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| Src | Date (GMT) | Titre | Description | Tags | Stories | Notes |
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2025-02-11 20:00:00 | Cybercrime: A Multifaceted National Security Threat (lien direct) | Executive Summary Cybercrime makes up a majority of the malicious activity online and occupies the majority of defenders\' resources. In 2024, Mandiant Consulting responded to almost four times more intrusions conducted by financially motivated actors than state-backed intrusions. Despite this overwhelming volume, cybercrime receives much less attention from national security practitioners than the threat from state-backed groups. While the threat from state-backed hacking is rightly understood to be severe, it should not be evaluated in isolation from financially motivated intrusions. A hospital disrupted by a state-backed group using a wiper and a hospital disrupted by a financially motivated group using ransomware have the same impact on patient care. Likewise, sensitive data stolen from an organization and posted on a data leak site can be exploited by an adversary in the same way data exfiltrated in an espionage operation can be. These examples are particularly salient today, as criminals increasingly target and leak data from hospitals. Healthcare\'s share of posts on data leak sites has doubled over the past three years, even as the number of data leak sites tracked by Google Threat Intelligence Group has increased by nearly 50% year over year. The impact of these attacks mean that they must be taken seriously as a national security threat, no matter the motivation of the actors behind it. Cybercrime also facilitates state-backed hacking by allowing states to purchase cyber capabilities, or co-opt criminals to conduct state-directed operations to steal data or engage in disruption. Russia has drawn on criminal capabilities to fuel the cyber support to their war in Ukraine. GRU-linked APT44 (aka Sandworm), a unit of Russian military intelligence, has employed malware available from cybercrime communities to conduct espionage and disruptive operations in Ukraine and CIGAR (aka RomCom), a group that historically focused on cybercrime, has conducted espionage operations against the Ukrainian government since 2022. However, this is not limited to Russia. Iranian threat groups deploy ransomware to raise funds while simultaneously conducting espionage, and Chinese espionage groups often supplement their income with cybercrime. Most notably, North Korea uses state-backed groups to directly generate revenue for the regime. North Korea has heavily targeted cryptocurrencies, compromising exchanges and individual victims\' crypto wallets. Despite the overlaps in effects and collaboration with states, tackling the root causes of cybercrime requires fundamentally different solutions. Cybercrime involves collaboration between disparate groups often across borders and without respect to sovereignty. Any solution requires international cooperation by both law enforcement and intelligence agencies to track, arrest, and prosecute these criminals. Individual takedowns can have important temporary effects, but the collaborative nature of cybercrime means that the disrupted group will be quickly replaced by others offering the same service. Achieving broader success will require collaboration between countries and public and private sectors on systemic solutions such as increasing education and resilience efforts. aside_block | Ransomware Malware Tool Vulnerability Threat Legislation Medical Cloud Technical | APT 41 APT 38 APT 29 APT 43 APT 44 | ★★★ |
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2024-10-11 00:28:23 | Mise à jour sur les opérations de cyber et des exploitations de vulnérabilité SVR Update on SVR Cyber Operations and Vulnerability Exploitations (lien direct) |
#### Targeted Industries - Government Agencies & Services - Information Technology - Financial Services ## Snapshot Russia\'s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), also tracked as [Midnight Blizzard](https://sip.security.microsoft.com/intel-profiles/d825313b053efea45228ff1f4cb17c8b5433dcd2f86353e28be2d484ce874616) or APT29, has persistently targeted global entities in defense, technology, and finance sectors to gather intelligence and support cyber operations, including those related to the invasion of Ukraine. The U.S. and U.K. cyber agencies, including the NSA, FBI, U.S. Cyber Command\'s Cyber National Mission Force, and the U.K.