction topics via benign conversation starting emails. In recent months, Proofpoint researchers have observed (Figure 1) a steady, and at times increasing, stream of this activity. While our researchers have consistently observed TA427 rely on social engineering tactics and regularly rotating its email infrastructure, in December 2023 the threat actor began to abuse lax Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC) policies to spoof various personas and, in February 2024, began incorporating web beacons for target profiling. It is this initial engagement, and the tactics successfully leveraged by TA427, which this blog is focused on. Figure 1. Volume of TA427 phishing campaigns observed between January 2023 and March 2024. Social engineering TA427 is a savvy social engineering expert whose campaigns are likely in support of North Korea\'s strategic intelligence collection efforts on US and ROK foreign policy initiatives. Based on the targets identified and the information sought, it is believed that TA427\'s goal is to augment North Korean intelligence and inform its foreign policy negotiation tactics (example Figure 2). TA427 is known to engage its targets for extended periods of time through a series of benign conversations to build a rapport with targets that can occur over weeks to months. They do so by constantly rotating which aliases are used to engage with the targets on similar subject matter. Figure 2. Example of TA427 campaign focused on US policy during an election year. Using timely, relevant lure content (as seen in Figure 3) customized for each victim, and often spoofing individuals in the DPRK research space with whom the victim is familiar to encourage engagement, targets are often requested to share their thoughts on these topics via email or a formal research paper or article. Malware or credential harvesting are never directly sent to the targets without an exchange of multiple messages, and based on Proofpoint visibility, rarely utilized by the threat actor. It is possible that TA427 can fulfill its intelligence requirements by directly asking targets for their opinions or analysis rather than from an infection. Additionally, insight gained from the correspondence is likely used to improve targeting of the victim organization and establish rapport for later questions and engagement. Figure 3. Timeline of real-world events based on international press reporting, side-by-side with Proofpoint observed subject lures. Lure content often includes invitations to attend events about North Korean policies regarding international affairs, questions regarding topics such as how deterr | Malware Tool Threat Conference | APT 37 APT 43 | ★★ |
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2024-04-12 06:00:03 | Arrêt de cybersécurité du mois: vaincre les attaques de création d'applications malveillantes Cybersecurity Stop of the Month: Defeating Malicious Application Creation Attacks (lien direct) |
This blog post is part of a monthly series, Cybersecurity Stop of the Month, which explores the ever-evolving tactics of today\'s cybercriminals. It focuses on the critical first three steps in the attack chain in the context of email threats. The goal of this series is to help you understand how to fortify your defenses to protect people and defend data against emerging threats in today\'s dynamic threat landscape. The critical first three steps of the attack chain-reconnaissance, initial compromise and persistence. So far in this series, we have examined these types of attacks: Supplier compromise EvilProxy SocGholish eSignature phishing QR code phishing Telephone-oriented attack delivery (TOAD) Payroll diversion MFA manipulation Supply chain compromise Multilayered malicious QR code attack In this post, we examine an emerging threat-the use of malicious cloud applications created within compromised cloud tenants following account takeover. We refer to it as MACT, for short. Background Cloud account takeover (ATO) attacks are a well-known risk. Research by Proofpoint found that last year more than 96% of businesses were actively targeted by these attacks and about 60% had at least one incident. Financial damages reached an all-time high. These findings are unsettling. But there is more for businesses to worry about. Cybercriminals and state-sponsored entities are rapidly adopting advanced post-ATO techniques. And they have embraced the use of malicious and abused OAuth apps. In January 2024, Microsoft revealed that a nation-state attacker had compromised its cloud environments and stolen valuable data. This attack was attributed to TA421 (aka Midnight Blizzard and APT29), which are threat groups that have been attributed to Russia\'s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Attackers exploited existing OAuth apps and created new ones within hijacked cloud tenants. After the incident, CISA issued a new advisory for businesses that rely on cloud infrastructures. Proofpoint threat researchers observed attackers pivoting to the use of OAuth apps from compromised-and often verified-cloud tenants. Threat actors take advantage of the trust that\'s associated with verified or recognized identities to spread cloud malware threats as well as establish persistent access to sensitive resources. The scenario Proofpoint monitors a malicious campaign named MACT Campaign 1445. It combines a known tactic used by cloud ATO attackers with new tactics, techniques and procedures. So far, it has affected dozens of businesses and users. In this campaign, attackers use hijacked user accounts to create malicious internal apps. In tandem, they also conduct reconnaissance, exfiltrate data and launch additional attacks. Attackers use a unique anomalous URL for the malicious OAuth apps\' reply URL-a local loopback with port 7823. This port is used for TCP traffic. It is also associated with a known Windows Remote Access Trojan (RAT). Recently, Proofpoint researchers found four accounts at a large company in the hospitality industry compromised by attackers. In a matter of days, attackers used these accounts to create four distinct malicious OAuth apps. The threat: How did the attack happen? Here is a closer look at how the attack unfolded. Initial access vectors. Attackers used a reverse proxy toolkit to target cloud user accounts. They sent individualized phishing lures to these users, which enabled them to steal their credentials as well as multifactor authentication (MFA) tokens. A shared PDF file with an embedded phishing URL that attackers used to steal users\' credentials. Unauthorized access (cloud account takeover). Once attackers had stolen users\' credentials, they established unauthorized access to the four targeted accounts. They logged in to several native Microsoft 365 sign-in apps, including “Azure Portal” and “Office Home.” Cloud malware (post-access OAuth app creat | Spam Malware Tool Threat Cloud | APT 29 | ★★★ |
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2024-04-11 13:27:54 | Revisiter MACT: Applications malveillantes dans des locataires cloud crédibles Revisiting MACT: Malicious Applications in Credible Cloud Tenants (lien direct) |
For years, the Proofpoint Cloud Research team has been particularly focused on the constantly changing landscape of cloud malware threats. While precise future predictions remain elusive, a retrospective examination of 2023 enabled us to discern significant shifts and trends in threat actors\' behaviors, thereby informing our projections for the developments expected in 2024. There is no doubt that one of the major, and most concerning, trends observed in 2023 was the increased adoption of malicious and abused OAuth applications by cybercriminals and state-sponsored actors. In January, Microsoft announced they, among other organizations, were targeted by a sophisticated nation-state attack. It seems that the significant impact of this attack, which was attributed to TA421 (AKA Midnight Blizzard and APT29), largely stemmed from the strategic exploitation of pre-existing OAuth applications, coupled with the creation of new malicious applications within compromised environments. Adding to a long list of data breaches, this incident emphasizes the inherent potential risk that users and organizations face when using inadequately protected cloud environments. Expanding on early insights shared in our 2021 blog, where we first explored the emerging phenomenon of application creation attacks and armed with extensive recent discoveries, we delve into the latest developments concerning this threat in our 2024 update. In this blog, we will: Define key fundamental terms pertinent to the realm of cloud malware and OAuth threats. Examine some of the current tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed by threat actors as part of their account-takeover (ATO) kill chain. Provide specific IOCs related to recently detected threats and campaigns. Highlight effective strategies and solutions to help protect organizations and users against cloud malware threats. Basic terminology OAuth (Open Authorization) 2.0. OAuth is an open standard protocol that enables third-party applications to access a user\'s data without exposing credentials. It is widely used to facilitate secure authentication and authorization processes. Line-of-business (LOB) applications. LOB apps (also known as second-party apps) typically refer to applications created by a user within their cloud environment in order to support a specific purpose for the organization. Cloud malware. A term usually referring to malicious applications created, utilized and proliferated by threat actors. Malicious apps can be leveraged for various purposes, such as: mailbox access, file access, data exfiltration, internal reconnaissance, and maintaining persistent access to specific resources. MACT (Malicious Applications Created in Compromised Credible Tenants). A common technique wherein threat actors create new applications within hijacked environments, exploiting unauthorized access to compromised accounts to initiate additional attacks and establish a persistent foothold within impacted cloud tenants. Apphish. A term denoting the fusion of cloud apps-based malware with phishing tactics, mainly by utilizing OAuth 2.0 infrastructure to implement open redirection attacks. Targeted users could be taken to a designated phishing webpage upon clicking an app\'s consent link. Alternatively, redirection to a malicious webpage could follow authorizing or declining an application\'s consent request. Abused OAuth applications. Benign apps that are authorized or used by attackers, usually following a successful account takeover, to perform illegitimate activities. What we are seeing Already in 2020, we witnessed a rise in malicious OAuth applications targeting cloud users, with bad actors utilizing increasingly sophisticated methods such as application impersonation and diverse lures. In October 2022, Proofpoint researchers demonstrated how different threat actors capitalized on the global relevance of the COVID-19 pandemic to spread malware and phishing threats. Proofpoint has also seen this trend include the propagation of malicious OAuth applications seamlessly integ | Malware Threat Prediction Cloud | APT 29 | ★★★ |
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2024-04-11 06:23:43 | FAQS de l'état de l'État 2024 du rapport Phish, partie 1: Le paysage des menaces FAQs from the 2024 State of the Phish Report, Part 1: The Threat Landscape (lien direct) |
In this two-part blog series, we will address many of the frequently asked questions submitted by attendees. In our first installment, we address questions related to the threat landscape. Understanding the threat landscape is paramount in crafting a human-centric security strategy. That\'s the goal behind our 10th annual State of the Phish report. When you know what threats are out there and how people are interacting with them, you can create a modern cybersecurity strategy that puts the complexity of human behavior and interaction at the forefront. Our report was launched a month ago. Since then, we\'ve followed up with a few webinars to discuss key findings from the report, including: Threat landscape findings: Over 1 million phishing threats involved EvilProxy, which bypasses multifactor authentication (MFA). Yet, 89% of security pros still believe that MFA provides complete protection against account takeover. BEC threat actors benefit from generative AI. Proofpoint detected and stopped over 66 million targeted business email compromise (BEC) attacks per month on average in 2023. User behavior and attitude findings: 71% of surveyed users took at least one risky action, and 96% of them knew that those actions were associated with risk. 58% of those risky actions were related to social engineering tactics. 85% of security pros believed that most employees know they are responsible for security. Yet nearly 60% of employees either weren\'t sure or disagreed. These findings inspired hundreds of questions from audiences across the world. What follows are some of the questions that repeatedly came up. Frequently asked questions What are the definitions of BEC and TOAD? Business email compromise (BEC) essentially means fraud perpetrated through email. It can take many forms, such as advance fee fraud, payroll redirection, fraudulent invoicing or even extortion. BEC typically involves a deception, such as the spoofing of a trusted third party\'s domain or the impersonation of an executive (or literally anyone the recipient trusts). BEC is hard to detect because it is generally pure social engineering. In other words, there is often no credential harvesting portal or malicious payload involved. Threat actors most often use benign conversation to engage the victim. Once the victim is hooked, attackers then convince that person to act in favor of them, such as wiring money to a specified account. Similarly, telephone-oriented attack delivery (TOAD) attacks also use benign conversations. But, in this case, a threat actor\'s goal is to motivate the victim to make a phone call. From there, they will walk their target through a set of steps, which usually involve tricking the victim into giving up their credentials or installing a piece of malware on their computer. TOAD attacks have been associated with high-profile malware families known to lead to ransomware, as well as with a wide variety of remote access tools like AnyDesk that provide the threat actors direct access to victims\' machines. The end goal might still be fraud; for example, there have been cases where payment was solicited for “IT services” or software (Norton LifeLock). But the key differentiator for TOAD, compared with BEC, is the pivot out of the email space to a phone call., is the pivot out of the email space to the phone. What is the difference between TOAD and vishing? TOAD often starts with an email and requires victims to call the fraudulent number within that email. Vishing, on the other hand, generally refers to fraudulent solicitation of personally identifiable information (PII) and may or may not involve email (it could result from a direct call). Some TOAD attempts may fall into this category, but most perpetrators focus on getting software installed on a victim\'s machine. How do you see artificial intelligence (AI) affecting phishing? What are security best practices to help defend against these novel phishing attacks? AI allows threat actors to tighten up grammatical and s | Ransomware Malware Tool Threat Cloud Technical | ★★★ | |
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2024-04-10 10:12:47 | Mémoire de sécurité: TA547 cible les organisations allemandes avec Rhadamanthys Stealer Security Brief: TA547 Targets German Organizations with Rhadamanthys Stealer (lien direct) |
Ce qui s'est passé Proofpoint a identifié TA547 ciblant les organisations allemandes avec une campagne de courriel livrant des logiciels malveillants de Rhadamanthys.C'est la première fois que les chercheurs observent TA547 utiliser des Rhadamanthys, un voleur d'informations utilisé par plusieurs acteurs de menaces cybercriminaux.De plus, l'acteur a semblé utiliser un script PowerShell que les chercheurs soupçonnent a été généré par un modèle grand langage (LLM) tel que Chatgpt, Gemini, Copilot, etc. Les e-mails envoyés par l'acteur de menace ont usurpé l'identité de la société de vente au détail allemande Metro prétendant se rapporter aux factures. De: Metro! Sujet: Rechnung No: 31518562 Attachement: in3 0gc- (94762) _6563.zip Exemple TA547 Courriel imitant l'identité de la société de vente au détail allemande Metro. Les e-mails ont ciblé des dizaines d'organisations dans diverses industries en Allemagne.Les messages contenaient un fichier zip protégé par mot de passe (mot de passe: mar26) contenant un fichier LNK.Lorsque le fichier LNK a été exécuté, il a déclenché PowerShell pour exécuter un script PowerShell distant.Ce script PowerShell a décodé le fichier exécutable Rhadamanthys codé de base64 stocké dans une variable et l'a chargé en tant qu'assemblage en mémoire, puis a exécuté le point d'entrée de l'assemblage.Il a par la suite chargé le contenu décodé sous forme d'un assemblage en mémoire et a exécuté son point d'entrée.Cela a essentiellement exécuté le code malveillant en mémoire sans l'écrire sur le disque. Notamment, lorsqu'il est désabuscée, le deuxième script PowerShell qui a été utilisé pour charger les rhadamanthys contenait des caractéristiques intéressantes non couramment observées dans le code utilisé par les acteurs de la menace (ou les programmeurs légitimes).Plus précisément, le script PowerShell comprenait un signe de livre suivi par des commentaires grammaticalement corrects et hyper spécifiques au-dessus de chaque composant du script.Il s'agit d'une sortie typique du contenu de codage généré par LLM et suggère que TA547 a utilisé un certain type d'outil compatible LLM pour écrire (ou réécrire) le PowerShell, ou copié le script à partir d'une autre source qui l'avait utilisé. Exemple de PowerShell soupçonné d'être écrit par un LLM et utilisé dans une chaîne d'attaque TA547. Bien qu'il soit difficile de confirmer si le contenu malveillant est créé via LLMS & # 8211;Des scripts de logiciels malveillants aux leurres d'ingénierie sociale & # 8211;Il existe des caractéristiques d'un tel contenu qui pointent vers des informations générées par la machine plutôt que générées par l'homme.Quoi qu'il en soit, qu'il soit généré par l'homme ou de la machine, la défense contre de telles menaces reste la même. Attribution TA547 est une menace cybercriminale à motivation financière considérée comme un courtier d'accès initial (IAB) qui cible diverses régions géographiques.Depuis 2023, TA547 fournit généralement un rat Netsupport mais a parfois livré d'autres charges utiles, notamment Stealc et Lumma Stealer (voleurs d'informations avec des fonctionnalités similaires à Rhadamanthys).Ils semblaient favoriser les pièces javascript zippées comme charges utiles de livraison initiales en 2023, mais l'acteur est passé aux LNK compressées début mars 2024. En plus des campagnes en Allemagne, d'autres ciblage géographique récent comprennent des organisations en Espagne, en Suisse, en Autriche et aux États-Unis. Pourquoi est-ce important Cette campagne représente un exemple de certains déplacements techniques de TA547, y compris l'utilisation de LNK comprimés et du voleur Rhadamanthys non observé auparavant.Il donne également un aperçu de la façon dont les acteurs de la menace tirent parti de contenu probable généré par LLM dans les campagnes de logiciels malveillants. Les LLM peuvent aider les acteurs de menace à comprendre les chaînes d'attaque plus sophistiquées utilisées | Malware Tool Threat | ChatGPT | ★★ |
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2024-04-05 06:00:25 | Amélioration de la détection et de la réponse: plaider en matière de tromperies Improving Detection and Response: Making the Case for Deceptions (lien direct) |
Let\'s face it, most enterprises find it incredibly difficult to detect and remove attackers once they\'ve taken over user credentials, exploited hosts or both. In the meantime, attackers are working on their next moves. That means data gets stolen and ransomware gets deployed all too often. And attackers have ample time to accomplish their goals. In July 2023, the reported median dwell time was eight days. That\'s the time between when an attacker accesses their victim\'s systems and when the attack is either detected or executed. Combine that data point with another one-that attackers take only 16 hours to reach Active Directory once they have landed-and the takeaway is that threats go undetected for an average of seven days. That\'s more than enough time for a minor security incident to turn into a major business-impacting breach. How can you find and stop attackers more quickly? The answer lies in your approach. Let\'s take a closer look at how security teams typically try to detect attackers. Then, we can better understand why deceptions can work better. What is the problem with current detection methods? Organizations and their security vendors have evolved when it comes to techniques for detecting active threats. In general, detection tools have focused on two approaches-finding files or network traffic that are “known-bad” and detecting suspicious or risky activity or behavior. Often called signature-based detection, finding “known-bad” is a broadly used tool in the detection toolbox. It includes finding known-bad files like malware, or detecting traffic from known-bad IPs or domains. It makes you think of the good old days of antivirus software running on endpoints, and about the different types of network monitoring or web filtering systems that are commonplace today. The advantage of this approach is that it\'s relatively inexpensive to build, buy, deploy and manage. The major disadvantage is that it isn\'t very effective against increasingly sophisticated threat actors who have an unending supply of techniques to get around them. Keeping up with what is known-bad-while important and helpful-is also a bit like a dog chasing its tail, given the infinite internet and the ingenuity of malicious actors. The rise of behavior-based detection About 20 years ago, behavioral-based detections emerged in response to the need for better detection. Without going into detail, these probabilistic or risk-based detection techniques found their way into endpoint and network-based security systems as well as SIEM, email, user and entity behavior analytics (UEBA), and other security systems. The upside of this approach is that it\'s much more nuanced. Plus, it can find malicious actors that signature-based systems miss. The downside is that, by definition, it can generate a lot of false positives and false negatives, depending on how it\'s tuned. Also, the high cost to build and operate behavior-based systems-considering the cost of data integration, collection, tuning, storage and computing-means that this approach is out of reach for many organizations. This discussion is not intended to discount the present and future benefits of newer analytic techniques such as artificial intelligence and machine learning. I believe that continued investments in behavior-based detections can pay off with the continued growth of security data, analytics and computing power. However, I also believe we should more seriously consider a third and less-tried technique for detection. Re-thinking detection Is it time to expand our view of detection techniques? That\'s the fundamental question. But multiple related questions are also essential: Should we be thinking differently about what\'s the best way to actively detect threats? Is there a higher-fidelity way to detect attackers that is cost-effective and easy to deploy and manage? Is there another less-tried approach for detecting threat actors-beyond signature-based and behavior-based methods-that can dra | Ransomware Malware Tool Vulnerability Threat | ★★ | |
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2024-04-04 11:47:34 | Latrodectus: ces octets d'araignée comme la glace Latrodectus: This Spider Bytes Like Ice (lien direct) |
