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2025-04-01 16:18:36 | Analyse cyber-physique des armes des systèmes de détection de destruction massive: Partie 1 - Darpa \\ 's Sigma Cyber-Physical Analysis of Weapons of Mass Destruction Detection Systems: Part 1 - DARPA\\'s SIGMA (lien direct) |
Index1. Introduction2. Practical Gamma Spectroscopy for Security Researchers3. SIGMA Network4. ConclusionsDisclaimerTo avoid any misunderstandings, I want to clarify that all the information in this post is based on open-source intelligence, publicly available documents, and reverse engineering. I have not attempted to compromise or replicate any potential attacks on internet-facing SIGMA systems. Instead, I conducted a simple, non-invasive reconnaissance phase, which involved accessing public websites, reviewing their source code, and examining generic endpoints to gather general information, such as system versions. A month before publishing this post, I gave a heads-up about it to those who needed to be informed.Introduction  This is the first part of a series on the cyber-physical analysis of weapons of mass destruction detection systems, focusing on technologies like CBRN networks and nuclear safeguards. These posts will cover how these systems integrate physical methods with cyber capabilities to counter potential threats. By analyzing both the hardware and software components, I aim to highlight the challenges and advancements in ensuring these systems function effectively in real-world scenarios, as well as some of the vulnerabilities, exploits, and security-related issues discovered during the research. Above all, the goal is to contribute to a better understanding of these systems and encourage critical thinking, especially in these challenging times.Thirty years ago, the Japanese apocalyptic cult \'Aum Shinrikyo\' managed to fabricate sarin gas in-house and released it in multiple trains during rush hour on the Tokyo subway system. The deadly nerve agent killed 14 people, injured over 1000, and caused severe health issues for thousands more. Initial reports only mentioned \'an explosion in the subway,\' causing the first 30 police officers who arrived at the scene to overlook the possibility of a chemical attack. As a result, they were exposed to and harmed by the sarin gas, which also delayed their ability to provide a timely and proper response to the other victims.Could a similar event happen today in a modern city? Probably yes, but at least in theory, it would be orders of magnitude harder for the perpetrators to achieve their goals. Even if they succeeded, the immediate aftermath (essentially the ability to mitigate the consequences), would (is expected to) be managed much more effectively, due to technological progress in countering Chemical, Biological, Radiological, |
Tool Vulnerability Threat General Information Legislation Mobile Prediction Cloud Commercial | ★★ | |
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2025-01-22 14:43:46 | La cyber-dimension de l'occupation du NPP Zaporizhzhia The Cyber Dimension of the Zaporizhzhia NPP Occupation (lien direct) |
 The war that began with Russia\'s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has led to a series of unprecedented nuclear-related situations. During the first 48 hours, Chernobyl-a symbol of the deep-seated fear of nuclear disaster, especially within Europe-was taken by Russian troops.This was accompanied by reports of radiation spikes, various plots involving dirty bombs and nuclear materials, and Russian soldiers allegedly killed by acute radiation syndrome. In the end, all of it was proven to be as fictitious as the reported radiation levels.We should view these mutual accusations between Ukraine and Russia as part of the information war, which likely didn\'t come as a complete surprise to those in the know. For instance, in an insightful piece Politico published documenting the \'first-ever oral history of how top U.S. and Western officials saw the warning signs of a European land war,\' John Kirby stated the following: Without time to recover from the shock caused by the events in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, just a few days later, Russia attacked and eventually occupied Europe\'s largest nuclear power plant: Zaporizhzhia. Four weeks later, Russian forces withdrew from Chernobyl, but they did not withdraw from Zaporizhzhia NPP, which remains occupied to this day. With a new administration taking over the U.S. government, likely to have a significant influence on the conditions and terms for ending this armed conflict-if it ends at all-now seems like the right moment to address a gap in the existing coverage of the Zaporizhzhia NPP occupation: its cyber dimension.Ukraine: From Non-Proliferation to the Modernization of Its Nuclear Power PlantsAfter the Soviet Union\'s collapse in 1991, Ukraine agreed to give up its nuclear weapons under the Budapest Memorandum (1994), in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the U.S., and the UK. Some might argue that this move has not aged well, |