\'s NCSC, have issued a joint advisory warning network defenders of these ongoing attacks. ## Description SVR actors exploit vulnerabilities for initial access, use techniques such as spearphishing and password spraying, and rely on obfuscation methods, including The Onion Router (TOR) network and proxies, to evade detection. The group\'s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) highlight a focus on exploiting known vulnerabilities, particularly through unpatched systems and weak authentication measures. For initial access, the actors leverage vulnerabilities like [CVE-2022-27924](https://sip.security.microsoft.com/intel-explorer/cves/CVE-2022-27924/) (Zimbra mail server) and [CVE-2023-42793](https://sip.security.microsoft.com/intel-profiles/CVE-2023-42793) (JetBrains TeamCity), allowing them to bypass authentication and execute arbitrary code. These vulnerabilities enable access to credentials, emails, and other sensitive data without victim interaction. Furthermore, SVR cyber actors engage in mass scanning to identify exposed systems and prioritize targets based on opportunity, often using compromised systems as infrastructure for subsequent attacks or as a launchpad for deeper network compromises. SVR also employs a range of techniques to maintain persistence and escalate privileges in victim networks. These include spearphishing via platforms like Microsoft Teams, where they impersonate technical support to gain account access, and password spraying to infiltrate poorly secured accounts. Once inside a network, SVR actors utilize living-off-the-land techniques, leveraging existing tools and software to blend into normal operations and evade detection. They also frequently lease infrastructure through resellers, relying on compromised accounts to maintain anonymity. In cases where detection is suspected, they act swiftly to destroy infrastructure and erase evidence, demonstrating a sophisticated approach to operational security. ## Microsoft Analysis Midnight Blizzard (NOBELIUM) is known to primarily target governments, diplomatic entities, NGOs, and IT service providers in primarily the United States and Europe. Their focus is to collect intelligence through longstanding and dedicated espionage of foreign interests that can be traced to early 2018 by leveraging the use of identity. Midnight Blizzard (NOBELIUM) is consistent and persistent in their operational targeting and their objectives rarely change. They utilize diverse initial access methods ranging from stolen credentials to supply chain attacks, exploitation of on-premises environments to laterally move to the cloud, exploitation of service providers\' trust chain to gain access to downstream customers, and the Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS) malware known as FOGGYWEB and MAGICWEB. Midnight Blizzard is tracked by partner security companies as APT29, UNC2452, and Cozy Bear. ## Recommendations Microsoft recommends the following mitigations to reduce the impact of this threat. Check the recommendations card for the deployment status of monitored mitigations. While multi-factor authentication (MFA) has largely reduced the number of compromised organizations, threat actors like Midnight Blizzard constantly seek new ways to circumvent this barrier. Piloting and deploying [phishing-resistant authentication methods](https://l | Malware Tool Vulnerability Threat Cloud Technical | APT 29 | ★★★ |
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2024-07-16 07:26:11 | Acteurs de menace \\ 'Arsenal: comment les pirates ciblent les comptes cloud Threat Actors\\' Arsenal: How Hackers Target Cloud Accounts (lien direct) |
Introduction In today\'s interconnected world, cloud computing has become the backbone of countless businesses. However, with this rise in cloud adoption, malicious actors have adapted their strategies to compromise sensitive data stored in cloud environments and propagate threats throughout supply chains. One prevalent method is the use of tools specifically designed to automate attacks against cloud accounts, resulting in account takeover (ATO) and business email compromise (BEC) incidents. Keeping up with a tradition of trying to understand the attackers\' perspective, Proofpoint cloud threat researchers have obtained and analyzed various hacking tools used by threat actors. In this blog series, we\'ll showcase a few examples and explore the largely uncovered world of these tools, while examining their functionalities, the risks they pose, and how organizations can defend against them. Understanding toolsets: basic concepts and terminology Attack toolsets are purposefully crafted to enable, automate, and streamline cyber-attacks en masse. These toolsets exploit diverse weaknesses, from frequent misconfigurations to old authentication mechanisms, in order to gain access to selected resources. Often, attack toolsets are designed with specific aims in mind. In recent years, cloud accounts have become prime targets. But