Proofpoint\'s Threat Research team joined up with the Team Cymru S2 Threat Research team, in a collaborative effort to provide the information security community with a comprehensive view of the threat activity described. Key takeaways Proofpoint first observed new malware named Latrodectus appear in email threat campaigns in late November 2023. While use of Latrodectus decreased in December 2023 through January 2024, Latrodectus use increased in campaigns throughout February and March 2024. It was first observed in Proofpoint data being distributed by threat actor TA577 but has been used by at least one other threat actor, TA578. Latrodectus is an up-and-coming downloader with various sandbox evasion functionality. While similar to IcedID, Proofpoint researchers can confirm it is an entirely new malware, likely created by the IcedID developers. Latrodectus shares infrastructure overlap with historic IcedID operations. While investigating Latrodectus, researchers identified new, unique patterns in campaign IDs designating threat actor use in previous IcedID campaigns. Overview Proofpoint identified a new loader called Latrodectus in November 2023. Researchers have identified nearly a dozen campaigns delivering Latrodectus, beginning in February 2024. The malware is used by actors assessed to be initial access brokers (IABs). Latrodectus is a downloader with the objective of downloading payloads and executing arbitrary commands. While initial analysis suggested Latrodectus was a new variant of IcedID, subsequent analysis confirmed it was a new malware most likely named Latrodectus, based on a string identified in the code. Based on characteristics in the disassembled sample and functionality of the malware, researchers assess the malware was likely written by the same developers as IcedID. This malware was first observed being distributed by TA577, an IAB known as a prolific Qbot distributor prior to the malware\'s disruption in 2023. TA577 used Latrodectus in at least three campaigns in November 2023 before reverting to Pikabot. Since mid-January 2024, researchers observed it being used almost exclusively by TA578 in email threat campaigns. Campaign details TA577 TA577 was only observed using Latrodectus in three campaigns, all occurring in November 2023. Notably, a campaign that occurred on 24 November 2023 deviated from previously observed TA577 campaigns. The actor did not use thread hijacking, but instead used contained a variety of different subjects with URLs in the email body. The URLs led to the download of a JavaScript file. If executed, the JavaScript created and ran several BAT files that leveraged curl to execute a DLL and ran it with the export “scab”. Figure 1: Example TA577 campaign delivering Latrodectus. On 28 November 2023, Proofpoint observed the last TA577 Latrodectus campaign. The campaign began with thread hijacked messages that contained URLs leading to either zipped JavaScript files or zipped ISO files. The zipped JavaScript file used curl to download and execute Latrodectus. The zipped ISO file contained a LNK file used to execute the embedded DLL, Latrodectus. Both attack chains started the malware with the export “nail”. TA578 Since mid-January 2024, Latrodectus has been almost exclusively distributed by TA578. This actor typically uses contact forms to initiate a conversation with a target. In one campaign observed on 15 December 2023, Proofpoint observed TA578 deliver the Latrodectus downloader via a DanaBot infection. This December campaign was the first observed use of TA578 distributing Latrodectus. On 20 February 2024, Proofpoint researchers observed TA578 impersonating various companies to send legal threats about alleged copyright infringement. The actor filled out a contact form on multiple targets\' websites, with text containing unique URLs and included in the URI both the domain of the site that initiated the contact form (the target), and the name of the impersonated company (to further the legitimacy | Ransomware Malware Tool Threat Prediction | ★★★ | |
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2024-04-03 06:00:40 | Les acteurs de la menace offrent des logiciels malveillants via les fissures du jeu vidéo YouTube Threat Actors Deliver Malware via YouTube Video Game Cracks (lien direct) |
Key takeaways Proofpoint identified multiple YouTube channels distributing malware by promoting cracked and pirated video games and related content. The video descriptions include links leading to the download of information stealers. The activity likely targets consumer users who do not have the benefits of enterprise-grade security on their home computers. Overview Threat actors often target home users because they do not have the same resources or knowledge to defend themselves from attackers compared to enterprises. While the financial gain might not be as large as attacks perpetrated on corporations, the individual victims likely still have data like credit cards, cryptocurrency wallets, and other personal identifiable information (PII) stored on their computers which can be lucrative to criminals. Proofpoint Emerging Threats has observed information stealer malware including Vidar, StealC, and Lumma Stealer being delivered via YouTube in the guise of pirated software and video game cracks. The videos purport to show an end user how to do things like download software or upgrade video games for free, but the link in the video descriptions leads to malware. Many of the accounts that are hosting malicious videos appear to be compromised or otherwise acquired from legitimate users, but researchers have also observed likely actor-created and controlled accounts that are active for only a few hours, created exclusively to deliver malware. Third-party researchers have previously published details on fake cracked software videos used to deliver malware. The distribution method is particularly notable due to the type of video games the threat actors appear to promote. Many of them appear to be targeted to younger users including games popular with children, a group that is less likely to be able to identify malicious content and risky online behaviors. During our investigation, Proofpoint Emerging Threats reported over two dozen accounts and videos distributing malware to YouTube, which removed the content. Example account The following is an example of a suspected compromised account (or potentially sold to a new “content creator”) used to deliver malware. Indicators of a suspected compromised or otherwise acquired account include significant gaps of time between the videos posted, content that vastly differs from previously published videos, differences in languages, and descriptions of the videos containing likely malicious links, among other indicators. The account has around 113,000 subscribers, and the account displays a grey check mark which indicates the account owner has met verified channel requirements including verifying their identity. Example of a verified YouTube account with a large following, suspected to be compromised. When Proofpoint researchers identified the account, the majority of the account\'s videos had been posted one year or more previously, and all had titles written in Thai. However, when the account was identified, twelve (12) new English language videos had been posted within a 24-hour period, all related to popular video games and software cracks. All of the new video descriptions included links to malicious content. Some of the videos had over 1,000 views, possibly artificially increased by bots to make the videos seem more legitimate. Screenshot of a suspected compromised YouTube account distributing malware comparing upload dates. In one example, a video purported to contain a character enhancement for a popular video game with a MediaFire link in the description. The MediaFire URL led to a password-protected file (Setup_Pswrd_1234.rar) containing an executable (Setup.exe) that, if executed, downloaded and installed Vidar Stealer malware. The video was uploaded to the suspected compromised account seven (7) hours prior to our investigation. Around the same time the video was posted, several comments purported to attest to the legitimacy of the software crack. It is likely those accounts and comments were created by the video | Malware Tool Threat | ★★★ | |
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2024-04-02 09:34:09 | ProofPoint en tête de KuppingerCole Leadership Compass pour la sécurité des e-mails Proofpoint Tops KuppingerCole Leadership Compass for Email Security (lien direct) |
Email is the primary threat vector for cybersecurity threats. And these days, many malware, phishing and social engineering schemes target your people. The 2023 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report notes that 74% of all data breaches include a human element. Threats are constantly evolving, too. It doesn\'t matter how sophisticated or complex your business is, it is a daunting task to protect your people from modern threats. At Proofpoint, we understand how critical it is for any business to protect its people from today\'s email threats. That\'s why we innovate every day. Recently, the industry has once again recognized our efforts to help our customers protect their people and their businesses. This time, our email security was recognized by major industry analyst firm KuppingerCole. Here is what they said about Proofpoint Threat Protection-and what makes it stand out from the competition. Proofpoint named an Overall Leader KuppingerCole just named Proofpoint an Overall Leader in the KuppingerCole Leadership Compass for Email Security Report, 2023. This is the third time in the past year that our email security has been named a leader by a major industry analyst firm. This recognition “triple crown” is the direct result of our commitment to helping businesses protect their people from modern email threats and change user behavior for the better. It keeps us innovating year after year. In the report from KuppingerCole, Proofpoint Threat Protection received the highest “strong positive” rating in all categories, including: Security Functionality Deployment Interoperability Usability With its ratings, KuppingerCole positioned Proofpoint as a leader in all evaluation categories, including product, technology, innovation and market. KuppingerCole named Proofpoint a leader in the product, technology, innovation and market categories. What makes Proofpoint stand out Here is a closer look at how we can help you protect your people from advanced email threats. Stop the widest variety of threats with accuracy Proofpoint uses a multilayered detection stack to identify a wide array of email threats with accuracy. Because we have a broad set of detection technology, we can apply the right technique to the right threat. For example, we have robust sandbox technology to detect URL-based threats, like quick response codes (QR Codes) and behavioral analysis for business email compromise (BEC) and telephone-oriented attack delivery (TOAD) threats. Our machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) models are trained by our experts using one of the richest sets of data in the industry. This ensures we provide superior accuracy. Every year, we analyze more than 3 trillion messages across our 230,000+ customer, global ecosystem. Our modular detection stack enables agility and speed to adapt to changes in the threat landscape. It allows us to quickly deploy new models to address new threats like BEC, TOAD and QR Codes. And it enables us to tune our existing detection models more frequently. Prevent email threats before they reach your people\'s inboxes Predelivery detection from Proofpoint stops known and emerging threats at the front door of your business-not after they are delivered. Proofpoint threat intelligence and research found that nearly 1 in 7 malicious URL clicks happen within one minute of an email\'s arrival. That\'s why predelivery protection is so critical. If a threat ends up in your users\' inboxes, it increases your risk of a cyberattack or data breach. We analyze all messages, links and attachments with our robust detection stack before they can reach an inbox. This analysis, combined with our predelivery sandboxing and behavioral analysis of suspicious QR codes, allows us to stop malicious messages before they become a risk to your business. Gain actionable insights into your human risks Proofpoint quantifies your people\'s risk so that you can prioritize budget and resources to focus o | Data Breach Malware Threat Mobile Commercial | ★★★ | |
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2024-03-26 06:00:09 | Proofpoint Discloses Technique Pivot by Attacker Group TA577: Targeting Windows NTLM (lien direct) | Proofpoint was the first to uncover a concerning new development in the world of cyberthreats that involves a group known as TA577. These cybercriminals, which typically act as initial access brokers (IAB), have pivoted to attacking an old, but widely deployed Windows service to steal sensitive information. Specifically, they aim to steal at scale the hash of the NT LAN Manager (NTLM) authentication session details. Then it is expected that they either sell the data, or they exploit it for various downstream activities like stealing sensitive data and ransoming systems. The planned end result is the same, a significant business-impacting breach of the targeted organizations. How did the new attack happen? Proofpoint detected two distinct email-based campaigns that TA577 carried out on February 26 and 27, 2024. The campaigns targeted hundreds of businesses globally via tens of thousands of emails. The attackers cleverly disguised the emails as replies to previous emails. This is an effective social engineering tactic known as thread hijacking. The emails contained HTML attachments compressed into zip files. Each malicious attachment had its own unique identifier. And the HTML files contained within the attachment were customized for each recipient. Because all the hashes were unique, a simple signature-based detection system could not consistently detect and block these emails. When the email recipient opened the files, it triggered a connection to a Server Message Block (SMB) server that the threat actor controlled. No malware was directly delivered through these connections. However, the attackers\' objective was clear-to capture the details of the challenge/response transaction and the NTLM hashes of the user\'s Windows machine, which include the user\'s password authentication data. The attackers can use this data in the next stage of the attack either in hash form or by cracking the hash first to retrieve the password. Note: In this case, the use of multifactor authentication (MFA) would not stop the attack, as TA577 targeted previously authenticated users on active Windows machines. If targeted businesses used MFA, that authentication step would have already occurred; thus, it would not significantly hinder this attack. What was the attackers\' intent? As noted earlier, TA577 usually acts as an IAB. So, the group likely aimed to exploit the data that they collected by cracking password hashes or facilitating “pass-the-hash” attacks. They could sell access to other threat actors who seek to penetrate targeted companies\' networks more deeply. As part of our investigation, Proofpoint identified the use of a well-known toolkit, Impacket, on the SMB servers involved in the attack. This discovery further confirmed that the malicious intent behind TA577\'s activities is to go well beyond the initial account or system compromise. What is especially concerning about this attack approach is that any connection to the SMB servers would compromise sensitive information that includes: Usernames Passwords Session hashes Domain names Computer names More troubling is the fact that the attackers delivered the malicious HTML files within zip archives. That means they bypassed measures in Outlook mail clients last patched before July 2023. If your email security provider did not block the inbound email and a user engaged with the message, your last hope to avoid the compromise is the timeliness of your software patching program. The impacts on businesses This attack is based on an old protocol (NTLM) from the 1990s. But this new twist by TA577 is noteworthy because it represents a departure from the group\'s usual tactics of delivering malware and bots directly. It suggests that the group is adapting and evolving. They are seeking new ways to bypass security measures and monetize their campaigns. This cyberthreat poses a significant risk to businesses that run Microsoft Windows. Through the theft of NTLM authenti | Malware Threat Patching | ★★★ | |
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2024-03-26 06:00:09 | ProofPoint révèle la technique PIVOT par un groupe d'attaquant TA577: Cibler Windows NTLM Proofpoint Discloses Technique Pivot by Attacker Group TA577: Targeting Windows NTLM (lien direct) |
Proofpoint was the first to uncover a concerning new development in the world of cyberthreats that involves a group known as TA577. These cybercriminals, which typically act as initial access brokers (IAB), have pivoted to attacking an old, but widely deployed Windows service to steal sensitive information. Specifically, they aim to steal at scale the hash of the NT LAN Manager (NTLM) authentication session details. Then it is expected that they either sell the data, or they exploit it for various downstream activities like stealing sensitive data and ransoming systems. The planned end result is the same, a significant business-impacting breach of the targeted organizations. How did the new attack happen? Proofpoint detected two distinct email-based campaigns that TA577 carried out on February 26 and 27, 2024. The campaigns targeted hundreds of businesses globally via tens of thousands of emails. The attackers cleverly disguised the emails as replies to previous emails. This is an effective social engineering tactic known as thread hijacking. The emails contained HTML attachments compressed into zip files. Each malicious attachment had its own unique identifier. And the HTML files contained within the attachment were customized for each recipient. Because all the hashes were unique, a simple signature-based detection system could not consistently detect and block these emails. When the email recipient opened the files, it triggered a connection to a Server Message Block (SMB) server that the threat actor controlled. No malware was directly delivered through these connections. However, the attackers\' objective was clear-to capture the details of the challenge/response transaction and the NTLM hashes of the user\'s Windows machine, which include the user\'s password authentication data. The attackers can use this data in the next stage of the attack either in hash form or by cracking the hash first to retrieve the password. Note: In this case, the use of multifactor authentication (MFA) would not stop the attack, as TA577 targeted previously authenticated users on active Windows machines. If targeted businesses used MFA, that authentication step would have already occurred; thus, it would not significantly hinder this attack. What was the attackers\' intent? As noted earlier, TA577 usually acts as an IAB. So, the group likely aimed to exploit the data that they collected by cracking password hashes or facilitating “pass-the-hash” attacks. They could sell access to other threat actors who seek to penetrate targeted companies\' networks more deeply. As part of our investigation, Proofpoint identified the use of a well-known toolkit, Impacket, on the SMB servers involved in the attack. This discovery further confirmed that the malicious intent behind TA577\'s activities is to go well beyond the initial account or system compromise. What is especially concerning about this attack approach is that any connection to the SMB servers would compromise sensitive information that includes: Usernames Passwords Session hashes Domain names Computer names More troubling is the fact that the attackers delivered the malicious HTML files within zip archives. That means they bypassed measures in Outlook mail clients last patched before July 2023. If your email security provider did not block the inbound email and a user engaged with the message, your last hope to avoid the compromise is the timeliness of your software patching program. The impacts on businesses This attack is based on an old protocol (NTLM) from the 1990s. But this new twist by TA577 is noteworthy because it represents a departure from the group\'s usual tactics of delivering malware and bots directly. It suggests that the group is adapting and evolving. They are seeking new ways to bypass security measures and monetize their campaigns. This cyberthreat poses a significant risk to businesses that run Microsoft Windows. Through the theft of NTLM authenti | Malware Threat Patching | ★★★ | |
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2024-03-25 06:00:56 | DNS pendante: nettoyage de printemps pour protéger contre le risque d'identification Dangling DNS: Spring Cleaning to Protect Against Impersonation Risk (lien direct) |
It is well-established that email is the number one threat vector for cyberattacks. It\'s a go-to for many bad actors because they don\'t need to be highly skilled to initiate an email-based attack. Nor do they need to do elaborate work upfront. Their success hinges on their ability to be convincing. Targets must believe that they are interacting with a trusted source if they\'re going to voluntarily hand over sensitive data, provide their authentication credentials, make a wire transfer or install malware. That\'s why a critical part of any company\'s security posture is using protocols and policies that reduce impersonation risk. And a major step in this direction is to enable and enforce email authentication methods across all your domains. These include: Sender Policy Framework (SPF). This is a published authoritative list of approved sending IP addresses. It can help recipient email systems confirm that an email is coming from a legitimate source and is not impersonating a person or entity through spoofing. DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM). This email authentication method stamps a digital signature to outgoing emails. It helps recipient email systems verify, with proper alignment, that the email was sent by the domain it claims to be from and that it hasn\'t been altered in transit. Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC). This email authentication protocol builds on SPF and DKIM by allowing senders to set policies for handling emails that fail these authentication checks. If you don\'t maintain your systems, bad actors can exploit out-of-date information and nullify your email authentication efforts. In this blog, we will highlight a key bad actor impersonation tactic to inspire you to regularly spring clean your records moving forward. The tactic in focus: “dangling DNS” Dangling DNS refers to a misconfiguration in your email-related domain name system (DNS) records. A reference domain or subdomain is left pointing to a domain that no longer exists or is not under the control of the original domain owner. The term “dangling" implies that the DNS entry is pointing to something that is hanging without proper support. In this case, it is a domain that has expired. Bad actors have gotten wise to the fact that these expired domains create a crack in your defense that they can exploit. The risk of subdomain takeover If a subdomain is left pointing to an external service that the domain owner no longer controls, an attacker can register that domain to gain control of any DNS records that are pointed toward it. So, when they initiate their impersonation-based attack, they have the added benefit of passing email authentication! Using SPF records with all your sending infrastructure listed, rather than hidden behind an SPF macro, also discloses sensitive data about your company\'s infrastructure. Attackers can use this data to plan and execute targeted attacks. Actions you can take to reduce risk To mitigate the risks associated with dangling DNS records, domain owners must review their email-related DNS configurations regularly. It is especially important when you decommission or change services. Here are some actions that can help you to reduce your risk exposure. Regularly review and remove unused DNS records You should promptly remove DNS records that point to deprecated or unused services: SPF records. Review and minimize the entries that are posted within your SPF record. Review every “Include” and “Reference”, especially for third parties and expired domains, or if domains change owners. Access to SPF telemetry data can help simplify your investigations. DKIM selector records. Review CNAMEd DKIM selector records that point to third parties for expired domains, or if domains change owners. DMARC policy records. Review CNAMEd DMARC records that point to third parties for expired domains, or if domains change owners. MX records. Review MX records for your domains to see if any old entries are still inc | Malware Threat Cloud | ★★★ | |
