What's new arround internet
| Src | Date (GMT) | Titre | Description | Tags | Stories | Notes |
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2019-08-14 21:45:48 | Threat hunting using DNS firewalls and data enrichment (lien direct) | After seeing a few advertisements about DNS firewalls and how expensive they are, I want to share my experience with blue teamers about how DNS firewalls work and how that knowledge can be used for in-house threat hunting solutions and/or building your own DNS firewall (aka do it yourself). These are examples of an approach to detect malicious behaviour, not a tailor made solutions.At the beginning I would like to highlight that it's a good practice to monitor not only logs but also DNS traffic in real time. Such traffic isn't encrypted and if you only check DNS server logs then you can miss direct requests to other DNS servers. Additionally you can also use recently published version of Sysmon [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon] which supports DNS queries in event ID 22 (DNSEvent).The DNS queries used below that end with | Spam Malware Threat Guideline | APT 18 | |
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2019-07-25 13:00:00 | Can you trust threat intelligence from threat sharing communities? | AT&T ThreatTraq (lien direct) | Every week the AT&T Chief Security Office produces a series called ThreatTraq with helpful information and news commentary for InfoSec practitioners and researchers. I really enjoy them; you can subscribe to the Youtube channel to stay updated. This is a transcript of a recent feature on ThreatTraq. The video features Jaime Blasco, VP and Chief Scientist, AlienVault, Stan Nurilov, Lead Member of Technical Staff, AT&T, and Joe Harten, Director Technical Security. Stan: Jaime. I think you have a very interesting topic today about threat intelligence. Jaime: Yes, we want to talk about how threat intelligence is critical for threat detection and incident response, but then when this threat intelligence and the threat actors try to match those indicators and that information that is being shared, it can actually be bad for companies. So we are going to share some of the experiences we have had with managing the Open Threat Exchange (OTX) - one of the biggest threat sharing communities out there. Stan: Jaime mentioned that they have so many threat indicators and so much threat intelligence as part of OTX, the platform. Jaime: We know attackers monitor these platforms and are adjusting tactics and techniques and probably the infrastructure based on public reaction to cyber security companies sharing their activities in blog posts and other reporting. An example is in September 2017, we saw APT28, and it became harder to track because we were using some of the infrastructure and some of the techniques that were publicly known. And another cyber security company published content about that and then APT28 became much more difficult to track. The other example is APT1. If you remember the APT1 report in 2013 that Mandiant published, that made the group basically disappear from the face of earth, right? We didn't see them for a while and then they changed the infrastructure and they changed a lot of the tools that they were using, and then they came back in 2014. So we can see that that threat actor disappeared for a while, changed and rebuilt, and then they came back. We also know that attackers can try to publish false information in this platform, so that's why it's important that not only those platforms are automated, but also there are human analysts that can verify that information. Joe: It seems like you have to have a process of validating the intelligence, right? I think part of it is you don't want to take this intelligence at face value without having some expertise of your own that asks, is this valid? Is this a false positive? Is this planted by the adversary in order to throw off the scent? I think it's one of those things where you can't automatically trust - threat intelligence. You have to do some of your own diligence to validate the intelligence, make sure it makes sense, make sure it's still fresh, it's still good. This is something we're working on internally - creating those other layers to validate and create better value of our threat intelligence. Jaime: The other issue I wanted to bring to the table is what we call false flag operations - that's when an adversary or a threat actor studies another threat actor and tries to emulate their behavior. So when companies try to do at | Malware Threat Studies Guideline | APT 38 APT 28 APT 1 | |
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2019-07-19 14:35:01 | Malware that waits for three mouse clicks before running. (lien direct) | An elusive hacking operation is using a previously unreported backdoor in a malware campaign targeting diplomats and government departments around the world. The Ke3chang advanced persistent threat group is thought to operate out of China and has conducted cyber-espionage campaigns using remote access trojans and other malware since at least 2010. Now cybersecurity researchers at ESET have identified […] | Malware Threat | APT 15 APT 25 | ★★ |
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2019-07-18 09:30:01 | Okrum: Ke3chang group targets diplomatic missions (lien direct) | >Tracking the malicious activities of the elusive Ke3chang APT group, ESET researchers have discovered new versions of malware families linked to the group, and a previously unreported backdoor | Malware | APT 15 APT 25 | |
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2019-07-18 07:03:00 | New Okrum Malware Used by Ke3chang Group to Target Diplomats (lien direct) | Updated malware implants and a new backdoor named Okrum connected with the Ke3chang threat group operating from China have been found by ESET researchers while monitoring their operations between 2015 and 2019. [...] | Malware Threat | APT 15 APT 25 | |
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2019-05-28 05:48:02 | APT10 is back with two new loaders and new versions of known payloads (lien direct) | The APT10 group has added two new malware loaders to its arsenal and used in attacks aimed at government and private organizations in Southeast Asia. In April 2019, China-linked cyber-espionage group tracked as APT10 has added two new loaders to its arsenal and used it against government and private organizations in Southeast Asia. The group […] | Malware | APT 10 | |
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2019-01-31 17:24:00 | APT10 Group Targets Multiple Sectors, But Seems to Really Love MSSPs (lien direct) |
Threat Actors That Don’t Discriminate
When it comes to threat actors and the malware variants they use, let’s talk dating — or rather, the way people date — because one could argue there are marked similarities between the two. You see, there are criminal groups who have a “type,” i.e. using malware that targets specific industries or even organizations — say, financial services (ever-popular and oh-so debonair) or perhaps critical infrastructure (spicy and daring!), or even healthcare for those who prefer staid and demure. Yet other groups are the free lovin’ types who go after multiple sectors using many different malware variants and approaches to accomplish their goal — no discriminating with this bunch.