getting your hands on effective tools is not so trivial. Some toolsets are only sold or circulated within restricted channels, such as closed Darknet hacking forums, while others (especially older versions) are publicly available online. With a rising demand for hacking capabilities, hacking-as-a-service (HaaS) has become a prominent business model in today\'s cyber threat landscape, providing convenient access to advanced hacking capabilities in exchange for financial gain. As such, it lowers entry barriers for cybercriminals, allowing them to execute attacks with minimal effort. Regardless of their complexity, every attack tool aiming to compromise cloud accounts must utilize an initial threat vector to gain unauthorized access. Proofpoint\'s ongoing monitoring of the cloud threat landscape has led its researchers to categorize the majority of observed attacks into two primary threat vectors: brute-force attacks and precision attacks. In terms of sheer volume, brute-force attacks, encompassing techniques such as password guessing and various other methods, continue to maintain their status as the most prevalent threat vector. Despite the statistical nature of these attacks and their reliance on a "spray and pray" approach, they remain a significant threat. According to our research, roughly 20% of all organizations targeted by brute-force attacks in 2023 experienced at least one successful account compromise instance. The surprising effectiveness of brute-force methods, combined with their relative simplicity, makes this vector appealing not only to common cybercriminals, but also to sophisticated actors. In January 2024, Microsoft disclosed that it had fallen victim to a nation-state attack attributed to the Russian state-sponsored group APT29 (also known as TA421 and Midnight Blizzard). According to Microsoft\'s announcement, the attackers employed password spraying to compromise a legacy, non-production test tenant account that lacked multifactor authentication (MFA). After gaining access, attackers were able to quickly leverage it and hijack additional assets, ultimately exfiltrating sensitive data from various resources. This incident emphasizes the potential risk that brute-force and password spraying attacks pose to inadequately protected cloud environments. A brute-force attack kill chain, targeting cloud environments using leaked credentials and proxy networks. Combo lists, proxy lists and basic authentication Combo lists play a crucial role in facilitating systematic and targeted credential stuffing attacks. These lists, comprised of curated email address and password pairs, serve as the basic ammunition for most tools. Attackers leverage combo lists to automate the pr | Spam Malware Tool Threat Prediction Cloud Technical | APT 29 | ★★★ |
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2024-07-08 14:00:00 | Enhardi et évolutif: un instantané des cyber-menaces auxquelles l'OTAN est confrontée à l'OTAN Emboldened and Evolving: A Snapshot of Cyber Threats Facing NATO (lien direct) |
Written by: John Hultquist
As North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members and partners gather for a historic summit, it is important to take stock of one of its most pressing challenges-the cyber threat. The Alliance faces a barrage of malicious cyber activity from all over the globe, carried out by emboldened state-sponsored actors, hacktivists, and criminals who are willing to cross lines and carry out activity that was previously considered unlikely or inconceivable. In addition to military targets, NATO must consider the risks that hybrid threats like malicious cyber activity pose to hospitals, civil society, and other targets, which could impact resilience in a contingency. The war in Ukraine is undoubtedly linked to escalating cyber threat activity, but many of these threats will continue to grow separately and in parallel. NATO must contend with covert, aggressive malicious cyber actors that are seeking to gather intelligence, preparing to or currently attacking critical infrastructure, and working to undermine the Alliance with elaborate disinformation schemes. In order to protect its customers and clients, Google is closely tracking cyber threats, including those highlighted in this report; however, this is just a glimpse at a much larger and evolving landscape. Cyber Espionage NATO\'s adversaries have long sought to leverage cyber espionage to develop insight into the political, diplomatic, and military disposition of the Alliance and to steal its defense technologies and economic secrets. However, intelligence on the Alliance in the coming months will be of heightened importance. This year\'s summit is a transition period, with the appointment of Mark Rutte as the new