Tool Vulnerability Studies Industrial Technical | ★★★ | |
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2025-01-08 18:35:29 | Aborder l'exploitation de la peur du rayonnement: un guide d'auto-évaluation pour contrer la désinformation Addressing the Exploitation of Radiation Fear: A Self-Assessment Guide to Counter Disinformation (lien direct) |
In December 2024, two events -drone sightings in the US and Israel\'s strike on Syria\'s weapon depots- were followed by orchestrated reports of detected radiation spikes. Some media outlets took these dubious reports (with millions of views) that originated from social media , and published pieces based on them. In one of these cases, the actors behind the disinformation campaign exploited a real-time radiation map, which is maintained by a private company that manufactures personal dosimeters, to sustain the narrative.Kim Zetter has recently published "Anatomy of a Nuclear Scare", an article that covers this issue.This trend does not come as a surprise, as radioactivity is one of those few things that can collectively trigger significant levels of societal anxiety and emotional, rather than rational, response, which is often disproportionate to the actual physical risks it poses. This radiation fear has been shaped during years by a mix of cultural, historical, and media-driven narratives. In recent years, increasing geopolitical instability, the ever-growing influence of social media, the return of magical thinking and the precariousness and discrediting of traditional sources of information have resulted in a constant flow of misinformation.. It\'s no coincidence that successful campaigns can be executed with limited resources, compared to traditional manipulation activities, and still have the potential to go viral, maximizing ROI.Despite the fact that these campaigns explicitly exploited-or leveraged-publicly available online resources providing real-time radiation levels, in most cases, the actions were simplistic and carried out without the need for specialized \'cyber\' skills or expertise. So far, the only exception to this trend can be found in Chernobyl\'s post-invasion radiation spikes from 2022.I see no reason to believe that we won\'t likely see similar campaigns in the near future. I also acknowledge that this topic is not everyone\'s cup of tea. You may not have the time or interest to go through detailed technical explanations of radioactivity from both physics and cybersecurity perspectives. However, for those who are really interested in that kind of in-depth reading, I\'ve published comprehensive research papers on this topic.So, I thought it might be useful to put together this publication, which is merely intended to serve as an \'emergency guide\' to quickly grasp a set of simple yet sound principles that hopefully can help everyone, regardless of their background, to approach radioactivity-related reports with a critical eye. Armed with these fundamentals of radiation monitoring, we\'ll learn how to quickly discern between stories that make sense and those that don\'t hold water.An Emergency Guide to Understanding Radioactivity and Radiation MonitoringLet\'s say that you want to build a simple cabin in a small plot of land you have in the woods. The foundations should be stable enough to ensure the structure does not collapse just right after finishing it. However, you have an unusual constraint: the only material you can use is balloons. Common sense suggests that, although balloons are not the ideal material, the best way to use them would be to keep them completely deflated. Anything built using inflated balloons will not last long; it depends on the quality of the material the balloon is made of, but everybody acknowl | Tool Threat Industrial Prediction Technical | ★★★ | |
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2024-10-01 12:10:41 | Une analyse pratique des attaques cyber-physiques contre les réacteurs nucléaires A Practical Analysis of Cyber-Physical Attacks Against Nuclear Reactors (lien direct) |
il y a un an, peu de temps après avoir présenté le Chernobyl Research , j'ai été surpris pour découvrir que A Plethora of Brand-Nwi (2e génération) Des composants étaient disponibles sur eBay. Framatome\'s Teleperm XS (TXS) is a digital Instrumentation & Control platform designed specifically for use in safety systems in Nuclear power plants, as a replacement pour ou améliorent leurs homologues analogiques. C'est l'une des plates-formes I&C de sécurité numérique les plus utilisées, soutenant la principale ligne de défense (système de protection des réacteurs, système d'actionnement des caractéristiques de sécurité conçue) dans des dizaines de réacteurs nucléaires à l'échelle mondiale, y compris l'Europe, les États-Unis, la Russie et la Chine. Évidemment, qui a été une bonne opportunité pour conférer à la plus grande importance des modernes de sécurité numérique, donc j'ai acheté des modernes TX sur le monde. C'était le point de départ de la recherche que je libère aujourd'hui: " une analyse pratique des attaques cyber-physiques contre les réacteurs nucléaires ". | Tool Technical Commercial | ★★★★ | |