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2024-03-21 07:53:21 | Mémoire de sécurité: TA450 utilise des liens intégrés dans les pièces jointes PDF dans la dernière campagne Security Brief: TA450 Uses Embedded Links in PDF Attachments in Latest Campaign (lien direct) |
Ce qui s'est passé Les chercheurs de ProofPoint ont récemment observé une nouvelle activité par l'acteur de menace aligné par l'Iran TA450 (également connu sous le nom de Muddywater, Mango Sandstorm et Static Kitten), dans lequel le groupe a utilisé un leurre d'ingénierie social lié aux salaires pour cibler les employés israéliens dans de grandes organisations multinationales.TA450 est connu pour cibler les entités israéliennes, en particulier depuis au moins octobre 2023 avec le début de la guerre des Israël-Hamas et cela se poursuit qui se concentre sur les sociétés mondiales de fabrication, de technologie et de sécurité de l'information. Dans la campagne de phishing, qui a commencé le 7 mars et s'est poursuivie tout au long de la semaine du 11 mars 2024, TA450 a envoyé des e-mails avec des pièces jointes PDF qui contenaient des liens malveillants.Bien que cette méthode ne soit pas étrangère à TA450, l'acteur de menace s'est récemment appuyé sur des liens malveillants directement dans les corps de messagerie électronique au lieu d'ajouter cette étape supplémentaire.Les chercheurs de ProofPoint ont observé que les mêmes cibles reçoivent plusieurs e-mails de phishing avec des pièces jointes PDF qui avaient des liens intégrés légèrement différents.Les liens étaient vers une variété de sites de partage de fichiers, notamment EGnyte, OneHub, Sync et Terabox.Les e-mails ont également utilisé un compte .il d'expéditeur probable compromis, ce qui est conforme à l'activité récente de cette menace. Comme le montre les figures 1 et 2, si une cible ouvrait la pièce jointe et cliquait sur le lien inclus, il conduirait au téléchargement d'une archive zip contenant un MSI compressé qui installerait finalement AteraAgent, logiciel d'administration à distance connue pour être abusépar TA450. Figure 1. Attachement PDF ouvert avec un lien malveillant (Traduction machine: Titre du document: Signon de paie; Body of PDF: Bonjour, à partir de maintenant, recevez votre bordereau de paie via le logiciel suivant). Figure 2. Zip Archive via OneHub qui mène au téléchargement du logiciel d'administration à distance. Attribution Les chercheurs de ProofPoint attribuent cette campagne à TA450 sur la base de tactiques, techniques et procédures connues de TA450, ciblage de la campagne et analyse de logiciels malveillants.En janvier 2022, les États-Unis ont cyber-commandant ce groupe au ministère de l'Iran \\ du renseignement et de la sécurité. Pourquoi est-ce important Cette activité est remarquable pour plusieurs raisons, notamment qu'elle marque un tour des tactiques de Ta450 \\.Bien que cette campagne ne soit pas la première instance observée de TA450 en utilisant des pièces jointes avec des liens malveillants dans le cadre de la chaîne d'attaque de l'acteur de menace, il est la première fois que les chercheurs ont observé que TA450 tentative de livrer une URL malveillante dans une attachement PDF plutôt plutôtque lier directement le fichier dans un e-mail.De plus, cette campagne est la première fois que Proofpoint a observé TA450 à l'aide d'un compte de messagerie d'expéditeur qui correspond au contenu de leurre.Par exemple, cette campagne a utilisé un compte de messagerie de salaire [@] co [.] Il, qui est aligné sur les différentes lignes d'objet sur le thème de la rémunération. Enfin, cette activité continue la tendance de Ta450 \\ de tirer parti des leurres de langue hébraïque et de compromis compromis. Signatures de menace émergente (ET) Sid Nom de règle 2051743 ET ouvre la requête DNS au domaine de partage de fichiers (EGNYTE .com) 2051745 ET Open 2051745 - DNS Query to File Share Domain (Sync .Com) 2051749 ET ouvre la requête DNS au domaine de partage de fichiers (Terabox .com) 2051750 ET Open Domaine de partage de fichiers observé (Terabox .com dans TLS SNI) 2051746 ET Open Domaine de partage de fichiers observé (EGNYTE .com dans TLS SNI) 2051748 ET Open Domaine de partage de fichiers observé (Sync .com d | Malware Threat Prediction | ★★★ | |
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2024-03-04 06:00:36 | La chaîne d'attaque inhabituelle de TA577 \\ mène au vol de données NTLM TA577\\'s Unusual Attack Chain Leads to NTLM Data Theft (lien direct) |
Ce qui s'est passé Proofpoint a identifié l'acteur de menace cybercriminale notable TA577 en utilisant une nouvelle chaîne d'attaque pour démontrer un objectif inhabituellement observé: voler des informations d'authentification NT LAN Manager (NTLM).Cette activité peut être utilisée à des fins de collecte d'informations sensibles et pour permettre l'activité de suivi. Proofpoint a identifié au moins deux campagnes en tirant parti de la même technique pour voler des hachages NTLM les 26 et 27 février 2024. Les campagnes comprenaient des dizaines de milliers de messages ciblant des centaines d'organisations dans le monde.Les messages sont apparus sous forme de réponses aux e-mails précédents, appelés détournement de fil, et contenaient des pièces jointes HTML zippées. Exemple de message utilisant le détournement de thread contenant une pièce jointe zippée contenant un fichier HTML. Chaque pièce jointe .zip a un hachage de fichiers unique, et les HTML dans les fichiers compressés sont personnalisés pour être spécifiques pour chaque destinataire.Lorsqu'il est ouvert, le fichier HTML a déclenché une tentative de connexion système à un serveur de blocs de messages (SMB) via un actualisation Meta à un schéma de fichier URI se terminant par .txt.Autrement dit, le fichier contacterait automatiquement une ressource SMB externe appartenant à l'acteur de menace.ProofPoint n'a pas observé la livraison de logiciels malveillants de ces URL, mais les chercheurs évaluent à la grande confiance que l'objectif de Ta577 \\ est de capturer les paires de défi / réponse NTLMV2 du serveur SMB pour voler des hachages NTLM en fonction des caractéristiques de la chaîne d'attaque et des outils utilisés. Exemple HTML contenant l'URL (en commençant par «File: //») pointant vers la ressource SMB. Ces hachages pourraient être exploités pour la fissuration du mot de passe ou faciliter les attaques "pass-the-hash" en utilisant d'autres vulnérabilités au sein de l'organisation ciblée pour se déplacer latéralement dans un environnement touché.Les indications à l'appui de cette théorie comprennent des artefacts sur les serveurs SMB pointant vers l'utilisation de l'impaquette de boîte à outils open source pour l'attaque.L'utilisation d'Impacket sur le serveur SMB peut être identifiée par le défi du serveur NTLM par défaut "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" et le GUID par défaut observé dans le trafic.Ces pratiques sont rares dans les serveurs SMB standard. Capture de paquets observée (PCAP) de la campagne TA577. Toute tentative de connexion autorisée à ces serveurs SMB pourrait potentiellement compromettre les hachages NTLM, ainsi que la révélation d'autres informations sensibles telles que les noms d'ordinateurs, les noms de domaine et les noms d'utilisateur dans un texte clair. Il est à noter que TA577 a livré le HTML malveillant dans une archive zip pour générer un fichier local sur l'hôte.Si le schéma de fichiers URI était envoyé directement dans l'organisme de messagerie, l'attaque ne fonctionnerait pas sur les clients d'Outlook Mail patchés depuis juillet 2023. La désactivation de l'accès des clients à SMB n'atteint pas l'attaque, car le fichier doit tenter de s'authentifier auprès du serveur externe SMB ServerPour déterminer s'il doit utiliser l'accès des clients. Attribution TA577 est un acteur de menace de cybercriminalité éminent et l'un des principaux affiliés de QBOT avant la perturbation du botnet.Il est considéré comme un courtier d'accès initial (IAB) et Proofpoint a associé des campagnes TA577 avec des infections de ransomware de suivi, notamment Black Basta.Récemment, l'acteur favorise Pikabot comme charge utile initiale. Pourquoi est-ce important Proof Point observe généralement TA577 menant des attaques pour livrer des logiciels malveillants et n'a jamais observé cet acteur de menace démontrant la chaîne d'attaque utilisée pour voler des informations d'identification NTLM observées le 26 février.Récemment, TA577 a été observé pour fou | Ransomware Malware Tool Vulnerability Threat | ★★ | |
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2024-02-16 06:00:45 | Les tenants et aboutissants de la confidentialité des données, partie 1: la complexité importante et croissante d'assurer la confidentialité des données The Ins and Outs of Data Privacy, Part 1: The Importance-and Growing Complexity-of Ensuring Data Privacy (lien direct) |
This blog is the first in a series where we explore data privacy. In these two blogs, we\'ll cover why data privacy is increasingly important as well as some tips for keeping data safe. We\'ll also discuss how data loss protection (DLP) and insider threat management tools (ITM) are critical to ensuring data privacy. Data Privacy Week in January 2024 highlighted the increasing importance and challenges of data privacy. Trends like digital transformation, remote work and the proliferation of cloud applications have made the task of protecting sensitive data harder than ever. As the volume and perceived value of data grows, so does the risk of data loss and theft, including by insiders. Despite these challenges, businesses can\'t afford missteps when it comes to keeping sensitive data safe. Companies everywhere are under pressure to meet strict data privacy laws that promote data security and data privacy. Noncompliance can be costly. Hefty fines and market loss are common. Research from our 2023 Voice of the CISO report underscores the risk. One-third of the CISOs who told us that their company suffered a material loss of sensitive data within the past 12 months also reported their business was hit with regulatory sanctions as a result. In this blog post, we take a closer look at data privacy and how it relates to data security. We also discuss how laws around data privacy are evolving. And we cover how data loss prevention (DLP) and insider threat management (ITM) tools can help you stay on top of your data compliance challenges. What is data privacy? Data privacy is about protecting sensitive data that belongs to individuals or entities. This includes personally identifiable information (PII), which can be used to identify an individual or a corporate customer. Examples of PII include names, addresses, Social Security or tax ID numbers, credit card data and dates of birth. A business that stores or manages this type of information must follow data privacy laws. These laws ensure that data is kept confidential and secure and that it is only used for authorized purposes. They are intended to help a business: Protect personal information Safeguard critical business data Preserve users\' autonomy Maintain trust with customers and employees Data privacy is also about trust. The misuse or theft of sensitive data can lead to email fraud, insurance fraud, identity theft and more. So, customers need to trust that the companies they share their private data with will guard it carefully. An evolving regulatory landscape Data privacy laws are designed to compel businesses to keep sensitive data safe. Data compliance mandates often require businesses to tell users exactly how their data is used and collected. They may also require companies to notify users when a data breach happens. As noted earlier, not following these laws can result in stiff penalties. Multiple data privacy laws around the globe govern regulations based on their type, the user\'s location and other criteria. Some examples include the: GDPR in the European Union CCPA in the U.S. HIPAA in the U.S. LGPD in Brazil Several state governments in the United States are stepping up efforts to enact data privacy laws. California, Colorado, Connecticut, Utah and Virginia enacted comprehensive consumer privacy laws before 2023. Those laws became enforceable last year. In 2023, these states enacted privacy laws: Delaware Florida Indiana Iowa Montana Oregon Tennessee Texas As data privacy laws emerge or evolve, the definition of sensitive data may change. For example, GDPR expanded the definition of PII to include data elements like email and IP addresses. That is why it is so important for companies to stay attuned to this ever-changing landscape. The rise of generative AI sites has also sparked new concerns about data privacy. New laws are likely to be developed soon. The Biden Administration\'s new executive order will also have an impact on data use in the year ahead. Why | Data Breach Malware Tool Threat Cloud | ★★ | |
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2024-02-13 07:32:08 | Bumblebee bourdonne en noir Bumblebee Buzzes Back in Black (lien direct) |
What happened Proofpoint researchers identified the return of Bumblebee malware to the cybercriminal threat landscape on 8 February 2024 after a four-month absence from Proofpoint threat data. Bumblebee is a sophisticated downloader used by multiple cybercriminal threat actors and was a favored payload from its first appearance in March 2022 through October 2023 before disappearing. In the February campaign, Proofpoint observed several thousand emails targeting organizations in the United States with the subject "Voicemail February" from the sender "info@quarlesaa[.]com" that contained OneDrive URLs. The URLs led to a Word file with names such as "ReleaseEvans#96.docm" (the digits before the file extension varied). The Word document spoofed the consumer electronics company Humane. Screenshot of the voicemail-themed email lure. Screenshot of the malicious Word document. The document used macros to create a script in the Windows temporary directory, for example "%TEMP%/radD7A21.tmp", using the contents of CustomDocumentProperties SpecialProps, SpecialProps1, SpecialProps2 and SpecialProps3. The macro then executed the dropped file using "wscript". Inside the dropped temporary file was a PowerShell command that downloads and executes the next stage from a remote server, stored in file “update_ver”: The next stage was another PowerShell command which in turn downloaded and ran the Bumblebee DLL. The Bumblebee configuration included: Campaign ID: dcc3 RC4 Key: NEW_BLACK It is notable that the actor is using VBA macro-enabled documents in the attack chain, as most cybercriminal threat actors have nearly stopped using them, especially those delivering payloads that can act as initial access facilitators for follow-on ransomware activity. In 2022, Microsoft began blocking macros by default, causing a massive shift in the landscape to attack chains that began using more unusual filetypes, vulnerability exploitation, combining URLs and attachments, chaining scripting files, and much more. Another noteworthy feature of this campaign is that the attack chain is significantly different from previously observed Bumblebee campaigns. Examples used in prior campaigns that distributed Bumblebee with the “NEW_BLACK” configuration included: Emails that contained URLs leading to the download of a DLL which, if executed, started Bumblebee. Emails with HTML attachments that leveraged HTML smuggling to drop a RAR file. If executed, it exploited the WinRAR vulnerability CVE-2023-38831 to install Bumblebee. Emails with zipped, password-protected VBS attachments which, if executed, used PowerShell to download and execute Bumblebee. Emails that contained zipped LNK files to download an executable file. If executed, the .exe started Bumblebee. Out of the nearly 230 Bumblebee campaigns identified since March 2022, only five used any macro-laden content; four campaigns used XL4 macros, and one used VBA macros. Attribution At this time Proofpoint does not attribute the activity to a tracked threat actor. The voicemail lure theme, use of OneDrive URLs, and sender address appear to align with previous TA579 activities. Proofpoint will continue to investigate and may attribute this activity to a known threat actor in the future. Proofpoint assesses with high confidence Bumblebee loader can be used as an initial access facilitator to deliver follow-on payloads such as ransomware. Why it matters Bumblebee\'s return to the threat landscape aligns with a surge of cybercriminal threat activity after a notable absence of many threat actors and malware. Recently, two threat actors-tax-themed actor TA576 and the sophisticated TA866-appeared once again in email campaign data after months-long gaps in activity. Post-exploitation operator TA582 and aviation and aerospace targeting ecrime actor TA2541 both reappeared in the threat landscape in late January after being absent since the end of November. Additionally, DarkGate malware reappeared | Ransomware Malware Vulnerability Threat | ★★ | |
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2024-02-12 08:02:39 | 4 étapes pour empêcher le compromis des e-mails des fournisseurs dans votre chaîne d'approvisionnement 4 Steps to Prevent Vendor Email Compromise in Your Supply Chain (lien direct) |
Supply chains have become a focal point for cyberattacks in a world where business ecosystems are increasingly connected. Email threats are a significant risk factor, as threat actors are keen to use compromised email accounts to their advantage. Every month, a staggering 80% of Proofpoint customers face attacks that originate from compromised vendor, third-party or supplier email accounts. Known as supplier account compromise, or vendor email compromise, these attacks involve threat actors infiltrating business communications between trusted partners so that they can launch internal and external attacks. Their ultimate goal might be to steal money, steal data, distribute malware or simply cause havoc. In this blog post, we\'ll explain how vendor emails are compromised and how you can stop these attacks. Finally, we\'ll tell you how Proofpoint can help. What\'s at stake Supply chain compromise attacks can be costly for businesses. IBM, in its latest Cost of a Data Breach Report, says that the average total cost of a cyberattack that involves supply chain compromise is $4.76 million. That is almost 12% higher than the cost of an incident that doesn\'t involve the supply chain. In addition to the financial implications, compromised accounts can lead to: Phishing scams that result in even more compromised accounts Reputational and brand damage Complex legal liabilities between business partners How does vendor email compromise occur? Supply chain compromise attacks are highly targeted. They can stretch out over several months. And typically, they are structured as a multistep process. The bad actor initiates the assault by gaining access to the email account of a vendor or supplier through various means. Phishing attacks are one example. Once the attacker gains access, they will lay low for an extended period to observe the vendor\'s email communications. During this time, the adversary will study the language and context of messages so that they can blend in well and avoid detection. Attackers might also use this observation period to establish persistence. They will create mail rules and infrastructure so that they can continue to receive and send messages even after the vendor has regained control of the account. Once they establish access and persistence, the attackers will begin to insert themselves into conversations within the supplier\'s company as well as with external partners and customers. By posing as the sender, the attacker takes advantage of established trust between parties to increase their chances of success. Overview of a vendor email compromise attack. Proofpoint has observed a growing trend of attackers targeting accounts within smaller businesses and using them to gain entry into larger companies. Threat actors often assume that small businesses have less protection than large companies. They see them as targets that can help them achieve a bigger payday. How to stop vendor email compromise If you want to defend against these attacks, it\'s critical to understand the methods behind them. Such a formidable problem requires a strategic and multilayered solution. The four broad steps below can help. Step 1: Know your suppliers Your first line of defense against these email attacks sounds simple, but it\'s challenging. It is the ability to intimately “know your supplier” and understand their security strategy. This requires more than a one-time vendor assessment. Your security teams will need to prioritize continuous monitoring of your company\'s business partnerships. On top of that knowledge, you need a thorough understanding of the access and privileges that your business grants to each vendor. Compromised accounts that have uncontrolled access may be able to exfiltrate sensitive data or upload malware like ransomware. So, when you know what your suppliers can (and can\'t) access, you can identify a data breach faster. Other steps, like requiring multifactor authentication (MFA) for vendor accounts, can | Ransomware Data Breach Malware Tool Threat Studies Prediction Cloud | ★★★ | |
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2024-02-12 07:37:05 | Alerte communautaire: campagne malveillante en cours impactant les environnements cloud Azure Community Alert: Ongoing Malicious Campaign Impacting Azure Cloud Environments (lien direct) |
Over the past weeks, Proofpoint researchers have been monitoring an ongoing cloud account takeover campaign impacting dozens of Microsoft Azure environments and compromising hundreds of user accounts, including senior executives. This post serves as a community warning regarding the attack and offers suggestions that affected organizations can implement to protect themselves from it. What are we seeing? In late November 2023, Proofpoint researchers detected a new malicious campaign, integrating credential phishing and cloud account takeover (ATO) techniques. As part of this campaign, which is still active, threat actors target users with individualized phishing lures within shared documents. For example, some weaponized documents include embedded links to “View document” which, in turn, redirect users to a malicious phishing webpage upon clicking the URL. Threat actors seemingly direct their focus toward a wide range of individuals holding diverse titles across different organizations, impacting hundreds of users globally. The affected user base encompasses a wide spectrum of positions, with frequent targets including Sales Directors, Account Managers, and Finance Managers. Individuals holding executive positions such as “Vice President, Operations”, "Chief Financial Officer & Treasurer" and "President & CEO" were also among those targeted. The varied selection of targeted roles indicates a practical strategy by threat actors, aiming to compromise accounts with various levels of access to valuable resources and responsibilities across organizational functions. Following the attack\'s behavioral patterns and techniques, our threat analysts identified specific indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with this campaign. Namely, the use of a specific Linux user-agent utilized by attackers during the access phase of the attack chain: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Attackers predominantly utilize this user-agent to access the \'OfficeHome\' sign-in application along with unauthorized access to additional native Microsoft365 apps, such as: \'Office365 Shell WCSS-Client\' (indicative of browser access to Office365 applications) \'Office 365 Exchange Online\' (indicative of post-compromise mailbox abuse, data exfiltration and email threats proliferation) \'My Signins\' (used by attackers for MFA manipulation; for more info about this technique, see our recent Cybersecurity Stop of the Month blog) \'My Apps\' \'My Profile\' Post compromise risks Successful initial access often leads to a sequence of unauthorized post-compromise activities, including: MFA manipulation. Attackers register their own MFA methods to maintain persistent access. We have observed attackers choosing different authentication methods, including the registration of alternative phone numbers for authentication via SMS or phone call. However, in most MFA manipulation instances, attackers preferred to add an authenticator app with notification and code. Examples of MFA manipulation events, executed by attackers in a compromised cloud tenant. Data exfiltration. Attackers access and download sensitive files, including financial assets, internal security protocols, and user credentials. Internal and external phishing. Mailbox access is leveraged to conduct lateral movement within impacted organizations and to target specific user accounts with personalized phishing threats. Financial fraud. In an effort to perpetrate financial fraud, internal email messages are dispatched to target Human Resources and Financial departments within affected organizations. Mailbox rules. Attackers create dedicated obfuscation rules, intended to cover their tracks and erase all evidence of malicious activity from victims\' mailboxes. Examples of obfuscation mailbox rules created by attackers following successful account takeover. Operational infrastructure Our forensic analysis of the attack has surfaced several proxies, | Malware Tool Threat Cloud | ★★★ | |
