One Article Review
| Source |  AlienVault Blog |
|---|---|
| Identifiant | 2316961 |
| Date de publication | 2021-02-09 11:00:00 (vue: 2021-02-09 11:05:20) |
| Titre | Zero Trust policies - Not just for humans, but for machines and applications too |
| Texte | This blog was written by an independent guest blogger. Hackers are continually finding more and more pathways into an organization’s internal environment. Not only is access widely available, it can also be alarmingly simple. Rather than having to actively hack systems, hackers often just log in using easily-obtained or compromised user identities and credentials. To avert these types of attacks, many organizations have adopted zero trust policies that require a user to provide additional authentication before accessing an organization’s resources and data. Traditional, identity-centric zero trust practices focusing solely on protecting the credentials of human users ignore a substantial set of vulnerabilities, namely those involving interactions between machines, applications and workloads. “Machine identities,” which now outnumber human identities 20:1, present organizations with additional security challenges. To address those challenges, businesses must implement effective processes for recognizing machine identities, provisioning their access to resources, and continuously authenticating identities during interactions with organizational resources. What is Zero Trust? Zero trust security models assume that no identity is inherently trustworthy. All identities are equally distrusted - whether customer, employee, device or process - and require additional authentication. A well-known example of a zero trust policy is the use of multi-factor authentication to verify a user’s identity. Identity authentication issues for machine identities, while similar, become a bit more complicated. But, as discussed below, there are policies and processes an organization should consider when implementing zero trust programs that will effectively protect both human and machine identities. Effective application of Zero Trust policies to machine identities Effective zero trust policies require frequent and continuous validation of all “users.” But to be as effective as possible, the policy must address the question “Who or what constitutes a user?” It is quite normal to think only of human users when the word “identity” is used. But there are any number of intermediate nodes between a human end user and the resources they access within an organization, including devices, applications and networks, as well as the organization’s databases that contain relevant data. In addition to having their own identities, each of these nodes can be associated with and accessed by a number of other identities, whether they be other devices, workloads, microservices, applications or human users. And each identity involved in an interaction, from human user identities to the machine identities, is a potential target for a hacker. Many businesses reach the point of zero trust too late, after a problem such as a breach or a failed security audit has already happened. Prudent businesses, however, implement strong zero trust policies proactively. Effective policies require strong, well-protected, frequently modified credentials and limit access to essential processes and data without negatively impacting interactions and workloads. Zero trust is not a perfect solution with respect to machine identities, but it can be effective. Organizations should consider the f |
| Envoyé | Oui |
| Condensat | “machine “users “who “you 20:1 access accessed accessing account across actively actually adapt addition additional address addresses adopted after against alarmingly all allows along already also among amounts analysis another any application applications are are: associated assume attack attacks attempting audit australia authenticate authenticating authentication available avert avoidance barriers based become been before below best between bit blog blogger both breach brings build building burden businesses but can cannot cardholder centric certificates certification challenges changing closer cloud comes common communications complex complicated component compromised conclusion configurations consider constitutes contain continually continues continuous continuously control controls conversion coordination credentials customer customers cyber cybersecurity damage data databases day days define designer development device devices digital discussed discusses disposal distrusted diverse doesn’t dss during each easily effective effectively effort employee encrypted end ensure ensures environment equally essential example exist existing expert exposure factor failed failure fault finch finding firewall first focus focusing following framework frequent frequently from front generation given goal goes greater guest hack hacker hackers hand happened happens hardware has have having help helping his hosting hours however human humans iam identify identities identities identity ignore ignoring impacting implement implementation implementing improve include includes including increase independent individual inherently inside interaction interactions intermediate internal involved involving isolate issues its just key keys kms know known large late least likewise limit limited limiting limits location log logging machine machines manage management many may measures microsegmentation microservices minimize models modification modified modules monitoring more multi must namely nathan necessary negatively network networks nodes normal not now number obtained often once ongoing online only open operating organization organization’s organizational organizations other out outnumber own parameters party passed password pathways payment pci perfect perimeter perimeters permission platforms point points policies policy possibility possible potential practices present privilege proactively problem process processes program program: programs properly protect protected protecting provide providers providing provisioning prudent question quite rates rather reach real recognizing reinforce relevant require requires resources respect result robust roles secrets secure security segments sensitive server service services set seven should signatures significant similar simple sit site software solely solution storage store strong structure substantial such supplementing supplied sydney systems target task than thereby these think third those time together too tools top traditional transmissions trust trustworthy types typically ultimately unauthorized unless use used user user’s users using validation vast vendor verficiations verify very vetted vulnerabilities weak web website week well what when whether which who widely will wish within without word work workloads written your zero |
| Tags | Hack |
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