Let’s look at one such example, APT10 / Cloud Hopper, which is likely the group behind a long running, sophisticated campaign that uses multiple malware variants to target many different sectors in many different countries. You can check out some of the pulses relating to APT10 / Cloud Hopper on the Open Threat Exchange (OTX).
The U.S. National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) reports the campaign started in May 2016, and NCCIC last updated its alert in December 2018 — so it’s not going away yet.
The group known as APT10 / Cloud Hopper has hit quite a few victims over the last few years in many different sectors, such as: information technology, energy, healthcare and public health, communications, and critical manufacturing. However, their “date of choice” seems to be MSSPs due to the fact a that credential compromises within those networks could potentially be leveraged to access customer environments. From OTX pulse “Operation Cloud Hopper”:
The espionage campaign has targeted managed IT service providers (MSSPs), allowing the APT10 group unprecedented potential access to the intellectual property and sensitive data of those MSSPs and their clients globally. This indirect approach of reaching many through only a few targets demonstrates a new level of maturity in cyber espionage – so it’s more important than ever to have a comprehensive view of all the threats your organization might be exposed to, either directly or through your supply chain.
As any clever serial dater would do, APT10 / Cloud Hopper doesn’t use just one approach. The NCCIC reports they have deployed multiple malware families and variants, some of which are currently not detected by anti-virus signatures — for example, PLUGX / SOGU and REDLEAVES. And although the observed malware is based on existing malware code, APT10 / Cloud Hopper modifies it to improve effectiveness and avoid detection by existing signatures.
How Can APT10 Group Impact You?
If these free lovin’ bad guys decide to come after you, they’re likely looking for your data (perhaps to steal intellectual property). At a high level, they’re accomplishing this by leveraging stolen administrative credentials (local and domain) and certificates to place sophisticated malware implants on critical systems (such as PlugX and Redleaves). Depending on the defensive mitigations in place, they then gain full access to networks and data in a way that appears legitimate to existing your monitoring tools. Voila! They’ve gone from first date to a home run!
Wired Maga |
Malware Vulnerability Threat | APT 10 | |
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2018-10-19 07:06:03 | Attackers behind Operation Oceansalt reuse code from Chinese Comment Crew (lien direct) | Security researchers from McAfee have recently uncovered a cyber espionage campaign, tracked as Operation Oceansalt, targeting South Korea, the United States, and Canada. The threat actors behind Operation Oceansalt are reusing malware previously associated with China-linked cyberespionage group APT1. “McAfee Advanced Threat Research and Anti-Malware Operations teams have discovered another unknown data reconnaissance implant targeting Korean-speaking users.” reads the report. “We […] | Malware Threat | APT 32 APT 1 | |
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2018-10-18 19:17:05 | New APT Could Signal Reemergence of Notorious Comment Crew (lien direct) | A custom malware used in a five-pronged APT espionage campaign was largely built from the defunct Comment Crew's proprietary code. | Malware | APT 1 | |
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2018-10-18 04:01:00 | The Mysterious Return of Years-Old APT1 Malware (lien direct) | Security researchers have discovered a new instance code associated with APT1, a notorious Chinese hacking group that disappeared in 2013. | Malware | APT 1 | |
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2018-10-18 04:01:00 | Oceansalt cyberattack wave linked to defunct Chinese APT Comment Crew (lien direct) | The source code of malware from the ancient Chinese military-affiliated group appears to have changed hands. | Malware | APT 32 APT 1 | |
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2018-02-28 21:54:40 | NBlog March 1 - Invasion of the Cryptominers (lien direct) |  That's it, we're done! The 2018 malware awareness module is on its way to NoticeBored subscribers, infecting customers with ... our passion for the topic.There are 28 different types of awareness and training material, in three parallel streams as always: Stream A: security awareness materials for staff/all employees [if !supportLists]-->1. [endif]-->Train-the-trainer guide on malware MS Word document [if gte vml 1]> |
Malware | APT 15 | |
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2014-10-27 03:00:42 | Malware APT28: une fenêtre sur les opérations de cyber-espionnage de la Russie? APT28 Malware: A Window into Russia\\'s Cyber Espionage Operations? (lien direct) |
Le rôle des acteurs de l'État-nation dans les cyberattaques a peut-être été le plus largement révélé en février 2013 lorsque mandiant href = "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/mandiant-expose-apt1-chinas-cyber-espionage-units" cible = "_ Blank"> Rapport APT1, en Chine.Aujourd'hui, nous publions un nouveau rapport: apt28:Une fenêtre sur les opérations de cyber-espionnage de la Russie?
Ce rapport se concentre sur un groupe de menaces que nous avons désigné comme APT28.Alors que les logiciels malveillants d'APT28 \\ sont assez connus dans la communauté de la cybersécurité, notre rapport détaille des informations supplémentaires exposant des opérations en cours et ciblées qui, selon nous, indiquent un sponsor gouvernemental basé à Moscou.
dans
The role of nation-state actors in cyber attacks was perhaps most widely revealed in February 2013 when Mandiant released the APT1 report, which detailed a professional cyber espionage group based in China. Today we release a new report: APT28: A Window Into Russia\'s Cyber Espionage Operations? This report focuses on a threat group that we have designated as APT28. While APT28\'s malware is fairly well known in the cybersecurity community, our report details additional information exposing ongoing, focused operations that we believe indicate a government sponsor based in Moscow. In |
Malware Threat | APT 28 APT 28 APT 1 | ★★★★ |
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