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2024-02-09 06:00:24 | Offensif et défensif: renforcer la sensibilisation à la sécurité avec deux approches d'apprentissage puissantes Offensive and Defensive: Build Security Awareness with Two Powerful Learning Approaches (lien direct) |
“Offensive” security awareness and “defensive” security awareness are two learning approaches that you can use to build a robust security culture in your company. They involve applying different strategies to educate your employees about threats and how they can respond to them safely. You may have heard the terms “offensive cybersecurity” and “defensive cybersecurity.” You use defensive tools and techniques to strengthen security vulnerabilities. And with offensive tools and techniques, you focus on identifying those vulnerabilities before attackers find them first. How do defensive and offensive approaches apply to security awareness? Here\'s a quick overview: With a defensive approach, users learn the fundamentals of security. With an offensive approach, users learn how to protect themselves and the business against future threats. Let\'s use a sports analogy here. You can actively learn to be a defensive goalie and block threats. Then, you can take your skills up a level and learn to score points with protective techniques. With Proofpoint Security Awareness, our industry-leading threat intelligence informs both approaches. We help people learn how to defend against current threats. And we give them the tools for taking offensive action against future threats. Live-action series about Insider Threats. (play video) Defensive security awareness: set the foundation We all have to start with the basics, right? With defensive security awareness, you teach people the fundamentals of security and set the stage for safe behavior. This training is often reactive. It enables people to respond to immediate threats and incidents as they arise. At Proofpoint, we believe in using behavioral science methodologies, like adaptive learning and contextual nudges. We combine this with a threat-driven approach, weaving trend analysis and insights about recent security breaches into our training. A personalized adaptive framework The adaptive learning framework is a personalized defensive approach to training. It recognizes that everyone learns differently; it is the opposite of a one-size-fits-all approach. You can teach security fundamentals in a way that is meaningful for each person based on what they know, what they might do and what they believe. This framework lets you drive behavior change with education that is tailored to each person\'s needs. That can include their professional role, industry, content style and native language. The learner can engage with a wide variety of styles and materials. And each training is tied to a specific learning objective. Adaptive learning recognizes that people learn best in short bursts that are spread over time. Our microlearning video modules are under three minutes, and our nano-learning videos are under one minute. These formats give people the flexibility to learn at their own pace. For instance, our “You\'re Now a Little Wiser” nano series offers bite-size training on topics such as data protection to help users learn about specific threats. Screenshots from a one-minute nano-learning video. Contextual nudges and positive reinforcement Training is essential if you want to build a robust security culture. But it is not enough to change behavior fully. Here is where contextual nudges play a vital role in helping to reinforce positive behavior habits once they are formed. These deliberate interventions are designed to shape how people behave. Nudges are rooted in a deep understanding of human behavior. They can move people toward making better decisions, often without them realizing it. They are gentle reminders that can guide people toward creating optimal outcomes. That, in turn, helps to foster a defensive security-conscious culture in your company. It is important to find the respectful balance of nudging people toward secure behaviors without being too intrusive or complex. For example, when a user fails a phishing simulation exercise, Proofpoint Security Awareness offers “Tea | Ransomware Malware Tool Vulnerability Threat Prediction | ★★★ | |
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2024-02-06 05:00:20 | Comment les cybercriminels augmentent-ils le privilège et se déplacent-ils latéralement? How Do Cybercriminals Escalate Privilege and Move Laterally? (lien direct) |
If you want to understand how cybercriminals cause business-impacting security breaches, the attack chain is a great place to start. The eight steps of this chain generalize how a breach progresses from start to finish. The most impactful breaches typically follow this pattern: Steps in the attack chain. In this blog post, we will simplify the eight steps of an attack into three stages-the beginning, middle and end. Our focus here will primarily be on the middle stage-info gathering, privilege escalation and lateral movement, which is often the most challenging part of the attack chain to see and understand. The middle steps are often unfamiliar territory, except for the most highly specialized security practitioners. This lack of familiarity has contributed to significant underinvestment in security controls required to address attacks at this stage. But before we delve into our discussion of the middle, let\'s address the easiest stages to understand-the beginning and the end. The beginning of the attack chain A cyberattack has to start somewhere. At this stage, a cybercriminal gains an initial foothold into a target\'s IT environment. How do they do this? Mainly through phishing. A variety of tactics are used here including: Stealing a valid user\'s login credentials Luring a user into installing malicious software, such as Remote Access Trojans (RATs) Calling the company\'s help desk to socially engineer the help desk into granting the attacker control over a user\'s account Much ink has been spilled about these initial compromise techniques. This is why, in part, the level of awareness and understanding by security and non-security people of this first stage is so high. It is fair to say that most people-IT, security and everyday users-have personally experienced attempts at initial compromise. Who hasn\'t received a phishing email? A great deal of investment goes into security tools and user training to stop the initial compromise. Think of all the security technologies that exist for that purpose. The list is very long. The end of the attack chain Similarly, the level of awareness and understanding is also very high around what happens at the end of the attack chain. As a result, many security controls and best practices have also been focused here. Everyone-IT, security and even everyday users-understands the negative impacts of data exfiltration or business systems getting encrypted by ransomware attackers. Stories of stolen data and ransomed systems are in the news almost daily. Now, what about the middle? The middle is where an attacker attempts to move from the initially compromised account(s) or system(s) to more critical business systems where the data that\'s worth exfiltrating or ransoming is stored. To most people, other than red teamers, pen testers and cybercriminals, the middle of the attack chain is abstract and unfamiliar. After all, regular users don\'t attempt to escalate their privileges and move laterally on their enterprise network! These three stages make up the middle of the attack chain: Information gathering. This includes network scanning and enumeration. Privilege escalation. During this step, attackers go after identities that have successively higher IT system privileges. Or they escalate the privilege of the account that they currently control. Lateral movement. Here, they hop from one host to another on the way to the “crown jewel” IT systems. Steps in the middle of the attack chain. Relatively few IT or security folks have experience with or a deep understanding of the middle of the attack chain. There are several good reasons for this: Most security professionals are neither red teamers, pen testers, nor cybercriminals. The middle stages are “quiet,” unlike initial compromise-focused phishing attacks or successful ransomware attacks, which are very “loud” by comparison. Unlike the front and back end of the attack chain, there has been little coverage about how these steps | Ransomware Malware Tool Vulnerability Threat | ★★★ | |
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2024-02-06 05:00:18 | Elon Musk veut vous envoyer à Mars: un tour d'horizon de quelques leurres impairs récents Elon Musk Wants to Send You to Mars: A Round Up of Some Recent Odd Lures (lien direct) |
Nous savons tous qu'Internet peut être un endroit étrange dans le meilleur des cas, il ne devrait donc pas surprendre que les cybercriminels du monde contribuent leur juste part d'étrangeté.Mais au cours des dernières semaines, nos chercheurs ont rencontré une poignée de campagnes malveillantes qui vont bien au-delà du niveau habituel de Bizarre pour atteindre leurs objectifs d'ingénierie sociale. Billets pour Mars Il y a quelques années à peine, le tourisme spatial faisait la une des gros titres.Il semblait que l'âge des escarpins orbitaux était juste au coin de la rue, et que la NASA construirait des bases de lune d'ici longtemps.Malheureusement, il y a eu des revers, et pour l'instant, l'espace reste la réserve des astronautes, des scientifiques et des très riches.Mais en suivant le principe «Go Big Or Rad Home», une récente campagne de messagerie malveillante ne s'est pas arrêtée au vol spatial sub-orbital ou ne visite pas sur la lune, promettant aux destinataires de gagner un voyage à Mars. Avec une ligne d'objet de «vous gagnez un voyage à Mars», les messages contenaient un PDF avec une image d'une récente biographie d'Elon Musk et une boîte de dialogue de mise à jour spoofée pour Adobe Reader.Le bouton de téléchargement de la fausse image liée à un fichier tar.gz contenant un exécutable qui a finalement téléchargé Redline Stealer. Le moment de cette campagne est intéressant, car le support natif de ce type de fichier dans Windows 11 n'a commencé qu'en octobre 2023. Les acteurs de menace occasionnellement proposent des leurres si improbables qu'il est difficile d'imaginer quiconque tombe amoureux d'eux.Mais il y a une méthode dans leur folie.Pour certains destinataires, la curiosité seule sera un leurre efficace.Après tout, l'ingénierie sociale consiste à amener votre victime à faire ce que vous voulez dans ce cas, en cliquant sur un lien de téléchargement.Et vous ne devez pas croire que vous allez vraiment gagner un voyage à Mars pour être intéressé à découvrir pourquoi vous en avez offert un. Service client grossier Nous avons tous de mauvais jours, mais les médias sociaux ont transformé les plaintes des clients en sport de spectateur.Dans cette campagne à faible volume, un acteur de menace non attribué a distribué des messages censés provenir de clients furieux appelés «Daniel Rodriguez» ou «Emma Grace».Daniel et Emma étaient tellement en colère contre le service qu'ils ont reçu qu'ils n'ont pas simplement envoyé un e-mail pour se plaindre - ils ne semblaient pas avoir rédigé des pensées encore plus étendues dans une pièce jointe appelée «attitude_reports.svg». Curieusement, SVG est l'extension de fichier pour les graphiques vectoriels évolutifs - un type de fichier inhabituel dans lequel notez vos réflexions sur un employé irrespectueux.Mais si le destinataire était suffisamment consciencieux pour télécharger la pièce jointe, les problèmes s'ensuivirent. Le SVG s'est ouvert dans un navigateur, initiant une chaîne d'infection complexe menant au malware du voleur de phédrone.La chaîne d'attaque était remarquable pour son utilisation de CVE-2023-38831, ainsi que d'être un exemple de l'utilisation croissante des fichiers SVG dans le paysage post-macro. De l'Ukraine à l'Ouzbékistan Le conflit entre la Russie et l'Ukraine a provoqué des troubles dans toute la région, et même les cybercriminels du monde ont été affectés.Dans une récente campagne, nos chercheurs ont remarqué un attaquant essayant d'utiliser la difficulté de l'approvisionnement en produits en Ukraine comme prétexte pour cibler les victimes potentielles dans toute l'Europe au nom de leurs partenaires en Ouzbékistan. Les messages contenaient une image hyperlienne usurpant une pièce jointe PDF.Les victimes cliquant sur l'image ont été adressées vers une URL MediaFire déclenchant une chaîne d'infection, ce qui a finalement conduit à l'agenttesla. Pour plus d'informations de nos chercheurs sur les menaces, abonnez-vous au podcast dé | Malware Threat | ★★ | |
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2024-02-05 11:41:18 | 7 conseils pour développer une approche proactive pour éviter le vol de données 7 Tips to Develop a Proactive Approach to Prevent Data Theft (lien direct) |
Data is one of the most valuable assets for a modern enterprise. So, of course, it is a target for theft. Data theft is the unauthorized acquisition, copying or exfiltration of sensitive information that is typically stored in a digital format. To get it, bad actors either abuse privileges they already have or use various other means to gain access to computer systems, networks or digital storage devices. The data can range from user credentials to personal financial records and intellectual property. Companies of all sizes are targets of data theft. In September 2023, the personal data of 2,214 employees of the multinational confectionary firm The Hershey Company was stolen after a phishing attack. And in January 2024, the accounting firm of Framework Computer fell victim to an attack. A threat actor posed as the Framework\'s CEO and convinced the target to share a spreadsheet with the company\'s customer data. Data thieves aim to profit financially, disrupt business activities or do both by stealing high-value information. The fallout from a data breach can be very costly for a business-and the cost is going up. IBM reports that the global average cost of a data breach in 2023 was $4.45 million, a 15% increase over three years. Other data suggests that the average cost of a breach is more than double for U.S. businesses-nearly $9.5 million. Not all data breaches involve data theft, but stealing data is a top aim for many attackers. Even ransomware gangs have been shifting away from data encryption in their attacks, opting instead to steal massive amounts of data and use its value as a means to compel businesses to pay ransom. So, what can businesses do to prevent data theft? Taking a proactive approach toward stopping someone from stealing your data is a must. This blog post can help jump-start your thinking about how to improve data security. We explore how data theft happens and describe some common threats that lead to it. We also outline seven strategies that can help reduce your company\'s risk of exposure to data theft and highlight how Proofpoint can bolster your defenses. Understanding data theft-and who commits it Data theft is a serious security and privacy breach. Data thieves typically aim to steal information like: Personally identifiable information (PII) Financial records Intellectual property (IP) Trade secrets Login credentials Once they have it, bad actors can use stolen data for fraudulent activities or, in the case of credential theft, to gain unlawful access to accounts or systems. They can also sell high-value data on the dark web. The consequences of data theft for businesses can be significant, if not devastating. They include hefty compliance penalties, reputational damage, and financial and operational losses. Take the manufacturing industry as an example. According to one source, a staggering 478 companies in this industry have experienced a ransomware attack in the past five years. The costs in associated downtime are approximately $46.2 billion. To prevent data theft, it\'s important to recognize that bad actors from the outside aren\'t the only threat. Insiders, like malicious employees, contractors and vendors, can also steal data from secured file servers, database servers, cloud applications and other sources. And if they have the right privileges, stealing that data can be a breeze. An insider\'s goals for data theft may include fraud, the disclosure of trade secrets to a competitor for financial gain, or even corporate sabotage. As for how they can exfiltrate data, insiders can use various means, from removable media to personal email to physical printouts. How does data theft happen? Now, let\'s look at some common methods that attackers working from the outside might employ to breach a company\'s defenses and steal data. Phishing. Cybercriminals use phishing to target users through email, text messages, phone calls and other forms of communication. The core objective of this approach is to trick users into doing what | Ransomware Data Breach Malware Tool Vulnerability Threat Cloud | ★★★ | |
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2024-01-30 05:00:16 | Mémoire de sécurité: \\ 'c'est la saison de Tax Hax Security Brief: \\'Tis the Season for Tax Hax (lien direct) |
Ce qui s'est passé Les chercheurs de ProofPoint ont récemment identifié le retour de TA576, un acteur de menace cybercriminale qui utilise des leurres sur le thème de la taxe ciblant spécifiquement les organisations comptables et financières.Cet acteur n'est généralement actif que les premiers mois de l'année pendant la saison fiscale des États-Unis, ciblant généralement les organisations en Amérique du Nord avec des campagnes de messagerie à faible volume.Dans toutes les campagnes, l'acteur par e-mail des demandes d'aide à la préparation des revenus et tentera de livrer des chevaux de Troie à distance (rats). Dans les deux premières campagnes observées en janvier 2024, l'acteur a utilisé un compte compromis pour envoyer des e-mails bénins censés demander une assistance fiscale.Bien que le compte de l'expéditeur ait été compromis, les e-mails comportaient une adresse de réponse avec un domaine récemment enregistré qui appartient probablement à l'acteur de menace.L'acteur de menace a fourni une trame de fond et a demandé des prix et une disponibilité.Si la cible a répondu, l'acteur de menace a répondu par une URL malveillante Google Firebase (Web.App). Lyure sur le thème des impôts utilisé par TA576. Si l'URL était cliquée, elle redirigea vers le téléchargement d'un fichier de raccourci zippé (LNK).Si ce raccourci était exécuté, il a exécuté PowerShell encodé via l'injection SyncappvpublishingServer.vbs lolbas.La commande PowerShell a lancé MSHTA pour exécuter la charge utile de l'application HTML (HTA) à partir d'une URL fournie.Vivant des techniques de binaires terrestres, scripts et bibliothèques (lolbas) devient de plus en plus populaire parmi les menaces cybercriminales. Exemple de cible de raccourci. Le code prend une séquence de valeurs numériques, soustrait un nombre de chacun (dans ce cas 593), et convertit chaque résultat en un caractère utilisant le casting de type [char], et concaténe les caractères en une chaîne stockée dans la variable $ k.Fait intéressant, le nombre soustrait diffère du raccourci au raccourci. La charge utile HTA a exécuté une commande PowerShell à AES Decrypt et décompresser une autre commande qui a téléchargé un exécutable dans le dossier% AppData% et l'a exécuté.Cette technique est similaire à celle précédemment documentée par SANS ISC.L'exécutable de la campagne TA576 a utilisé la technique d'évasion de la "porte du ciel" pour exécuter Parallax Rat. Résumé de la chaîne d'attaque: Message bénigne> Réponse cible> Réponse de l'acteur avec web.app URL> Redirection> zip> lnk> syncappvpublishingServer.vbs lolbas> PowerShell> mshta exécute HTA à partir de l'URL> PowerShell cryptée> Obfuscated PowerShell> Télécharger et exécuter l'exe exe Les campagnes de 2024 de TA576 \\ sont notables car il s'agit du premier point de preuve a observé que l'acteur livrant Parallax Rat.De plus, la chaîne d'attaque de l'acteur \\ à l'aide de techniques LOLBAS et de plusieurs scripts PowerShell est nettement différente des campagnes précédemment observées qui ont utilisé des URL pour zipper les charges utiles JavaScript ou des documents Microsoft Word en macro. Attribution TA576 est un acteur de menace cybercriminale.ProofPoint a suivi TA576 depuis 2018 via des techniques de création de courriels de spam, une utilisation des logiciels malveillants, des techniques de livraison de logiciels malveillants et d'autres caractéristiques.Cet acteur utilise des leurres d'impôt contenant des caractéristiques et des thèmes similaires pendant la saison fiscale américaine pour livrer et installer des rats.Les objectifs de suivi de Ta576 \\ sont inconnus.Bien que les secteurs les plus fréquemment observés ciblés incluent les entités comptables et financières, Proof Point a également observé le ciblage des industries connexes telles que le légal. Pourquoi est-ce important Les campagnes annuelles sur le thème de l'impôt de TA576 \\ servent de rappel récurrent que les acteurs des menaces de cybercri | Spam Malware Threat Prediction | ★★ | |
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2024-01-23 12:51:12 | Le paysage des menaces est toujours en train de changer: à quoi s'attendre en 2024 The Threat Landscape Is Always Changing: What to Expect in 2024 (lien direct) |
Gather \'round, cyber friends, and I\'ll let you in on a little secret: no one knows what the Next Big Thing on the threat landscape will be. But we can look back on 2023, identify notable changes and actor behaviors, and make educated assessments about what 2024 will bring. This month on the DISCARDED podcast my co-host Crista Giering and I sat down with our Threat Research leaders Daniel Blackford, Alexis Dorais-Joncas, Randy Pargman, and Rich Gonzalez, leaders of the ecrime, advanced persistent threat (APT), threat detection, and Emerging Threats teams, respectively. We discussed what we learned over the last year, and what\'s on the horizon for the future. While the discussions touched on different topics and featured different opinions on everything from artificial intelligence (AI) to living off the land binaries (LOLBins) to vulnerability exploitation to ransomware, there were some notable themes that are worth writing down. We can\'t say for sure what surprises are in store, but with our cyber crystals balls fully charged – and a deep knowledge of a year\'s worth of threat actor activity based on millions of email threats per day – we can predict with high confidence what\'s going to be impactful in the coming year. 1: Quick response (QR) codes will continue to proliferate 2023 was the year of the QR code. Although not new, QR codes burst on the scene over the last year and were used in many credential phishing and malware campaigns. The use was driven by a confluence of factors, but ultimately boiled down to the fact that people are now way more accustomed to scanning QR codes for everything from instructions to menus. And threat actors are taking advantage. Proofpoint recently launched new in-line sandboxing capabilities to better defend against this threat, and our teams anticipate seeing more of it in 2024. Notably, however, Dorais-Joncas points out that QR codes still just exist in the realm of ecrime – APT actors have not yet jumped on the QR code bandwagon. (Although, some of those APT actors bring ecrime energy to their campaigns, so it\'s possible they may start QR code phishing, too.) 2: Zero-day and N-day vulnerability exploitation A theme that appeared throughout our conversations was the creative use of vulnerabilities – both known and unreported – in threat actor activity. APT actors used a wide variety of exploits, from TA473 exploiting publicly-facing webmail servers to espionage actors using a zero-day in an email security gateway appliance that ultimately forced users to rip out and reinstall physical hardware. But ecrime actors also exploited their share of vulnerabilities, including the MOVEit file transfer service vulnerability from the spring of 2023 that had cascading repercussions, and the ScreenConnect flaw announced in the fall of 2023 – both of which were used by ecrime actors before being officially published. Proofpoint anticipates vulnerability exploitation will continue, driven in part by improved defense making old school techniques – like macro-enabled documents – much less useful, as well as the vast financial resources now available to cybercriminals that were once just the domain of APT. Pargman says the creativity from ecrime threat actors is a direct response of defenders imposing cost on our adversaries. 3: Continuing, unexpected behavior changes Avid listeners of the podcast know I have regularly said the ecrime landscape is extremely chaotic, with TA577 demonstrating the most chaotic vibes of them all. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of some of the most sophisticated actors continue to change. The cost imposed on threat actors that Pargman mentioned – from law enforcement takedowns of massive botnets like Qbot to improved detections and automated defenses – have forced threat actors, cybercriminals in particular, to regularly change their behaviors to figure out what is most effective. For example, recently Proofpoint has observed the increased use of: traffic dis | Ransomware Malware Tool Vulnerability Threat Prediction | ★★★ | |