Secretary General and a number of adaptations expected to be rolled out to shore up the Alliance\'s defense posture and its long-term support for Ukraine. Successful cyber espionage from threat actors could potentially undermine the Alliance\'s strategic advantage and inform adversary leadership on how to anticipate and counteract NATO\'s initiatives and investments. NATO is targeted by cyber espionage activity from actors around the world with varying capabilities. Many still rely on technically simple but operationally effective methods, like social engineering. Others have evolved and elevated their tradecraft to levels that distinguish themselves as formidable adversaries for even the most experienced defenders. APT29 (ICECAP) Publicly attributed to the Russian Foreign Intelligence Services (SVR) by several governments, APT29 is heavily focused on diplomatic and political intelligence collection, principally targeting Europe and NATO member states. APT29 has been involved in multiple high-profile breaches of technology firms that were designed to provide access to the public sector. In the past year, Mandiant has observed APT29 targeting technology companies and IT service providers in NATO member countries to facilitate third-party and software supply chain compromises of government and poli |
Ransomware Malware Tool Vulnerability Threat Legislation Medical Cloud Technical | APT 29 APT 28 | ★★★ |
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2024-04-25 10:00:00 | Pole Voûte: cyber-menaces aux élections mondiales Poll Vaulting: Cyber Threats to Global Elections (lien direct) |
Written by: Kelli Vanderlee, Jamie Collier
Executive Summary The election cybersecurity landscape globally is characterized by a diversity of targets, tactics, and threats. Elections attract threat activity from a variety of threat actors including: state-sponsored actors, cyber criminals, hacktivists, insiders, and information operations as-a-service entities. Mandiant assesses with high confidence that state-sponsored actors pose the most serious cybersecurity risk to elections. Operations targeting election-related infrastructure can combine cyber intrusion activity, disruptive and destructive capabilities, and information operations, which include elements of public-facing advertisement and amplification of threat activity claims. Successful targeting does not automatically translate to high impact. Many threat actors have struggled to influence or achieve significant effects, despite their best efforts. When we look across the globe we find that the attack surface of an election involves a wide variety of entities beyond voting machines and voter registries. In fact, our observations of past cycles indicate that cyber operations target the major players involved in campaigning, political parties, news and social media more frequently than actual election infrastructure. Securing elections requires a comprehensive understanding of many types of threats and tactics, from distributed denial of service (DDoS) to data theft to deepfakes, that are likely to impact elections in 2024. It is vital to understand the variety of relevant threat vectors and how they relate, and to ensure mitigation strategies are in place to address the full scope of potential activity. Election organizations should consider steps to harden infrastructure against common attacks, and utilize account security tools such as Google\'s Advanced Protection Program to protect high-risk accounts. Introduction The 2024 global election cybersecurity landscape is characterized by a diversity of targets, tactics, and threats. An expansive ecosystem of systems, administrators, campaign infrastructure, and public communications venues must be secured against a diverse array of operators and methods. Any election cybersecurity strategy should begin with a survey of the threat landscape to build a more proactive and tailored security posture. The cybersecurity community must keep pace as more than two billion voters are expected to head to the polls in 2024. With elections in more than an estimated 50 countries, there is an opportunity to dynamically track how threats to democracy evolve. Understanding how threats are targeting one country will enable us to better anticipate and prepare for upcoming elections globally. At the same time, we must also appreciate the unique context of different countries. Election threats to South Africa, India, and the United States will inevitably differ in some regard. In either case, there is an opportunity for us to prepare with the advantage of intelligence. |
Ransomware Malware Hack Tool Vulnerability Threat Legislation Cloud Technical | APT 40 APT 29 APT 28 APT 43 APT 31 APT 42 | ★★★ |
