One Article Review
| Source |  CISCO Talos |
|---|---|
| Identifiant | 6392803 |
| Date de publication | 2022-08-18 08:00:00 (vue: 2022-08-18 13:06:10) |
| Titre | Ukraine and the fragility of agriculture security |
| Texte |  By Joe Marshall.The war in Ukraine has had far-reaching global implications and one of the most immediate effects felt will be on the global supply chain for food. This war-induced fragility has exposed the weaknesses of how we feed ourselves globally. Ransomware cartels and other adversaries are well aware of this and are actively exploiting that fragility. For the past six years, Cisco Talos has been actively involved in assisting public and private institutions in Ukraine to defend themselves against state-sponsored actors. Our involvement stretches the gamut from commercial to critical infrastructure, to election security. Our presence has afforded us unique opportunities and observations about cybersecurity in a macro and micro way. Ukraine has been a frequent victim of state-sponsored cyber attacks aimed at critical infrastructures like power and transportation. Talos is proud to stand with our partners in Ukraine and help defend their critical networks and help users there maintain access to necessary services. Now that Russia has invaded Ukraine, those threats have escalated to kinetic attacks that are wreaking havoc on a critical element of our world: agriculture and our global food supply chain. Even worse is the implications this war will have for future cyber attacks, as fragility is considered a lucrative element in deciding victimology by threat actors like ransomware cartels. To truly grasp the implications of the war in Ukraine, we have to examine how vital Ukrainian agriculture feeds the world, the current state of affairs, and what this means for the global cybersecurity posture to protect agricultural assets. Where there is weakness, there is opportunityRansomware cartels and their affiliates are actively targeting the agricultural industry. Moreover, these actors have done their homework and are targeting agricultural companies during the two times of the year where they cannot suffer disruptions: planting and harvesting. Per the published FBI PIN Alert: “Cyber actors may perceive cooperatives as lucrative targets with a willingness to pay due to the time-sensitive role they play in agricultural production.” This is far from unusual for these adversaries - they are shrewd and calculating, and understand their victims' weaknesses and industries. H |
| Envoyé | Oui |
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| Tags | Ransomware Threat Guideline Cloud |
| Stories | NotPetya Uber APT 37 APT 32 APT 28 APT 10 APT 21 Guam |
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