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2024-01-22 06:00:26 | Types de menaces et d'attaques d'identité que vous devez être consciente Types of Identity Threats and Attacks You Should Be Aware Of (lien direct) |
It\'s easy to understand why today\'s cybercriminals are so focused on exploiting identities as a key step in their attacks. Once they have access to a user\'s valid credentials, they don\'t have to worry about finding creative ways to break into an environment. They are already in. Exploiting identities requires legwork and persistence to be successful. But in many ways this tactic is simpler than exploiting technical vulnerabilities. In the long run, a focus on turning valid identities into action can save bad actors a lot of time, energy and resources. Clearly, it\'s become a favored approach for many attackers. In the past year, 84% of companies experienced an identity-related security breach. To defend against identity-based attacks, we must understand how bad actors target the authentication and authorization mechanisms that companies use to manage and control access to their resources. In this blog post, we will describe several forms of identity-based attacks and methods and offer an overview of some security controls that can help keep identity attacks at bay. Types of identity-based attacks and methods Below are eight examples of identity attacks and related strategies. This is not an exhaustive list and, of course, cybercriminals are always evolving their techniques. But this list does provide a solid overview of the most common types of identity threats. 1. Credential stuffing Credential stuffing is a type of brute-force attack. Attackers add pairs of compromised usernames and passwords to botnets that automate the process of trying to use the credentials on many different websites at the same time. The goal is to identify account combinations that work and can be reused across multiple sites. Credential stuffing is a common identity attack technique, in particular for widely used web applications. When bad actors find a winning pair, they can steal from and disrupt many places at once. Unfortunately, this strategy is highly effective because users often use the same passwords across multiple websites. 2. Password spraying Another brute-force identity attack method is password spraying. A bad actor will use this approach to attempt to gain unauthorized access to user accounts by systematically trying commonly used passwords against many usernames. Password spraying isn\'t a traditional brute-force attack where an attacker attempts to use many passwords against a single account. It is a more subtle and stealthy approach that aims to avoid account lockouts. Here\'s how this identity attack usually unfolds: The attacker gathers a list of usernames through public information sources, leaked databases, reconnaissance activities, the dark web and other means. They then select a small set of commonly used or easily guessable passwords. Next, the attacker tries each of the selected passwords against a large number of user accounts until they find success. Password spraying is designed to fly under the radar of traditional security detection systems. These systems may not flag these identity-based attacks due to the low number of failed login attempts per user. Services that do not implement account lockout policies or have weak password policies are at risk for password spraying attacks. 3. Phishing Here\'s a classic and very effective tactic that\'s been around since the mid-1990s. Attackers use social engineering and phishing to target users through email, text messages, phone calls and other forms of communication. The aim of a phishing attack is to trick users into falling for the attacker\'s desired action. That can include providing system login credentials, revealing financial data, installing malware or sharing other sensitive data. Phishing attack methods have become more sophisticated over the years, but they still rely on social engineering to be effective. 4. Social engineering Social engineering is more of an ingredient in an identity attack. It\'s all about the deception and manipulation of users, and it\'s a feature in | Malware Vulnerability Threat Patching Technical | ★★ | |
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2024-01-18 05:00:52 | Mémoire de sécurité: TA866 revient avec une grande campagne de messagerie Security Brief: TA866 Returns with a Large Email Campaign (lien direct) |
What happened Proofpoint researchers identified the return of TA866 to email threat campaign data, after a nine-month absence. On January 11, 2024, Proofpoint blocked a large volume campaign consisting of several thousand emails targeting North America. Invoice-themed emails had attached PDFs with names such as “Document_[10 digits].pdf” and various subjects such as “Project achievements”. The PDFs contained OneDrive URLs that, if clicked, initiated a multi-step infection chain eventually leading to the malware payload, a variant of the WasabiSeed and Screenshotter custom toolset. Screenshot of an email with an attached PDF. If the user clicked on the OneDrive URL inside the PDF, they were: Served a JavaScript file hosted on OneDrive. The JavaScript, if run by the user, downloaded and ran an MSI file. The MSI file executed an embedded WasabiSeed VBS script. The WasabiSeed VBS script then downloaded and executed a second MSI file as well as continued polling for additional payloads in a loop. The additional payloads are currently unknown. Finally, the second MSI file contained components of the Screenshotter screenshot utility which took a screenshot of the desktop and sent it the C2. Attack chain summary: Email > PDF > OneDrive URL > JavaScript > MSI / VBS (WasabiSeed) > MSI (Screenshotter). The attack chain was similar to the last documented email campaign using this custom toolset observed by Proofpoint on March 20, 2023. The similarities helped with attribution. Specifically, TA571 spam service was similarly used, the WasabiSeed downloader remained almost the same, and the Screenshotter scripts and components remained almost the same. (Analyst Note: While Proofpoint did not initially associate the delivery TTPs with TA571 in our first publication on TA866, subsequent analysis attributed the malspam delivery of the 2023 campaigns to TA571, and subsequent post-exploitation activity to TA866.) One of the biggest changes in this campaign from the last observed activity was the use of a PDF attachment containing a OneDrive link, which was completely new. Previous campaigns used macro-enabled Publisher attachments or 404 TDS URLs directly in the email body. Screenshot of “TermServ.vbs” WasabiSeed script whose purpose is to execute an infinite loop, reaching out to C2 server and attempting to download and run an MSI file (empty lines were removed from this script for readability). Screenshot of “app.js”, one of the components of Screenshotter. This file runs “snap.exe”, a copy of legitimate IrfanView executable, (also included inside the MSI) to save a desktop screenshot as “gs.jpg”. Screenshot of “index.js”, another Screenshotter component. This code is responsible for uploading the desktop screenshot ”gs.jpg” to the C2 server. Attribution There are two threat actors involved in the observed campaign. Proofpoint tracks the distribution service used to deliver the malicious PDF as belonging to a threat actor known as TA571. TA571 is a spam distributor, and this actor sends high volume spam email campaigns to deliver and install a variety malware for their cybercriminal customers. Proofpoint tracks the post-exploitation tools, specifically the JavaScript, MSI with WasabiSeed components, and MSI with Screenshotter components as belonging to TA866. TA866 is a threat actor previously documented by Proofpoint and colleagues in [1][2] and [3]. TA866 is known to engage in both crimeware and cyberespionage activity. This specific campaign appears financially motivated. Proofpoint assesses that TA866 is an organized actor able to perform well thought-out attacks at scale based on their availability of custom tools, and ability and connections to purchase tools and services from other actors. Why it matters The following are notable characteristics of TA866\'s return to email threat data: TA866 email campaigns have been missing from the landscape for over nine months (although there are indications that the actor was meanwhile | Spam Malware Tool Threat | ★★ | |
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2024-01-16 08:32:19 | Défense post-livraison à propulsion du cloud: la dernière innovation de Proofpoint \\ dans la protection des e-mails Cloud-Powered Post-Delivery Defense: Proofpoint\\'s Latest Innovation in Email Protection (lien direct) |
Cybercriminals are constantly innovating so that they can infiltrate your systems and steal your valuable data. They do this through a complex multi-stage method commonly known as the attack chain. During the initial compromise, attackers use advanced email threats like phishing scams, malware attachments, business email compromise (BEC) and QR code threats to get a foothold in your systems. That\'s why email security tools typically focus on stopping these threats. Steps in the attack chain. But no technology is foolproof. Inevitably, some emails will get through. To keep your company safe, you need an email security solution that can detect, analyze and remediate email threats post-delivery. That\'s where Proofpoint can help. Proofpoint Cloud Threat Response is the cloud-based alternative to TRAP (Threat Response Auto-Pull), known for its effective post-delivery remediation capabilities. Not only is this solution easy to use, but it also automates post-detection incident response and remediation tasks that slow down security teams. In this blog post, we\'ll highlight some of its capabilities and benefits. Overview of Cloud Threat Response capabilities Proofpoint Cloud Threat Response keeps you safer by remediating threats post-delivery. Plus, it helps security teams prioritize and execute response actions three different ways: Automatically by Proofpoint. Cloud Threat Response automatically analyzes emails post-delivery. It identifies and quarantines malicious emails within user inboxes. Doing so reduces the risk that users will interact with them, helping to prevent your business from being compromised. Manually by the SOC team. Your security team gains instant access to detailed email analysis, historical data and risk scoring through an integration with Proofpoint Smart Search. This integration makes it easier for you to delve into specific emails and swiftly identify and remove any lurking threats. With the assistance of end users. Users can report messages that look suspicious thanks to a simple button directly integrated into their mailboxes. Reported emails are automatically investigated and are neutralized if determined to be a threat. Proofpoint Cloud Threat Response benefits At many companies, security incident response is a slow and labor-intensive process. Responding to security incidents may take days or weeks depending on the size of your security team. Time-intensive tasks can turn into painful bottlenecks. Compare that to Proofpoint Cloud Threat Response, which automates and simplifies threat response tasks. Here\'s what you can expect: Enjoy a simplified management interface. Our centralized, modern interface simplifies how you manage email security. From this dashboard, you can manage a range of tasks, including threat reporting, threat analysis and user administration. The simplified, modern interface of Proofpoint Cloud Threat Response. Respond to incidents faster. Proofpoint Cloud Threat Response acts on intelligence from our Supernova detection engine, which improves threat detection and reduces the mean time to respond (MTTR). Spend less time on deployment and maintenance. Because it\'s cloud native, our platform is not only easy to deploy but it eliminates the need for on-premises infrastructure. Plus, your investment is future-proof, and it comes with automated maintenance and security updates. Streamline security operations. Use Single Sign-On (SSO) to seamlessly navigate between Cloud Threat Response and other Proofpoint apps such as Targeted Attack Protection, Email Fraud Defense and Email Protection. This helps to boost analyst efficiency and response times. See more threats. It automatically shares a threat\'s remediation status across your other Proofpoint platforms. This increases threat visibility and helps you to identify and neutralize threats faster. Proofpoint Cloud Threat Response is integrated with Proofpoint threat intelligence and abuse mailbox sources. Contain threats quickly. Malici | Malware Tool Threat Cloud | ★★ | |
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2024-01-12 06:00:17 | Déterministe vs détection de menace probabiliste: quelle est la différence? Deterministic vs. Probabilistic Threat Detection: What\\'s the Difference? (lien direct) |
When you understand the difference between deterministic and probabilistic threat detection, you can better choose the right mix of processes and tools that will keep your data, systems and users most secure. Here is a spoiler, though: As you compare probabilistic and deterministic methods, you will likely conclude that both approaches are needed to some degree. That means you\'re on the right track. When you employ both, you can use the strengths of each approach while mitigating their respective weaknesses. In other words, these methods are different but complementary. To help you figure out when to use each method, we put together this overview. In each section, we start by defining terms, and then we delve into the pros and cons of using the approach to detect threats. What is probabilistic threat detection? Probabilistic threat detection involves the use of probability-based analytic methods to identify potential security threats or malicious activities within a system. This approach doesn\'t rely on fixed (deterministic) rules or signatures alone. Instead, it relies on the likelihood-or probability-that certain behaviors or patterns may indicate the presence of a security threat. Tools for probabilistic threat detection analyze various factors and assign weights to different indicators. That helps cybersecurity systems-and security teams-to prioritize and respond to potential threats based on their perceived risk. This approach to threat detection presents advantages as well as challenges. Here\'s a look at some of the pros and cons of using probabilistic and deterministic detections. Pros Let\'s start with the pros of probabilistic threat detection. Adaptability to new threats. Probabilistic threat detection can help you identify new and evolving threats that may not have definitive signatures. Machine learning and behavioral analysis can adapt to changing attack tactics. Slight pivots in attacker tools and techniques won\'t necessarily fake out these detection techniques. Reduced false positives to unknown threats. Probabilistic methods may result in fewer false negatives for threats that have not been seen before. That\'s because these methods don\'t require a perfect match to a known signature to send an alert. Probabilistic methods are inherently non-binary. Behavioral analysis. This is often part of probabilistic threat detection. It typically uses a baseline of normal system behavior. That, in turn, makes it easier to detect deviations that may indicate a security threat. Continuous learning. Machine learning models for probabilistic threat detection can continuously learn, incorporate feedback from security analysts, and adapt to changes in the threat landscape. That means their accuracy is not static and can improve over time. Cons Now, here is a rundown of some cons. False positives. Probabilistic methods will produce false positives. They rely on statistical models that might interpret unusual but benign behavior as a potential threat. That can lead to alerts on activities that aren\'t malicious. Taken to extremes this can waste security analysts\' time. But making the models less sensitive can lead to false negatives. That\'s why tuning is part of ongoing maintenance. Complexity and resource intensiveness. Implementing and maintaining probabilistic threat detection systems can be complex and demand a lot of resources. That is especially true when it comes to systems that use machine learning because they require a great deal of computing power and expertise to operate. Cost issues. Probabilistic methods and tools deal with uncertainty, which is a key design principle. So they may not be as cost effective as deterministic approaches for detecting well-known threats. Difficulty in interpreting results. It can be a challenge to understand the output of probabilistic models. You may have difficulty discerning why a particular activity is flagged as a potential threat, as the rationale is deep within the model. To interpret the results, you | Malware Tool Vulnerability Threat | ★★ | |
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2024-01-09 11:57:12 | L'augmentation préoccupante des attaques centrées sur l'identité: tendances et faits The Concerning Rise in Identity-Centric Attacks: Trends and Facts (lien direct) |
Identity threats are by no means a new type of crime. But in today\'s increasingly digitized world, there are more opportunities for bad actors to steal identities and engage in identity-centric attacks than ever before. Unfortunately, user identities are tough for businesses to protect. The fact that these types of attacks are skyrocketing is evidence of that-in the past year alone the Identity Defined Security Alliance reports that a whopping 84% of companies experienced an identity-related security breach. In this post, we\'ll take a look at identity attack statistics and trends and provide some recent case studies to illustrate how some attacks work. We\'ll also highlight one of the most important identity threat facts-that the human element plays a crucial role in the success of these attacks. Understanding identity-centric attacks There are many types of identity attacks. When most people think of these types of crimes, they often imagine traditional identity theft scenarios: Financial identity theft, where a criminal gains access to a victim\'s financial data, like their credit card details, bank account numbers or Social Security number, to make unauthorized purchases, withdraw funds or open new accounts. Tax identity theft, where a bad actor uses a victim\'s personal information to file false tax returns and claim refunds, diverting the money to their own accounts. Employment identity theft, where a fraudster uses a victim\'s identity to get a job, potentially causing issues for that person when discrepancies arise in their employment and tax records. But identity-based attacks also target enterprises and their online users. The cybercriminals behind these attacks might aim to steal sensitive data, siphon off funds, damage or disrupt systems, deploy ransomware or worse. Those are the types of identity attacks we\'re covering here. Identity threat trends and tactics In short, identity-centric attacks are a practical calculation by bad actors: Why would they invest their time and resources to build exploits to help them get in through a virtual back door when they can just walk through the front door? But before they reap the rewards, they still have some legwork to do. Here are a few techniques that cybercriminals use to progress identity-based attacks against businesses and their users: MFA bypass attacks. Many businesses today use multifactor authentication (MFA) to protect the account of their users. It\'s more secure than using passwords alone. But of course, bad actors have found new ways to bypass commonly used MFA methods. MFA fatigue attacks are one example. People-activated malware. People often give life to malware when they fall for a phishing scam or other social engineering tactics. Malware can appear in the form of a .zip file, QR code, .html link, MS Office file and more-there are at least 60 known techniques to plant people-activated malware on corporate networks. Active Directory (AD) attacks. Most enterprises today use AD as a primary method for directory services like user authentication and authorization. Cybercriminals are keen to target AD, which touches almost every place, person and device on a network. This approach works very well, too-more than half of identity-related breaches can be traced back to AD. Cached credentials harvesting. Cached credentials are commonly stored on endpoints, in memory, in the registry, in a browser or on disk. Attackers use various tools and techniques to collect these credentials and gain access to more privileged identities. Once they have harvested these credentials, they can use them to move laterally and log into different applications. Adversaries are likely to find a good “crop” when they are harvesting cached credentials. Recent research from Proofpoint found that more than one in 10 endpoints have exposed privileged account passwords, making it one of the most common identity risks. Keep in mind that cybercriminals are always innovating, and they are quick to build or adopt tools that | Ransomware Malware Tool Threat Studies | Uber | ★★ |
