One Article Review
| Source |  Errata Security |
|---|---|
| Identifiant | 846347 |
| Date de publication | 2018-10-14 04:57:46 (vue: 2018-10-14 11:03:01) |
| Titre | How to irregular cyber warfare |
| Texte | Somebody (@thegrugq) pointed me to this article on "Lessons on Irregular Cyber Warfare", citing the masters like Sun Tzu, von Clausewitz, Mao, Che, and the usual characters. It tries to answer:...as an insurgent, which is in a weaker power position vis-a-vis a stronger nation state; how does cyber warfare plays an integral part in the irregular cyber conflicts in the twenty-first century between nation-states and violent non-state actors or insurgenciesI thought I'd write a rebuttal.None of these people provide any value. If you want to figure out cyber insurgency, then you want to focus on the technical "cyber" aspects, not "insurgency". I regularly read military articles about cyber written by those, like in the above article, which demonstrate little experience in cyber.The chief technical lesson for the cyber insurgent is the Birthday Paradox. Let's say, hypothetically, you go to a party with 23 people total. What's the chance that any two people at the party have the same birthday? The answer is 50.7%. With a party of 75 people, the chance rises to 99.9% that two will have the same birthday.The paradox is that your intuitive way of calculating the odds is wrong. You are thinking the odds are like those of somebody having the same birthday as yourself, which is in indeed roughly 23 out of 365. But we aren't talking about you vs. the remainder of the party, we are talking about any possible combination of two people. This dramatically changes how we do the math.In cryptography, this is known as the "Birthday Attack". One crypto task is to uniquely fingerprint documents. Historically, the most popular way of doing his was with an algorithm known as "MD5" which produces 128-bit fingerprints. Given a document, with an MD5 fingerprint, it's impossible to create a second document with the same fingerprint. However, with MD5, it's possible to create two documents with the same fingerprint. In other words, we can't modify only one document to get a match, but we can keep modifying two documents until their fingerprints match. Like a room, finding somebody with your birthday is hard, finding any two people with the same birthday is easier.The same principle works with insurgencies. Accomplishing one specific goal is hard, but accomplishing any goal is easy. Trying to do a narrowly defined task to disrupt the enemy is hard, but it's easy to support a group of motivated hackers and let them do any sort of disruption they can come up with.The above article suggests a means of using cyber to disrupt a carrier attack group. This is an example of something hard, a narrowly defined attack that is unlikely to actually work in the real world.Conversely, consider the attacks attributed to North Korea, like those against Sony or the Wannacry virus. These aren't the careful planning of a small state actor trying to accomplish specific goals. These are the actions of an actor that supports hacker groups, and lets them loose without a lot of oversight and direction. Wannacry in particular is an example of an undirected cyber attack. We know from our experience with network worms that its effects were impossible to predict. Somebody just stuck the newly discovered NSA EternalBlue payload into an existing virus framework and let it run to see what happens. As we worm experts know, nobody could have predicted the results of doing so, not even its creators.Another example is the DNC election hacks. The reason we can attribute them to Russia is because it wasn't their narrow goal. Instead, by looking at things like their URL shortener, we can see that they flailed around broadly all over cyberspace. The DNC was just one of thei |
| Envoyé | Oui |
| Condensat | 128 365 @thegrugq about above accomplish accomplishing accurately achieve achievement actions actor actors actually adversaries africa against algorithm all allies america among anonymous another answer answer: anticipate any approach are aren around article articles aspects asymmetric attack attacks attribute attributed away banging based because been behind being best between birthday bit britain broad broadly bungling but calculating can careful carrier centrally century chance changes characters che chief china citing clausewitz code combination come comes communist comparative compelling comprehend conflicts consider contrast conversely could create creators crypto cryptography cuban cyber cybercriminals cyberspace cyberwar cyberwarriors decide defenses defined demonstrate desired despite directed direction discovered disrupt disruption dnc document documents does doing don dramatically easier easy effect effects efforts election end ended enemy enormous eternalblue even example existing experience experts exploiting extension face failure failures famous fashionable figure finding fingerprint fingerprints first flailed focus focused found framework from get given goal goals group groups guerillas we guevara hack hacker hackers hacking hacks happens hard have having hinders his historically history how however hypothetically identity illusion impossible improbable inadvertently incompetent indeed infinite informs insist instead insurgencies insurgenciesi insurgency insurgent integral interesting intuitive investment iran irregular israel its just keep keyboards know known korea lack large lately leader leaders leaving less lesson lessons let lets like little looking loose lot make makers many mao marbles masters match math md5 means mentioned metadata military modify modifying monkeys more most motivated much narrow narrowly nation need needs network newly nobody non none nonsense north not nothing nsa number odds offensive one only opportunistic opportunistically opportunity other out over overcome oversight own paradox paradox: part participated particular party payload people phishing planning plans plays pointed policy politicians popular position possible power predict predicted pretentious primarily principle produces provide public quote rather read real realities really reason rebuttal regularly relied remainder response results revolution revolutions rises room roughly run russia same say second secret see seeing shakespear shortener should skill small somebody something sony sophisticated sort south specific state state; states stronger struggle stuck student stuxnet succeed success successes successful such suggests sun support supports sure suspect talented talking task technical teenagers terms than their fingerprints them then these things thinking those thought total traditional tries trying twenty two tzu understand undirected uniquely unlikely unsophisticated until upon url using usual value violent virus vis von vulnerabilities wannacry want warfare warriors wasn watched way weaker well what which who will willing without word words work works world worm worms write written wrong your yourself zedong |
| Tags | Hack Guideline |
| Stories | Wannacry |
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