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2022-08-03 12:05:12 | J'ai un gamma frappuccino, s'il vous plaît. I\\'ll have a Gamma Frappuccino, please. (lien direct) |
A recent story has been making the rounds: "Hundreds of Nuclear Radiation Monitors Were Allegedly Hacked by Former Repairmen". Basically, it seems that more than a year ago two disgruntled employees sabotaged +300 radiation monitoring devices, which were part of a nation-wide civil radiation monitoring network (RAR) in Spain. On top of that, they were apparently using the free WiFi of a Starbucks to carry out their activities. Obviously not being the sharpest tool in the box they were eventually caught.In this story there is a boring part, which is everything related to these guys and their motivations, and a slightly more interesting part which is the underlying technology behind Radiation Monitoring Networks (RMN).In 2017 I presented at BlackHat USA \'Go Nuclear: Breaking Radiation Monitoring Devices", so I thought it could be interesting to write a brief post to provide some context.The NeverEnding storyAs in most \'disgruntled employee\' attacks, the initial motivation behind the sabotage seems to be a \'poorly assessed\' reaction to a troubled employment relationship. According to the information publicly released by the police the attacks started on March 2021. Coincidentally, by using the public procurement portal of the Spanish State, we can find that, in 2020, a public contract to support and maintain the RAR network was announced, as the valid one at that time was about to expire in Feb 2021. Anyway, if you\'re interested in the technology, public procurement documents always provide a lot of information when you are researching into nation-wide systems. As expected, it is possible to find some interesting bits of information about the RAR network, including its topology, devices, deployments... The radiation monitoring devices are provided by Envinet. Indra seems to have developed some Data Acquisition Units as well as the Control System. |
Tool Legislation Industrial Commercial | ★★★ | |
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2022-04-21 12:59:05 | Le gars avec des outils rudimentaires qui ont excité des choses The guy with rudimentary tools who hyped things (lien direct) |
I\'ve just released a new research that describes in detail the reverse engineering methodology and vulnerabilities found in a DAL-A, safety-critical, certified avionics component: Collins\' Pro Line Fusion - AFD-3700, a LynxOS-178 based system deployed in both commercial and military aircraft. At the time of writing this I don\'t know exactly what will happen after the disclosure. However, this time, I certainly know what will not happen. I understand this statement does sound a little bit cryptic, so you should keep reading to understand the context; from where this situation is coming and why this point has been reached. Right, the title is probably more suited for a cheap sequel of Stieg Larsson\'s "Millenium" trilogy rather than for the usual technical contents I publish over here, so for the fans of that saga I would kindly ask you to forgive the liberty of giving myself that license. You\'ll understand that title afterwards.This post contains traces of a \'plot\' spanning several years now. As a compulsive fiction reader I didn\'t want to miss this opportunity to follow a dramatic structure, thus having a little bit of fun out of situation that, for me, has been everything but fun. That said, I\'ve learnt a lot along the way, which is probably the only thing that paid off.In this story there are no evil or good characters, I guess it\'s just people doing their job the best they can. Obviously there has to be some kind of conflict, which emerges from the fact that the nature of their jobs, although theoretically pursuing the same objectives, usually makes them clash. There is also an escalation on the action over the years, some plot twists included, until reaching a high tension moment that determines how the conflict will be resolved. The resolution is yet to be written...As one would have expected I\'ll write this story from my perspective, others may have a different one. Let\'s start.Index1. 20182. 20193. 20204. 20215. 20226. Paper7. Personal Statement2018.During a flight to Copenhagen, aboard a Norwegian Boeing 737, I noticed something weird in the In-Flight WiFi, which was provided by a satellite network. Once at the hotel I found out it was possible to reach, over the internet through a misconfigured SATCOM infrastructure, tens of in-flight aircraft from different airlines. We coordinated |
Hack Tool Vulnerability Threat Studies Industrial Conference Technical Commercial | ★★★ |
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