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2024-01-04 06:00:10 | Cybersecurity Stop of the Month: MFA Manipulation (lien direct) | This blog post is part of a monthly series exploring the ever-evolving tactics of today\'s cybercriminals. Cybersecurity Stop of the Month focuses on the critical first three steps in the attack chain in the context of email threats. The series is designed to help you understand how to fortify your defenses to protect people and defend data against emerging threats in today\'s dynamic threat landscape. The critical first three steps of the attack chain: reconnaissance, initial compromise and persistence. So far in this series, we have covered the following types of attacks: Supplier compromise EvilProxy SocGholish eSignature phishing QR code phishing Telephone-oriented attack delivery (TOAD) Payroll diversion In this post, we examine an attack technique called multifactor (MFA) manipulation. This malicious post-compromise attack poses a significant threat to cloud platforms. We cover the typical attack sequence to help you understand how it works. And we dive deeper into how Proofpoint account takeover capabilities detected and prevented one of these threats for our customer. Background MFA manipulation is an advanced technique where bad actors introduce their own MFA method into a compromised cloud account. These attackers are used after a cloud account takeover attack, or ATO. ATOs are an insidious threat that are alarmingly common. Recent research by Proofpoint threat analysts found that in 2023 almost all businesses (96%) were targeted by cloud-based attacks. What\'s more, a whopping 60% were successfully compromised and had at least one account taken over. MFA manipulation attacks can work several ways with bad actors having multiple options for getting around MFA. One way is to use an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attack. This is where the bad actor inserts a proxy server between the victim and the website that they\'re trying to log into. Doing so enables them to steal that user\'s password as well as the session cookie. There\'s no indication to the user that they\'ve been attacked-it just seems like they\'ve logged into their account as usual. However, the attackers have what they need to establish persistence, which means they can maintain access even if the stolen MFA credentials are revoked or deemed invalid. The scenario Recently, Proofpoint intercepted a series of MFA manipulation attacks on a large real estate company. In one case, the bad actors used an AiTM attack to steal the credentials of the firm\'s financial controller as well as the session cookie. Once they did that, they logged into that user\'s business account and generated 27 unauthorized access activities. The threat: How did the attack happen? Here is a closer look at how this MFA manipulation attack played out: 1. Bad actors used the native “My Sign-Ins” app to add their own MFA methods to compromise Microsoft 365 accounts. We observed that the attackers registered their own authenticator app with notification and code. They made this move right after they gained access to the hijacked account as part of an automated attack flow execution. This, in turn, allowed them to secure their foothold within the targeted cloud environment. The typical MFA manipulation flow using Microsoft\'s “My Sign-Ins” app. 2. After the compromise, the attackers demonstrated a sophisticated approach. They combined MFA manipulation with OAuth application abuse. With OAuth abuse, an attacker authorizes and/or uses a third-party app to steal data, spread malware or execute other malicious activities. Attackers also use the abused app to maintain persistent access to specific resources even after their initial access to a compromised account has been cut off. 3. The attackers authorized the seemingly benign application, “PERFECTDATA SOFTWARE,” to gain persistent access to the user\'s account and the systems, as well as the resources and applications that the user could access. The permissions the attackers requested for this app included: | Malware Tool Vulnerability Threat Cloud | ★★★ | |
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2023-12-21 05:00:25 | Battleroyal, le cluster Darkgate se propage par e-mail et les fausses mises à jour du navigateur BattleRoyal, DarkGate Cluster Spreads via Email and Fake Browser Updates (lien direct) |
Overview Throughout the summer and fall of 2023, DarkGate entered the ring competing for the top spot in the remote access trojan (RAT) and loader category. It was observed in use by multiple cybercrime actors and was spread via many methods such as email, Microsoft Teams, Skype, malvertising and fake updates. Proofpoint researchers are tracking a particularly interesting operator of the DarkGate malware. At the time of publication, researchers are not attributing this cluster of activity to a known threat actor and are temporarily calling it BattleRoyal. Between September and November 2023, at least 20 email campaigns used DarkGate malware with GroupIDs “PLEX”, “ADS5”, “user_871236672” and “usr_871663321”. The GroupID is a configuration setting that is also referred to as username, botnet, campaign, or flag 23. The campaigns are notable for: Delivery: via email and RogueRaticate fake browser updates Volumes and geography: email campaigns include tens of thousands of emails targeting dozens of industries primarily in USA and Canada Attack chain: includes a variety of notable tools such as 404 TDS, Keitaro TDS, and .URL files exploiting CVE-2023-36025 Volume of DarkGate campaigns based on four GroupIDs discussed in this report. TDS all the things! (an email campaign example) On October 2, 2023, Proofpoint identified one of the first campaigns in this cluster. It was notable due to the use of more than one traffic delivery system (TDS), specifically 404 TDS and Keitaro TDS. Additionally, the .URL files involved exploited CVE-2023-36025, a vulnerability in Windows SmartScreen. While other parts of the attack chain from this actor changed or varied, .URL files were involved in every campaign. The emails in this campaign contained: 404 TDS URLs that, if clicked by the user, redirected to Keitaro TDS Keitaro TDS was observed serving an internet shortcut (.URL) file The internet shortcut, if double clicked, downloaded a zipped VBS script The VBS in turn downloaded and executed several shell commands (cmd.exe) The shell commands (a) created a directory on C: drive, (b) copied curl.exe from system folder to this new directory, (c) used the curl to download Autoit3.exe, (d) used curl to download and save an AutoIT script, and (e) ran the downloaded AutoIT script with the downloaded AutoIT interpreter The AutoIT script ran an embedded DarkGate Attack chain summary that follows the flow of: Email > 404 TDS > Keitaro TDS > .URL > .VBS > Shell commands > AutoIT / AutoIT script > DarkGate. Screenshot of an example email from October 2 campaign. Screenshot of the .URL file involved in the October 2 campaign. Proofpoint has identified multiple cybercriminal campaigns exploiting CVE-2023-36025; however, the BattleRoyal cluster exploited this vulnerability more than any other actor observed in Proofpoint threat data. Notably, this activity cluster exploited CVE-2023-36025 before it was published by Microsoft. SmartScreen is a security feature that is designed to prevent people from visiting malicious websites. The vulnerability could allow an actor to bypass the SmartScreen defenses if a user clicked on a specially crafted .URL file or a hyperlink pointing to a .URL file. More specifically, a SmartScreen alert would not be triggered when a .URL points to a SMB or WebDav share as file:// and the malicious payload is inside a ZIP file which is specified in the URL target. RogueRaticate (fake browser update campaign example) On October 19, 2023, an external researcher identified and publicly shared details of the RogueRaticate fake update activity cluster using an interesting obfuscation technique first identified in 2020. Proofpoint subsequently identified the activity in Proofpoint data. This campaign delivered fake browser update requests to end users on their web browsers that dropped a DarkGate payload with the “ADS5” GroupID. The threat actor injected a request to a domain they controlled that used .css steganography to conceal the malicious c | Malware Tool Vulnerability Threat Prediction | ★★ | |
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2023-12-14 09:00:56 | La détection de code QR malveillant fait un bond en avant géant Malicious QR Code Detection Takes a Giant Leap Forward (lien direct) |
Proofpoint introduces inline, pre-delivery QR code detection engine to help protect against imaged-based QR code phishing attacks QR code phishing, also known as quishing, is the latest attack hitting inboxes. This emerging threat is able to get around traditional email defenses and is forging a new way to deliver email attacks directly to users. Along with email phishing, executive impersonation, spear phishing and business email compromise (BEC), this threat has become one of the top concerns for security and IT teams. In response, Proofpoint has launched new inline sandboxing capabilities to detect and stop suspicious QR code threats. Not only do we support behavioral and sandbox detection engines, but we also provide pre- and post-scanning for risky QR codes. When combined, these capabilities more accurately detect and better protect against this new threat vector. Most API-based email security tools rely on behavioral signals, which means they can only detect a suspicious QR code email after it has been delivered to the user\'s inbox. In contrast, Proofpoint stops attacks pre-delivery, so threats can never make it to users\' inboxes. In this blog post, we\'ll cover what you should know about QR code phishing and detection-and how Proofpoint can help. Why QR codes? When Microsoft disabled macros to prevent threat actors from exploiting them to deliver malware, threat actors started to test various new attack delivery techniques, such as QR codes. Used by marketers as a quick and easy way to connect with consumers and drive engagement, QR codes have become a part of our daily lives and are now used in retail stores, airline tickets, contactless menus and scan-to-pay, among many others. While it\'s common knowledge that standard QR codes can be used in malicious ways, a recent Scantrust QR code survey found that “over 80% of US-based QR code users said that they think QR codes are safe.” It\'s this inherent trust of QR codes that threat actors depend on. That and the fact that QR codes do not expose malicious URLs make them very hard detect with traditional email security tools. What is QR code phishing? A QR code scam is when a bad actor creates a QR code phishing campaign to trick a user into navigating to a malicious URL. This leads them to a malicious website that then harvests their credentials or downloads malware onto their device. These campaigns include payment scams, package scams, email scams and even donation scams during the holiday season. Because all QR codes look similar, users are easily fooled. Figure 1: How a QR scam typically works. Why are QR codes getting through? Legacy email security providers and most API-based email security tools have a very difficult time detecting these attacks. That\'s because these tools scan email messages for known malicious links-they don\'t scan images for links that are hidden inside QR code images. This attack method also creates a new security blind spot. QR codes are scanned by a separate device, like a smartphone, from where the email is delivered. And smartphones are less likely to have robust security protection, which is needed to detect and prevent these attacks. For this reason, it\'s essential that an email security tool detects and blocks QR code phishing emails before they reach users\' inboxes. When messages are scanned post-delivery, like with API-based tools, there\'s a chance that users will get to them first-before they\'re clawed back. Post-delivery-only detection risks Post-delivery-only email security tools claim to “detect and block” QR code phishing emails, but they simply cannot. While they may “detect” a suspicious QR code email, it\'s only after the threat has been delivered to the user\'s inbox. Moreover, these tools do not sandbox suspicious QR codes. This means they have a high miss rate-which creates more risk for your company. Besides creating more risk, they also create more work for your teams. By relying solely on behavioral anomalies, these tools | Malware Tool Threat Mobile Cloud | ★★★ | |
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2023-12-12 05:00:00 | Mémoire de sécurité: TA4557 cible les recruteurs directement par e-mail Security Brief: TA4557 Targets Recruiters Directly via Email (lien direct) |
What happened Since at least October 2023, TA4557 began using a new technique of targeting recruiters with direct emails that ultimately lead to malware delivery. The initial emails are benign and express interest in an open role. If the target replies, the attack chain commences. Previously, throughout most of 2022 and 2023, TA4557 typically applied to existing open job listings purporting to be a job applicant. The actor included malicious URLs, or files containing malicious URLs, in the application. Notably, the URLs were not hyperlinked and the user would have to copy and paste the URL text to visit the website. The legitimate job hosting sites would then generate and send email notifications to the prospective employers who posted the positions. In recently observed campaigns, TA4557 used both the new method of emailing recruiters directly as well as the older technique of applying to jobs posted on public job boards to commence the attack chain. Specifically in the attack chain that uses the new direct email technique, once the recipient replies to the initial email, the actor was observed responding with a URL linking to an actor-controlled website posing as a candidate resume. Alternatively, the actor was observed replying with a PDF or Word attachment containing instructions to visit the fake resume website. Example initial outreach email by TA4557 to inquire about a job posting. Example follow up email containing a URL linking to a fake resume website. Very notably, in campaigns observed in early November 2023, Proofpoint observed TA4557 direct the recipient to “refer to the domain name of my email address to access my portfolio” in the initial email instead of sending the resume website URL directly in a follow up response. This is likely a further attempt to evade automated detection of suspicious domains. Email purporting to be from a candidate directing the recipient to visit the domain in an email address. If the potential victims visit the “personal website” as directed by the threat actor, the page mimics a candidate\'s resume or job site for the candidate (TA4557) applying for a posted role. The website uses filtering to determine whether to direct the user to the next stage of the attack chain. Example of a fake candidate website operated by TA4557 that leads to download of a zip attachment. If the potential victim does not pass the filtering checks, they are directed to a page containing a resume in plain text. Alternatively, if they pass the filtering checks, they are directed to the candidate website. The candidate website uses a CAPTCHA which, if completed, will initiate the download of a zip file containing a shortcut file (LNK). The LNK, if executed, abuses legitimate software functions in "ie4uinit.exe" to download and execute a scriptlet from a location stored in the "ie4uinit.inf" file. This technique is commonly referred to as "Living Off The Land" (LOTL). The scriptlet decrypts and drops a DLL in the %APPDATA%\Microsoft folder. Next, it attempts to create a new regsrv32 process to execute the DLL using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) and, if that fails, tries an alternative approach using the ActiveX Object Run method. The DLL employs anti-sandbox and anti-analysis techniques. It incorporates a loop specifically designed to retrieve the RC4 key necessary for deciphering the More_Eggs backdoor. This loop is strategically crafted to extend its execution time, enhancing its evasion capabilities within a sandbox environment. Furthermore, the DLL employs multiple checks to determine if it is currently being debugged, utilizing the NtQueryInformationProcess function. The DLL drops the More_Eggs backdoor along with the MSXSL executable. Subsequently, it initiates the creation of the MSXSL process using the WMI service. Once completed, the DLL deletes itself. More_Eggs can be used to establish persistence, profile the machine, and drop additional payloads. Attribution Proofpoint has been tracking TA4557 since 2018 as a | Malware Tool Threat | ★★★ | |
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2023-12-08 06:00:37 | Protéger les identités: comment ITDR complète EDR et XDR pour garder les entreprises plus en sécurité Protecting identities: How ITDR Complements EDR and XDR to Keep Companies Safer (lien direct) |
Defenders who want to proactively protect their company\'s identities have no shortage of security tools to choose from. There are so many, in fact, that it seems like a new category of tool is invented every few months just to help keep them all straight. Because most security teams are finding it increasingly difficult to stop attackers as they use identity vulnerabilities to escalate privilege and move laterally across their organization\'s IT environment, some of today\'s newest tools focus on this middle part of the attack chain. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) and extended detection and response (XDR) are two tools that claim to cover this specialized area of defense. But unfortunately, because of their fundamental architecture and core capabilities, that\'s not really what they do best. That\'s why a new category of tool-identity threat detection and response (ITDR)-is emerging to fill the gaps. In this blog post, we\'ll explain the difference between EDR, XDR and ITDR so that you can understand how these tools complement and reinforce each other. They each have strengths, and when they\'re combined they provide even better security coverage. But first, let\'s rewind the cybersecurity evolution timeline back to the 1980s to understand why ITDR has emerged as a critical defense measure in today\'s threat landscape. The rise of antivirus software and firewalls We\'re starting in the 1980s because that\'s the decade that saw the advent of computer networks and the proliferation of personal computers. It also saw the rapid rise of new threats due to adversaries taking advantage of both trends. There were notable computer threats prior to this decade, of course. The “Creeper” self-replicating program in 1971 and the ANIMAL Trojan in 1975 are two examples. But the pace of development picked up considerably during the 1980s as personal computing and computer networking spread, and bad actors and other mischief-makers sought to profit from or simply break into (or break) devices and systems. In 1987, the aptly named Bernd Robert Fix, a German computer security expert, developed a software program to stop a virus known as Vienna. This virus destroyed random files on the computers it infected. Fix\'s program worked-and the antivirus software industry was born. However, while early antivirus tools were useful, they could only detect and remove known viruses from infected systems. The introduction of firewalls to monitor and control network traffic is another security advancement from the decade. Early “network layer” firewalls were designed to judge “packets” (small chunks of data) based on simple information like the source, destination and connection type. If the packets passed muster, they were sent to the system requesting the data; if not, they were discarded. The internet explosion-and the escalation of cybercrime The late 1990s and early 2000s witnessed the explosive growth of the internet as a key business platform, kicking off an era of tremendous change. It brought new opportunities but also many new security risks and threats. Cybercrime expanded and became a more formalized and global industry during this time. Bad actors focused on developing malware and other threats. Email with malicious attachments and crafty social engineering strategies quickly became favorite tools for adversaries looking to distribute their innovations and employ unsuspecting users in helping to activate their criminal campaigns. As cyberthreats became more sophisticated, defenders evolved traditional detective security tools to feature: Signature-based detection to identify known malware Heuristic analysis to detect previously difficult to detect threats based on suspicious behavioral patterns All of these methods were effective to a degree. But once again, they could not keep in step with cybercriminal innovation and tended to generate a lot of false positives and false negatives. Enter the SIEM Around 2005, security information and event management (SIEM) tools emerged to enhance | Ransomware Malware Tool Vulnerability Threat Studies Cloud | ★★★ | |
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2023-12-05 05:00:40 | TA422 \\ Soule d'exploitation dédiée - la même semaine après semaine TA422\\'s Dedicated Exploitation Loop-the Same Week After Week (lien direct) |
Key takeaways Since March 2023, Proofpoint researchers have observed regular TA422 (APT28) phishing activity, in which the threat actor leveraged patched vulnerabilities to send, at times, high-volume campaigns to targets in Europe and North America. TA422 used the vulnerabilities as initial access against government, aerospace, education, finance, manufacturing, and technology sector targets likely to either disclose user credentials or initiate follow-on activity. The vulnerabilities included CVE-2023-23397-a Microsoft Outlook elevation of privilege flaw that allows a threat actor to exploit TNEF files and initiate NTLM negotiation, obtaining a hash of a target\'s NTLM password-and CVE-2023-38831-a WinRAR remote code execution flaw that allows execution of “arbitrary code when a user attempts to view a benign file within a ZIP archive,” according to the NIST disclosure. Overview Starting in March 2023, Proofpoint researchers have observed the Russian advanced persistent threat (APT) TA422 readily use patched vulnerabilities to target a variety of organizations in Europe and North America. TA422 overlaps with the aliases APT28, Forest Blizzard, Pawn Storm, Fancy Bear, and BlueDelta, and is attributed by the United States Intelligence Community to the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). While TA422 conducted traditional targeted activity during this period, leveraging Mockbin and InfinityFree for URL redirection, Proofpoint observed a significant deviation from expected volumes of emails sent in campaigns exploiting CVE-2023-23397-a Microsoft Outlook elevation of privilege vulnerability. This included over 10,000 emails sent from the adversary, from a single email provider, to defense, aerospace, technology, government, and manufacturing entities, and, occasionally, included smaller volumes at higher education, construction, and consulting entities. Proofpoint researchers also identified TA422 campaigns leveraging a WinRAR remote execution vulnerability, CVE-2023-38831. Bar chart showing the breakdown of TA422 phishing activity from March 2023 to November 2023. Please attend: CVE-2023-23397-test meeting In late March 2023, TA422 started to launch high volume campaigns exploiting CVE-2023-23397 targeting higher education, government, manufacturing, and aerospace technology entities in Europe and North America. TA422 previously used an exploit for CVE-2023-23397 to target Ukrainian entities as early as April 2022, according to open-source reporting by CERT-EU. In the Proofpoint-identified campaigns, our researchers initially observed small numbers of emails attempting to exploit this vulnerability. The first surge in activity caught our attention partly due to all the emails pointing to the same listener server, but mostly due to the volume. This campaign was very large compared to typical state-aligned espionage campaign activity Proofpoint tracks. Proofpoint observed over 10,000 repeated attempts to exploit the Microsoft Outlook vulnerability, targeting the same accounts daily during the late summer of 2023. It is unclear if this was operator error or an informed effort to collect target credentials. TA422 re-targeted many of the higher education and manufacturing users previously targeted in March 2023. It is unclear why TA422 re-targeted these entities with the same exploit. Based upon the available campaign data, Proofpoint suspects that these entities are priority targets and as a result, the threat actor attempted broad, lower effort campaigns regularly to try and gain access. Like the high-volume TA422 campaign Proofpoint researchers identified in March 2023, the late summer 2023 messages contained an appointment attachment, using the Transport Neutral Encapsulation Format (TNEF) file. The TNEF file used a fake file extension to masquerade as a CSV, Excel file, or Word document, and contained an UNC path directing traffic to an SMB listener being hosted on a likely compromised Ubiquiti router. TA422 has previously used compromised routers to host the gr | Malware Vulnerability Threat | APT 28 | ★★★ |
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2023-11-30 07:23:34 | Améliorations aux solutions fédérales de preuvepoint: un nouveau moteur de détection AI / ML, mises à jour du tableau de bord TAP et plus Enhancements to Proofpoint Federal Solutions: A New AI/ML Detection Engine, Updates to the TAP Dashboard and More (lien direct) |
ProofPoint a fait plus d'investissements dans notre plate-forme de protection contre les menaces AEGIS cette année qui peut aider à soutenir nos clients et partenaires de nos agences fédérales dans leurs missions.Ce blog donne un aperçu de certaines de ces innovations et améliorations récentes.