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2024-03-22 00:00:00 | APT29 Uses WINELOADER to Target German Political Parties (lien direct) | Written by: Luke Jenkins, Dan Black
Executive Summary In late February, APT29 used a new backdoor variant publicly tracked as WINELOADER to target German political parties with a CDU-themed lure. This is the first time we have seen this APT29 cluster target political parties, indicating a possible area of emerging operational focus beyond the typical targeting of diplomatic missions. Based on the SVR\'s responsibility to collect political intelligence and this APT29 cluster\'s historical targeting patterns, we judge this activity to present a broad threat to European and other Western political parties from across the political spectrum. Please see the Technical Annex for technical details and MITRE ATT&CK techniques, (T1543.003, T1012, T1082, T1134, T1057, T1007, T1027, T1070.004, T1055.003 and T1083) Threat Detail In late February 2024, Mandiant identified APT29 - a Russian Federation backed threat group linked by multiple governments to Russia\'s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) - conducting a phishing campaign targeting German political parties. Consistent with APT29 operations extending back to 2021, this operation leveraged APT29\'s mainstay first-stage payload ROOTSAW (aka EnvyScout) to deliver a new backdoor variant publicly tracked as WINELOADER. Notably, this activity represents a departure from this APT29 initial access cluster\'s typical remit of targeting governments, foreign embassies, and other diplomatic missions, and is the first time Mandiant has seen an operational interest in political parties from this APT29 subcluster. Additionally, while APT29 has previously used lure documents bearing the logo of German government organizations, this is the first instance where we have seen the group use German-language lure content - a possible artifact of the targeting differences (i.e. domestic vs. foreign) between the two operations. Phishing emails were sent to victims purporting to be an invite to a dinner reception on 01 March bearing a logo from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), a major political party in Germany (see Figure 1). The German-language lure document contains a phishing link directing victims to a malicious ZIP file containing a ROOTSAW dropper hosted on an actor-controlled compromised website “https://waterforvoiceless[.]org/invite.php”. ROOTSAW delivered a second-stage CDU-themed lure document and a next stage WINELOADER payload retrieved from “waterforvoiceless[.]org/util.php”. WINELOADER was first observed in operational use in late January 2024 in an operation targeting likely diplomatic entities in Czechia, Germany, India, Italy, Latvia, and Peru. The backdoor contains several features and functions that overlap with several known APT29 malware families including BURNTBATTER, MUSKYBEAT and BEATDROP, indicating they are likely created by a common developer (see Technical Annex for additional details). |
Malware Threat Cloud Technical | APT 29 | ★★★ |
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2017-04-03 07:00:00 | Dissection de l'une des boursiers WMI et PowerShell sans fichu et PowerShell (Poshspy) Dissecting One of APT29\\'s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY) (lien direct) |
Mandiant a observé APT29 en utilisant une porte dérobée furtive que nous appelons poshspy.Poshspy exploite deux des outils que le groupe utilise fréquemment: PowerShell et Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).Dans les enquêtes que Mandiant a menées, il est apparu qu'APT29 a déployé Poshspy comme porte dérobée secondaire pour une utilisation s'ils perdaient l'accès à leurs possibilités principales.
Poshspy tire le meilleur parti des fonctionnalités Windows intégrées & # 8211;Ce que l'on appelle «vivre du terrain» & # 8211;pour faire une porte dérobée particulièrement furtive.L'utilisation de WMI de Poshspy \\ pour stocker et persister le code de porte dérobée le rend presque invisible pour quiconque
Mandiant has observed APT29 using a stealthy backdoor that we call POSHSPY. POSHSPY leverages two of the tools the group frequently uses: PowerShell and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). In the investigations Mandiant has conducted, it appeared that APT29 deployed POSHSPY as a secondary backdoor for use if they lost access to their primary backdoors. POSHSPY makes the most of using built-in Windows features – so-called “living off the land” – to make an especially stealthy backdoor. POSHSPY\'s use of WMI to both store and persist the backdoor code makes it nearly invisible to anyone |
Tool Technical | APT 29 | ★★★★ |
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