Moteur comportemental de supernova
En octobre, nous avons commencé à déployer le moteur comportemental Supernova pour Proofpoint FedRamp Reptection Environments.Supernova est une pile de détection de pointe qui utilise l'intelligence artificielle avancée et l'apprentissage automatique pour arrêter les menaces en temps réel.
Non seulement Supernova arrête le spam, mais il protège également contre les menaces qui ne comptent pas sur des logiciels malveillants, comme les compromis par courrier électronique (BEC), la fraude des fournisseurs et les attaques de livraison d'attaques axées sur le téléphone (TOAD).Il détecte également les menaces basées sur les logiciels malveillants, comme les ransomwares.Et il analyse les messages de phishing avant la livraison afin qu'ils ne soient jamais livrés aux utilisateurs.
Le moteur comportemental Supernova utilise la langue, les relations, la cadence et le contexte pour détecter les anomalies et prévenir les menaces en temps réel en utilisant l'IA / ML.
Avec cette récente version, Supernova est désormais disponible pour tous les clients de la sécurité des e-mails de ProofPoint à travers le monde.Il s'agit d'une mise à niveau de pile de détection gratuite qui est intégrée dans notre plate-forme plus large.Vous pouvez en savoir plus sur le moteur comportemental Supernova ici.
Autres investissements de point de preuve qui profitent aux clients fédéraux
Supernova n'est pas le seul nouveau déploiement.Ce sont des améliorations de produits supplémentaires qui soutiennent la communauté du gouvernement fédéral et ses missions:
FedRamp Email Gateway (Proofpoint à la demande, alias FedPod).Nous avons mis à niveau FedPod pour aligner la parité des fonctionnalités plus étroitement avec nos environnements commerciaux.Cela comprend des améliorations des balises d'avertissement de messagerie de preuves et du cercle de confiance de ProofPoint.
Tableau de bord de protection contre les attaques ciblés par FedRamp (TAP).Désormais, le tableau de bord TAP comprend un résumé détaillé de la menace.Il présente des informations sur les menaces sur les principales menaces à l'échelle mondiale et au sein de votre agence ou de votre verticale.Ceci s'ajoute aux vulnérabilités et aux expositions courantes (CVE) que nous organisons à partir de nos analystes émergents des données de renseignement des menaces et des analystes de renseignements sur les menaces de preuve.
Solutions de point de preuve pour le gouvernement fédéral
Il existe des centaines de clients fédéraux qui utilisent des dizaines de solutions sur site et cloud de Proofpoint.Ce ne sont que quelques-uns:
Département américain de la défense
La base industrielle de la défense
La communauté du renseignement
Agences civiles fédérales
Intégrateurs de systèmes fédéraux
ProofPoint a obtenu la certification modérée FedRamp dans ces quatre solutions basées sur le cloud:
Protection de la protection des e-mails
ProofPoint Email Data Loss Prevention (DLP)
Tap de point de preuve
Archivage de preuves
Apprendre encore plus
Les missions de l'agence fédérale sont sous attaque constante.Et les agences sont confrontées à une tâche intimidante: ils doivent mettre en œuvre des mesures qui protègent les données vitales tout en permettent à leurs employés de réaliser leurs missions.Le point de preuve peut aider.
Pour plus de détails sur la façon dont Proofpoint aide à protéger les agences gouvernementales fédérales, consultez cette solution brève.Vous pouvez en savoir plus sur nos solutions gouvernementales ici.
Proofpoint has made more investments in our Aegis threat protection platform this year that can help support our federal agency customer |
Ransomware Spam Malware Vulnerability Threat Industrial Cloud Commercial | ★★ | |
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2023-11-28 23:05:04 | Prédictions 2024 de Proofpoint \\: Brace for Impact Proofpoint\\'s 2024 Predictions: Brace for Impact (lien direct) |
In the ever-evolving landscape of cybersecurity, defenders find themselves navigating yet another challenging year. Threat actors persistently refine their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), showcasing adaptability and the rapid iteration of novel and complex attack chains. At the heart of this evolution lies a crucial shift: threat actors now prioritize identity over technology. While the specifics of TTPs and the targeted technology may change, one constant remains: humans and their identities are the most targeted links in the attack chain. Recent instances of supply chain attacks exemplify this shift, illustrating how adversaries have pivoted from exploiting software vulnerabilities to targeting human vulnerabilities through social engineering and phishing. Notably, the innovative use of generative AI, especially its ability to improve phishing emails, exemplifies a shift towards manipulating human behavior rather than exploiting technological weaknesses. As we reflect on 2023, it becomes evident that cyber threat actors possess the capabilities and resources to adapt their tactics in response to increased security measures such as multi-factor authentication (MFA). Looking ahead to 2024, the trend suggests that threats will persistently revolve around humans, compelling defenders to take a different approach to breaking the attack chain. So, what\'s on the horizon? The experts at Proofpoint provide insightful predictions for the next 12 months, shedding light on what security teams might encounter and the implications of these trends. 1. Cyber Heists: Casinos are Just the Tip of the Iceberg Cyber criminals are increasingly targeting digital supply chain vendors, with a heightened focus on security and identity providers. Aggressive social engineering tactics, including phishing campaigns, are becoming more prevalent. The Scattered Spider group, responsible for ransomware attacks on Las Vegas casinos, showcases the sophistication of these tactics. Phishing help desk employees for login credentials and bypassing MFA through phishing one-time password (OTP) codes are becoming standard practices. These tactics have extended to supply chain attacks, compromising identity provider (IDP) vendors to access valuable customer information. The forecast for 2024 includes the replication and widespread adoption of such aggressive social engineering tactics, broadening the scope of initial compromise attempts beyond the traditional edge device and file transfer appliances. 2. Generative AI: The Double-Edged Sword The explosive growth of generative AI tools like ChatGPT, FraudGPT and WormGPT bring both promise and peril, but the sky is not falling as far as cybersecurity is concerned. While large language models took the stage, the fear of misuse prompted the U.S. president to issue an executive order in October 2023. At the moment, threat actors are making bank doing other things. Why bother reinventing the model when it\'s working just fine? But they\'ll morph their TTPs when detection starts to improve in those areas. On the flip side, more vendors will start injecting AI and large language models into their products and processes to boost their security offerings. Across the globe, privacy watchdogs and customers alike will demand responsible AI policies from technology companies, which means we\'ll start seeing statements being published about responsible AI policies. Expect both spectacular failures and responsible AI policies to emerge. 3. Mobile Device Phishing: The Rise of Omni-Channel Tactics take Centre Stage A notable trend for 2023 was the dramatic increase in mobile device phishing and we expect this threat to rise even more in 2024. Threat actors are strategically redirecting victims to mobile interactions, exploiting the vulnerabilities inherent in mobile platforms. Conversational abuse, including conversational smishing, has experienced exponential growth. Multi-touch campaigns aim to lure users away from desktops to mobile devices, utilizing tactics like QR codes and fraudulent voice calls | Ransomware Malware Tool Vulnerability Threat Mobile Prediction Prediction | ChatGPT ChatGPT | ★★★ |
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2023-11-27 09:26:51 | 8 sujets essentiels de cybersécurité à inclure dans votre programme de formation 8 Essential Cybersecurity Topics to Include in Your Training Program (lien direct) |
Your employees have a critical role to play as a first line of defense against cyberthreats. But to be effective, they need to know what those threats are-and stay apprised of how they\'re evolving. A comprehensive security awareness program is the key to helping your users grow their understanding of attackers\' methods and objectives so they can become more proactive defenders. That includes knowing what strategies malicious actors employ to manipulate people so they can use them to enable their campaigns. The importance of security awareness It\'s well worth taking the time to craft a meaningful and engaging security awareness program. By presenting the right mix of information to your users in a compelling way, you can empower them to help you improve your organization\'s security posture as well as create a more robust security culture overall. The cybersecurity topics that you include in your program should be relevant to your business and industry, of course. Companies face different cyberthreat challenges and regulatory compliance requirements related to data protection and data privacy. That said, there are several subjects that almost any modern business, regardless of its industry, will want to ensure its employees understand. We list eight of these cybersecurity topics below. They are the go-to approaches and tools that attackers around the world commonly use to compromise users and their accounts, disrupt normal business operations, steal money or data, and do other damage. Here\'s a high-level overview of these eight must-know cybersecurity topics: 1. Social engineering Social engineering is a collection of techniques malicious actors use to manipulate human psychology. Attackers rely on these strategies to trick or threaten users to take actions such as giving up account credentials, handing over sensitive data, running malicious code and transferring funds. They do this by taking advantage of users\': Emotions, by conveying a sense of urgency, generating excitement about an opportunity, or creating fear around losing money or doing something wrong Trust, by posing as someone familiar to the user or a trusted brand or authority-such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), UPS, Amazon or Microsoft Fatigue, by timing attacks when users are likely to be tired or distracted and more inclined to let their “emotional mind” guide their decision-making Common social engineering tactics include phishing-which we cover in the next section-and these others: Social media reconnaissance. Attackers often turn to social media to gather information about users that they target with their campaigns. These efforts can include direct outreach to users. Vishing (voice phishing) and smishing (SMS/text phishing). Vishing is the fraudulent practice of making phone calls or leaving voice messages purporting to be from a trusted brand or authority. With smishing, attackers use text messages to send SMS messages to users or robocall them. The messages often promise gifts or services in exchange for payment. Telephone-oriented attack delivery (TOAD). TOAD attacks start with an email that claims to be from a legitimate source and includes a phone number for customer assistance. Callers are connected to fake customer service representatives who then direct the victim through the attack. They may instruct the victim to let them access their machine remotely or download a file that turns out to be malware. Or they might direct them to a phishing site. Common sense can go a long way toward preventing a social engineering attack. Make sure to reiterate that if a message seems too good to be true, it\'s very likely a scam. And if something doesn\'t look or sound right, it probably isn\'t. 2. Phishing Phishing is an example of social engineering. Most phishing messages are sent by email. But some attackers deliver these messages through other methods, including smishing and vishing. Here are some typical strategies: Malicious links. When a user clicks on a | Ransomware Malware Tool Vulnerability Threat Mobile Cloud | Uber Uber | ★★ |
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2023-11-21 08:35:02 | Prévenir les attaques de fatigue du MFA: sauvegarder votre organisation Preventing MFA Fatigue Attacks: Safeguarding Your Organization (lien direct) |
Gaining access to critical systems and stealing sensitive data are top objectives for most cybercriminals. Social engineering and phishing are powerful tools to help them achieve both. That\'s why multifactor authentication (MFA) has become such an important security measure for businesses and users. Without MFA as part of the user authentication process, it is much less challenging for an attacker with stolen credentials to authenticate a user\'s account. The primary goal of MFA is to reduce the risk of unauthorized access, especially in situations where passwords alone may not provide enough protection. Even if an attacker steals a user\'s password, with MFA they still need the second factor (and maybe others) to gain access to an account. Examples of MFA factors include biometrics, like fingerprints, and signals from user devices, like GPS location. MFA isn\'t a perfect solution, though-it can be bypassed. Adversaries are relentless in their efforts to undermine any security defenses standing in the way of their success. (The evolution of phish kits for stealing MFA tokens is evidence of that.) But sometimes, attackers will choose to take an in-your-face approach that is not very creative or technical. MFA fatigue attacks fall into that category. What are MFA fatigue attacks-and how do they work? MFA fatigue attacks, also known as MFA bombing or MFA spamming, are a form of social engineering. They are designed to wear down a user\'s patience so that they will accept an MFA request out of frustration or annoyance-and thus enable an attacker to access their account or device. Many people encounter MFA requests daily, or even multiple times per day, as they sign-in to various apps, sites, systems and platforms. Receiving MFA requests via email, phone or other devices as part of that process is a routine occurrence. So, it is logical for a user to assume that if they receive a push notification from an account that they know requires MFA, it is a legitimate request. And if they are very busy at the time that they receive several push notifications in quick succession to authenticate an account, they may be even more inclined to accept a request without scrutinizing it. Here\'s an overview of how an MFA attack works: A malicious actor obtains the username and password of their target. They can achieve this in various ways, from password-cracking tactics like brute-force attacks to targeted phishing attacks to purchasing stolen credentials on the dark web. The attacker then starts to send MFA notifications to the user continuously, usually via automation, until that individual feels overwhelmed and approves the login attempt just to make the requests stop. (Usually, the push notifications from MFA solutions require the user to simply click a “yes” button to authenticate from the registered device or email account.) Once the attacker has unauthorized access to the account, they can steal sensitive data, install malware and do other mischief, including impersonating the user they have compromised-taking their actions as far as they can or want to go. 3 examples of successful MFA fatigue attacks To help your users understand the risk of these attacks, you may want to include some real-world examples in your security awareness program on this topic. Here are three notable incidents, which are all associated with the same threat actor: Uber. In September 2022, Uber reported that an attacker affiliated with the threat actor group Lapsus$ had compromised a contractor\'s account. The attacker may have purchased corporate account credentials on the dark web, Uber said in a security update. The contractor received several MFA notifications as the attacker tried to access the account-and eventually accepted one. After the attacker logged in to the account, they proceeded to access other accounts, achieving privilege escalation. One action the attacker took was to reconfigure Uber\'s OpenDNS to display a graphic image on some of the company\'s internal sites. Cisco. Cisco suffer | Ransomware Data Breach Malware Tool Threat Technical | Uber | ★★★ |
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2023-11-17 12:01:12 | Démystifier l'IA et ML: six questions critiques à poser à votre fournisseur de cybersécurité Demystifying AI and ML: Six Critical Questions to Ask Your Cybersecurity Vendor (lien direct) |
As cyber threats continue to evolve at an unprecedented pace, many organizations are turning to artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) in hopes of keeping up. While these advanced technologies hold immense promise, they\'re also more complex and far less efficient than traditional threat detection approaches. The tradeoff isn\'t always worth it. And not all AI and ML processes are created equal. The models used, the size and quality of the data sets they\'re trained on-and whether an advanced computational process is suitable for the problem at hand-are all critical factors to consider when deciding how both AI and ML fit into your cybersecurity strategy. In this blog post, we explore the vital questions you should ask your cybersecurity vendor about these technologies. We will also demystify their role in safeguarding your people, data and environment. Note: Though often conflated, AL and ML are related but distinct concepts. For simplicity, we\'re using AI when discussing the broader technology category and ML to discuss narrower learning models used in AI. Question 1: Why is AI suitable for this security problem? You\'ve probably heard the old saying that when your only tool is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. While AI has rightly generated enthusiasm in cybersecurity, it may not be the optimal approach to every task. On one hand, the technologies can help analyze large amounts of data and find anomalies, trends and behaviors that indicate potential attacks. And the technologies can automate response and mitigation of security incidents. But depending on the size and complexity of the learning model, they can also be computationally intensive (read: expensive) to maintain. And worse, execution time can be much longer than less complex approaches such as rules and signatures. On the other hand, rules and signatures are static, so they don\'t automatically evolve to detect new threats. But they\'re also fast, easy on computing resources and highly effective for certain aspects of threat detection. Other signals, such as email sender reputation and IP addresses, can also be as effective as AI for many detections-and in most cases are faster and much more cost-effective. Getting AI right starts with understanding what cybersecurity tasks they\'re best suited to and applying them to the right problems. In the same vein, how the technology is applied matters. In cybersecurity, every second counts. Making decisions in real time and blocking malicious content before it can be delivered is today\'s key challenge. If the processing time of the vendor\'s AI means the technology is relegated solely to post-delivery inspection and remediation, that\'s a major drawback. Question 2: Where do you get your training data? The performance of ML models hinges on the source and quality of their data. That\'s because AI models learn from examples and patterns, not rules. And that requires a large amount of data. The more data, and the higher the quality of that data, the better the model can learn and generalize to new conditions. Like any ML model, those used in cybersecurity need a wide-ranging, diverse data set that accurately reflects the real world. Or more precisely, the data used to train your vendor\'s AI model should reflect your world-the threats targeting your organization and users. Finding data for general-purpose AI applications is easy. It\'s all over the internet. But threat data-especially data well-suited for the type of ML model the vendor intends to use- is scarcer. Gaining malware samples is a lot harder than acquiring data used in applications such as image and natural language processing. First, not much attack data is publicly available. Most security vendors hold on tightly to the threat data they collect, and for good reason. Beyond the obvious competitive advantages it offers, threat data is sensitive and comes with a bevy of privacy concerns. As a result, few cybersecurity vendors have a dataset large enough to trai | Malware Tool Vulnerability Threat | ★★ | |
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2023-11-14 05:00:49 | TA402 utilise des chaînes d'infection Ironwind complexes pour cibler les entités gouvernementales à base de Moyen-Orient TA402 Uses Complex IronWind Infection Chains to Target Middle East-Based Government Entities (lien direct) |
Points clés à retenir De juillet à octobre 2023, des chercheurs de PROVELPOINT ont observé que TA402 s'engage dans des campagnes de phishing qui ont livré un nouveau téléchargeur d'accès initial surnommé Ironwind.Le téléchargeur a été suivi par des étapes supplémentaires qui consistaient à ShellCode téléchargé. Au cours de la même période, TA402 a ajusté ses méthodes de livraison, passant de l'utilisation de liens Dropbox à l'utilisation des pièces jointes XLL et RAR, susceptibles d'échapper aux efforts de détection. Cet acteur de menace s'est toujours engagé dans une activité extrêmement ciblée, poursuivant moins de cinq organisations avec une seule campagne.Ils ont également maintenu un fort accent sur les entités gouvernementales basées au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique du Nord. Proofpoint a suivi TA402 depuis 2020. Nos chercheurs évaluent l'acteur de menace est un groupe de menace persistante avancée (APT) du Moyen-Orient qui a historiquement opéré dans l'intérêt des territoires palestiniens et chevauche des rapports publics sur MoleratS, Gaza Cybergang, Frankenstein et Wirte. Aperçu À la mi-2023, les chercheurs de la preuve ont d'abord identifié TA402 (Molerats, Gaza CyberActivité Gang, Frankenstein, Wirte) Utilisant une chaîne d'infection labyrinthique pour cibler les gouvernements du Moyen-Orient avec un nouveau point de téléchargeur d'accès initial surnommé Ironwind.De juillet à octobre 2023, TA402 a utilisé trois variations de cette infection des liens de chair de chaîne, des pièces jointes de fichiers XLL et des pièces jointes RAR-avec chaque variante conduisant constamment au téléchargement d'une DLL contenant les logiciels malveillants multifonctionnels.Dans ces campagnes, TA402 a également été éloigné de son utilisation de services cloud comme l'API Dropbox, que les chercheurs à preuves ont observés dans l'activité de 2021 et 2022, à l'utilisation d'infrastructures contrôlées par acteur pour la communication C2. Fin octobre 2023, les chercheurs de PEOTPOINT n'avaient observé aucun changement dans le ciblage par TA402, un groupe APT qui a historiquement opéré dans l'intérêt des territoires palestiniens, ni identifié aucune indication d'un mandat modifié malgré le conflit actuel dans la région.Il reste possible que cet acteur de menace redirige ses ressources à mesure que les événements continuent de se dérouler. Détails de la campagne et Ironwind Activité de juillet 2023: En juillet 2023, des chercheurs de Pointpoint ont observé le premier de la nouvelle chaîne d'infection plus compliquée de TA402 \\ par rapport à l'activité de la campagne antérieure de 2021 et 2022 (figures 1 et 2). Figure 1. Chaîne d'infection TA402 utilisée de novembre 2021 à janvier 2022. Figure 2. Chaîne d'infection TA402 utilisée dans la campagne de juillet 2023. TA402 s'est engagé dans une campagne de phishing en utilisant un compte de messagerie compromis du ministère des Affaires étrangères pour cibler les entités gouvernementales du Moyen-Orient.Les e-mails ont utilisé un leurre d'ingénierie sociale sur le thème économique ("برنامج التعاون الإقتصاDE avec les pays du Golfe Cooperation Council 2023-2024ies of the Gulf Cooperation Council 2023-2024 "]) Pour livrer un lien drobox qui a téléchargé un fichier Microsoft Powerpoint Microsoft Powerpoint (PPAM)..exe, et GathernetworkInfo.vbs. timeout.exe a été utilisé pour la localisation de Sideload Ironwind.Au moment de l'analyse en août 2023. Les chercheurs de points de preuve ont observé TA402 en train de tirer parti de Dropbox pour la livraison de logiciels malveillants depuis au moins décembre 2021. Après avoir reçu la demande HTTP GET, le C2 a répondu avec Shellcode qui représentait la troisième étape de la chaîne d'infection.Pendant l'analyse de Proofpoint \\, le shellcode a utilisé des chargeurs .net réfléchissants pour mener des requêtes WMI.Le Shellcode a également servi de chargeur polyvalent, téléchargeant l'exécutable .NET de | Malware Threat Cloud | ★★ | |
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2023-11-13 07:14:17 | Informations exploitables: comprenez votre profil de risque global avec le rapport de résumé exécutif Actionable Insights: Understand Your Overall Risk Profile with the Executive Summary Report (lien direct) |
In this blog series we cover how to improve your company\'s security posture with actionable insights. Actionable insights are a critical tool to help you improve your security posture and stop initial compromise in the attack chain. You can use them to identify and respond to potential risks, enhance your incident response capabilities, and make more informed security decisions. In previous actionable insights blog posts, we covered these topics: People risk Origin risk Business email compromise (BEC) risk Ensuring proper risk context Risk efficacy Telephone-oriented attack delivery (TOAD) risk Threat intelligence In this post, we introduce the new TAP Executive Summary Report-which is available to all Proofpoint Targeted Attack Protection (TAP) customers who use the Proofpoint Aegis threat protection platform. We\'ll show you why the Executive Summary Report is so useful so you can use it effectively to enhance your company\'s security posture. Unlock powerful insights with the Executive Summary Report Email security is more crucial than ever in today\'s fast-evolving threat landscape. To protect your business and users from emerging threats, you need the right tools-like the TAP Dashboard Executive Summary Report. We designed this new report specifically to meet the high-level reporting needs of executives and other decision-makers. It empowers these users by providing quick, easy-to-consume insights on their email security, which helps to accelerate their decision-making. You can find it in the Reports section of the TAP Dashboard as the new first tab. Let\'s explore how this new feature can help your business. Insights: What you can learn from the Executive Summary This report gives you a comprehensive overview of your business\'s email threat landscape. It equips your teams and executives with actionable intelligence. End-to-end threat protection insights Integrating data from the Proofpoint email gateway, the Executive Summary Report offers a holistic view of your company\'s inbound email threat protection effectiveness. This end-to-end visibility helps you understand how your security measures perform across your email stack. Inbound email protection breakdown This new visualization in the TAP Threat Insight Dashboard provides an at-a-glance breakdown of the total number of messages received through your email protection stack. It reveals how and when Proofpoint identified and blocked malicious messages. With this detailed insight, you can identify threats and detect anomalies-and make data-driven decisions to enhance your email security. The inbound email protection breakdown. Exposure insights The Executive Summary Report also provides insight into potentially exposed messages. With drilldowns and actionable items, you can address these threats quickly to minimize the risk of a breach. Exposure insights in the Executive Summary Report. Messages protected This chart offers a trended view of messages protected by advanced threat detection capabilities in Proofpoint TAP. The information presented is broken down by threat type or category. It lets you see the evolving nature of threats over time, so you can conduct a more in-depth analysis of your company\'s email security. The messages protected trend chart-by threat type. Efficacy metrics There are two charts that report on Proofpoint TAP\'s efficacy. The first is the “threat landscape effectiveness” chart. It provides you with a clear understanding of where the most significant threats exist within your email landscape. It displays top objectives, malware families and threat actors by total message volume. The threat landscape effectiveness chart with a breakdown of threat objectives. The second chart is “inbound protection overview.” This donut-style chart combines traditional email security and advanced threat detection (TAP) metrics. This single statistic reflects the overall effectiveness of your Proofpoint inbound email prote | Malware Tool Threat Prediction | ★★ | |
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2023-11-10 07:55:46 | New Gartner & Reg;Rapport BEC: les recommandations sont entièrement prises en charge par Proofpoint New Gartner® BEC Report: Recommendations Are Fully Supported by Proofpoint (lien direct) |
Business email compromise (BEC) is costly. The latest Internet Crime Report from the FBI\'s Internet Crime Complaint Center notes that businesses lost more than $2.7 billion due to these scams in 2022. Another staggering statistic that is less reported: BEC losses were almost 80 times that of ransomware last year. The rate of BEC attacks and the average loss per incident are likely to keep climbing, which makes BEC an ongoing concern for businesses. A recent report by Gartner, How to Protect Organizations Against Business Email Compromise Phishing, offers companies several recommendations to help them reduce the risk of these attacks and minimize potential losses. Below, we share five top takeaways and key findings from this 2023 report. We also explain how Proofpoint can help protect your business against BEC attacks by linking what we do to Gartner\'s recommendations. 1. To combat BEC, businesses need to invest in email security rather than relying on endpoint protection Not all BEC scams contain a malicious payload like malware or malicious links. That\'s why endpoint protection and endpoint detection and response platforms are not effective defenses for these types of attacks. Gartner recommends: If you\'re a security and risk management leader who is responsible for infrastructure security, you can maximize your protection against BEC by seeking out and implementing artificial intelligence (AI)-based secure email gateway solutions. Look for solutions that offer: Advanced BEC phishing protection Behavioral analysis Impostor detection Internal email protection Proofpoint protects: Proofpoint believes that Gartner report\'s recommendation stems from the understanding that stopping BEC attacks before they reach a recipient\'s inbox is the best method to minimize risks. This strategy is at the heart of the Proofpoint Aegis threat protection platform. Proofpoint has used machine learning (ML) for more than two decades to detect email threats. We create the highest levels of BEC detection efficacy through our combination of AI/ML-driven behavioral analysis and rich threat intelligence. 2. Supplement email security with additional controls to reduce the risk of ATO Account takeover fraud (ATO) is often a feature in BEC attacks. It occurs when an adversary gains control of a legitimate account. To reduce the risk of ATO, businesses need to be able to recognize whether an email is from a genuine sender. Gartner recommends: Businesses should supplement their existing email security solutions with additional controls to further reduce the risk of BEC attacks like ATO and domain abuse. Proofpoint protects: To protect against account takeover, you need to identify accounts that might be compromised and automate remediation. If you rely solely on behavioral analytics to detect these accounts, you could end up with a high volume of false alerts. Proofpoint combines behavioral analysis with our rich threat intelligence to detect both compromised employee accounts and compromised third-party accounts. How Proofpoint helps when ATO occurs If an internal account has been compromised, a password reset isn\'t enough. Attackers in your environment can still manipulate third-party apps and gain persistent access to the account to wage attacks at will. Proofpoint TAP Account Takeover (TAP ATO) provides insights into what types of threats are targeting your users\' email accounts. And it provides you with the tools you need to take corrective action to protect a compromised account. TAP ATO correlates threat intelligence with artificial intelligence, ML and behavioral analytics to find malicious events across the email attack chain. It helps you see who is being attacked and how, and it provides automated remediation. How Proofpoint helps when supplier accounts are compromised Proofpoint Supplier Threat Protection gives you insight into which third-party and supplier accounts may be compromised. We combine AI/ML-driven behavioral analysis with threat in | Ransomware Malware Tool Threat | ★★ | |
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2023-11-06 07:20:56 | 3 erreurs courantes que vous faites avec votre programme de sensibilisation à la sécurité 3 Common Mistakes You\\'re Making with Your Security Awareness Program (lien direct) |
Despite the vast budget and resources invested in cybersecurity, breaches are still commonplace and increasingly impactful. When these incidents are analyzed, there is a common factor-the controlling technology is undermined by human action. This can include staff handing out credentials, facilitating unauthorized requests, falling for spoof emails and running malware at the behest of an attacker. When the World Economic Forum states that 95% of security breaches occur because of human action, it is clear that security awareness throughout your organization is imperative. Yet despite years of activity, more still needs to be done. Here are some things you may be doing that will hinder your security program-and, more importantly, the steps you can take to fix them. Mistake 1: You have named your security program incorrectly As simple as it sounds, you may have chosen a poor name for your security program. We all focus on security awareness and build “security awareness programs” for our businesses, but that isn\'t what we really want. Our true aim is more than just to improve awareness-it is to change behavior. Calling our program “security awareness” encourages us to focus on the wrong outcome. After all, if our real aim is to stop people smoking, we wouldn\'t call our initiative the “be aware of the risks of smoking campaign.” This has an easy fix: Change the name of your program. Decide on the outcome you want and name your program appropriately-such as \'Security Behavior Change Program\' or \'Build Security Culture Program.\' You will be amazed by the difference such a small change can make because the new title will be a constant reminder of what you are actually trying to achieve. Mistake 2: Thinking that \'lots of awareness\' leads to culture The second mistake is related to the first. All too often, programs decide they can change the culture of the organization by increasing the amount of awareness training that staff undertake. That won\'t happen. Culture is not the same as “lots of awareness.” There is an “ABC” maturity model that I use, which stands for awareness, behavior, culture. Each is a step that builds on the previous one. Critically, there is a pivot at each step-a change of focus that\'s required to transition from one level to the next. Let\'s assume we already do awareness. To pivot to behavior, you need to focus on making sure that your staff members understand the consequences of cybersecurity, both personally and professionally. Once they have awareness and motivation, they are much more likely to display the correct behavior. (There is science behind this simplified approach, and I recommend you check out Professor BJ Fogg\'s behavior model.) Once behavior is on the road to achievement, then culture becomes your goal. The pivot for the culture step is the creation of a wide-ranging perception that everyone around the business cares about security. Note that I use the word “perception.” It doesn\'t have to be true initially, as this is a real case of “fake it \'til you make it.” Create that perception by tuning your communications plan to ensure that security messages arrive from across your organization-from executives, from receptionists, and especially from middle and line managers. Indeed, these messages should come from almost everyone except the chief information security officer (CISO). This will build a perception in each staff member that everyone around them cares about security, and that will create peer pressure for them to act in similar ways. This is the crucible of culture. Mistake 3: Using negative consequences as a primary motivator The key step to mature to the behavior level mentioned above is to create a motivation to change behavior. Motivation can be encouraged in various ways. One approach is to create a fear of punishment or embarrassment if staff make an error or fail a security test. Many security professionals have strong opinions on this matter. Some believe that negative c | Malware Tool Vulnerability | ★★ | |
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2023-10-30 07:40:00 | Mémoire de sécurité: TA571 fournit un chargeur à fourche icedid Security Brief: TA571 Delivers IcedID Forked Loader (lien direct) |
Ce qui s'est passé Les chercheurs de Proofpoint ont identifié TA571 livrant la variante fourchue de l'IceDID dans deux campagnes les 11 et 18 octobre 2023. Les deux campagnes comprenaient plus de 6 000 messages, chacun plus de 1 200 clients dans une variété d'industries dans le monde. Les e-mails dans les campagnes prétendaient être des réponses aux threads existants.Ceci est connu sous le nom de détournement de fil.Les e-mails contenaient 404 URL TDS liant au téléchargement d'une archive zip protégée par mot de passe avec le mot de passe répertorié dans l'e-mail.La chaîne d'attaque comprenait une série de contrôles pour valider le destinataire avant de livrer les archives zip. TA571 LURE Utilisé dans une campagne Icedid le 11 octobre 2023. Le fichier zip contenait un script VBS et un fichier texte bénin.Le script VBS, s'il est double de l'utilisateur, exécuté un chargeur fourchu icedid intégré à regsvr32.Le chargeur a à son tour téléchargé le bot icedid. L'utilisation de la variante iceide fourchue est inhabituelle, car elle n'a été observée que dans un petit nombre de campagnes.ProofPoint a d'abord identifié cette variante en février 2023. Une différence clé entre la variante iceide d'origine et la variante fourchue était l'élimination de la fonctionnalité bancaire.À l'époque, les acteurs évalués par Proofpoint utilisaient les variantes modifiées pour pivoter les logiciels malveillants loin de l'activité de Troie bancaire et de la fraude bancaire typique pour se concentrer sur la livraison de la charge utile, ce qui comprend probablement la hiérarchisation des ransomwares. TA571 utilise régulièrement 404 TD dans des campagnes pour fournir des logiciels malveillants, notamment Asyncrat, Netsupport et Darkgate.Les chercheurs de ProofPoint suivent 404 TDS depuis au moins septembre 2022, et il est utilisé par un certain nombre d'acteurs de menace.Un système de distribution de trafic (TDS) est une application utilisée pour acheminer le trafic Web via des serveurs contrôlés par l'opérateur.Ils peuvent être utilisés par les acteurs de la menace pour rediriger le trafic vers des téléchargements de logiciels malveillants et utiliser le filtrage IP pour déterminer s'il faut livrer une charge utile ou rediriger vers un site Web de récolte d'identification.ProofPoint évalue 404 TDS est probablement partagé ou vendu à d'autres acteurs en raison de son implication dans une variété de campagnes de phishing et de logiciels malveillantes sans rapport. Attribution TA571 est un distributeur de spam, et cet acteur envoie des campagnes de courriel de spam à volume élevé pour livrer et installer un logiciel malveillant variété pour leurs clients cybercriminaux, selon les objectifs de l'opérateur ultérieur.ProofPoint évalue avec une grande confiance que les infections à TA571 peuvent conduire à des ransomwares. Pourquoi est-ce important La livraison de Ta571 \\ de la variante iceide fourchue est unique car le point de preuve ne les observe pas souvent dans les données de menace.De plus, Proofpoint considère TA571 comme un acteur sophistiqué de menace cybercriminale.Sa chaîne d'attaque comprend un filtrage unique utilisant des «portes» intermédiaires pour que le trafic passe.Ces portes, qui sont des URL intermédiaires, filtrent le trafic basé sur la propriété intellectuelle et la géo-clôture.TA571 peut avoir jusqu'à deux portes par campagne.Il s'agit de garantir que seuls les utilisateurs spécifiquement ciblés reçoivent les logiciels malveillants et contourner l'activité automatisée de sable ou le chercheur. Signatures des menaces émergentes 2853110 - ETPRO EXPLOIT_KIT 404 TDS Redirect 2032086 - ET Trojan Win32 / Cookie de demande IceDide 2847335 - ETPRO TROJAN WIN32 / IceDID Stage2 Checkin 2032086 - ET Trojan Win32 / Cookie de demande IceDideIndicateurs de compromis Indicateur Description D'abord observé 6C6A68DA31204CFE93EE86CD85CF668A20259220AD44341B3915396E263E4F86 Exemple de charge utile SHA256 Hlsv1249_5361051.zip | Ransomware Spam Malware Threat | ★★★ | |
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2023-10-26 06:00:18 | Break the Attack Chain with Identity Threat Protection (lien direct) | “The attacker only has to be right once. Defenders have to get it right every time.” This well-known saying has shaped countless cybersecurity strategies. The belief is that a single compromise of our defenses can lead to a catastrophic outcome. As new risks emerge and attackers develop tactics to evade controls, defenders face the daunting task of protecting an ever-expanding array of connected identities. Many companies now embrace resilience strategies, accepting that an incident is inevitable - “It\'s not a matter of if, but when.” That\'s because defenders have been fixated on the impossible task of protecting everything within the business. But a new industry approach to cyber defense in recent years has emerged that points the path towards a better way. Instead of protecting everything, defenders should aim to neutralize attackers\' tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), which are hard to replace. This disrupts the completion of the attack chain. What is the attack chain? And how does identity threat protection disrupt it? That\'s what we\'re here to discuss. The enduring relevance of the attack chain No other concept has captured the essence of successful cyber attacks like the attack chain (aka the “cyber kill chain”), which was developed by Lockheed Martin in 2011. Even 12 years later, the attack chain remains relevant, while defenders struggle to prevent the most impactful incidents. While cyber criminals don\'t follow the same steps every time, the basic phases of an attack are pretty much always the same: Steps in the cyber attack chain. The challenge of initial compromise The first phase in the attack chain is the initial compromise. Modern cyber criminals use an array of tactics to infiltrate companies and wreak havoc on their systems, from BEC attacks to cloud account takeovers and ransomware incidents. One trend is to exploit trusted third-party relationships to compromise companies through their suppliers. What seems like an innocuous initial email can escalate into a full-scale compromise with great speed. Once attackers gain unrestricted access to a company\'s domain, they can infiltrate email accounts to commit fraudulent activities. One alarming twist to credential phishing emails is that they can evade detection. They leave behind no traces of compromise or malware. Even with the rise of multifactor authentication (MFA), these attacks continue to surge. Once accounts are compromised through a credential phishing email or a vulnerable remote desktop session, businesses face the next phase of the attack chain: privileged escalation and lateral movement within their networks. Next phase: privilege escalation and lateral movement This is the middle of the attack chain. And it\'s where threat actors try to breach a company\'s defenses. Often, they do this by compromising the identities of employees, contractors, service providers or edge devices. Their main goal is to use this initial access to elevate their privileges, typically targeting Active Directory (AD). AD, which many businesses around the world use, is susceptible to compromise. It can provide attackers with unparalleled control over a company\'s computing infrastructure. With this access, they can engage in lateral movement and spread malware across the business, causing more harm. Finally, the risk of data loss Attackers don\'t rely on a single stroke of luck. Their success hinges on a series of precise maneuvers. Monetary gains through data exfiltration are often their objective. And once they have navigated the intricate web of identities, they can target valuable data and orchestrate data theft operations. Defenders must disrupt this chain of events to prevent the loss of sensitive data, like intellectual property or customer identifiable data. Then, they can gain the upper hand and steer the course of cybersecurity in their favor. The three best opportunities to break the attack chain. Building a map of your organizat | Ransomware Malware Tool Threat Prediction Cloud | ★★ |
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