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2021-09-14 15:00:00 |
Anomali Cyber Watch: Azurescape Cloud Threat, MSHTML 0-Day in The Wild, Confluence Cloud Hacked to Mine Monero, and More (lien direct) |
The various threat intelligence stories in this iteration of the Anomali Cyber Watch discuss the following topics: Android, APT, Confluence, Cloud, MSHTML, Phishing, and Vulnerabilities. The IOCs related to these stories are attached to Anomali Cyber Watch and can be used to check your logs for potential malicious activity.
Figure 1 - IOC Summary Charts. These charts summarize the IOCs attached to this magazine and provide a glimpse of the threats discussed. Current Anomali ThreatStream users can query these indicators under the “anomali cyber watch” tag.
Trending Cyber News and Threat Intelligence
S.O.V.A. – A New Android Banking Trojan with Fowl Intentions
(published: September 10, 2021)
ThreatFabric researchers have discovered a new Android banking trojan called S.O.V.A. The malware is still in the development and testing phase and the threat actor is publicly-advertising S.O.V.A. for trial runs targeting banks to improve its functionality. The trojan’s primary objective is to steal personally identifiable information (PII). This is conducted through overlay attacks, keylogging, man-in-the-middle attacks, and session cookies theft, among others. The malware author is also working on other features such as distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) and ransomware on S.O.V.A.’s project roadmap.
Analyst Comment: Always keep your mobile phone fully patched with the latest security updates. Only use official locations such as the Google Play Store / Apple App Store to obtain your software, and avoid downloading applications, even if they appear legitimate, from third-party stores. Furthermore, always review the permissions an app will request upon installation.
MITRE ATT&CK: [MITRE ATT&CK] Input Capture - T1056 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Man-in-the-Middle - T1557 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Steal Web Session Cookie - T1539 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Network Denial of Service - T1498 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Data Encrypted for Impact - T1486
Tags: Android, Banking trojan, S.O.V.A., Overlay, Keylogging, Cookies, Man-in-the-Middle
Finding Azurescape – Cross-Account Container Takeover in Azure Container Instances
(published: September 9, 2021)
Unit 42 researchers identified and disclosed critical security issues in Microsoft’s Container-as-a-Service (CaaS) offering that is called Azure Container Instances (ACI). A malicious Azure user could have compromised the multitenant Kubernetes clusters hosting ACI, establishing full control over other users' containers. Researchers gave the vulnerability a specific name, Azurescape, highlighting its significance: it the first cross-account container takeover in the public cloud.
Analyst Comment: Azurescape vulnerabilities could have allowed an attacker to execute code on other users' containers, steal customer secrets and images deployed to the platform, and abuse ACI's infrastructure processing power. Microsoft patched ACI shortly after the discl |
Ransomware
Spam
Malware
Tool
Vulnerability
Threat
Guideline
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Uber
APT 41
APT 15
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2021-07-06 15:05:00 |
Anomali Cyber Watch: Thousands attacked as REvil ransomware hijacks Kaseya VSA, Leaked Babuk Locker Ransomware Builder Used In New Attacks and More (lien direct) |
The various threat intelligence stories in this iteration of the Anomali Cyber Watch discuss the following topics: Babuk, IndigoZebra, Ransomware, REvil, Skimmer, Zero-day and Vulnerabilities. The IOCs related to these stories are attached to Anomali Cyber Watch and can be used to check your logs for potential malicious activity.
Figure 1 - IOC Summary Charts. These charts summarize the IOCs attached to this magazine and provide a glimpse of the threats discussed.
Trending Cyber News and Threat Intelligence
Shutdown Kaseya VSA Servers Now Amidst Cascading REvil Attack Against MSPs, Clients
(published: July 4, 2021)
A severe ransomware attack reportedly took place against the popular remote monitoring and management (RMM) software tool Kaseya VSA. On July 2, 2021, Kaseya urged users to shut down their VSA servers to prevent them from being compromised. The company estimated that fewer than 40 of their customers worldwide were affected, but as some of them were managed service providers (MSPs), over 1,000 businesses were infected. The majority of known victims are in the US with some in Europe (Sweden) and New Zealand. The attackers exploited a zero-day vulnerability in Kaseya’s systems that the company was in the process of fixing. It was part of the administrative interface vulnerabilities in tools for system administration previously identified by Wietse Boonstra, a DIVD researcher. The REvil payload was delivered via Kaseya software using a custom dropper that dropped two files. A dropper opens an old but legitimate copy of Windows Defender (MsMpEng.exe) that then side loads and executes the custom malicious loader's export. The attack coincided with the start of the US Independence Day weekend, and has several politically-charged strings, such as “BlackLivesMatter” Windows registry key and “DTrump4ever” as a password.
Analyst Comment: Kaseya VSA clients should safely follow the company’s recommendations as it advised shutting Kaseya VSA servers down, and is making new security updates available. Every organization should have a ransomware disaster recovery plan even if it is serviced by a managed service provider (MSP).
MITRE ATT&CK: [MITRE ATT&CK] Data Encrypted for Impact - T1486 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Supply Chain Compromise - T1195 | [MITRE ATT&CK] DLL Side-Loading - T1073
Tags: REvil, Sodinokibi, Gandcrab, Leafroller, Kaseya VSA, ransomware, Ransomware-as-a- Service, zero-day, CVE-2021-30116, supply-chain, North America, USA, Sweden, New Zealand, MSP, RMM, schools
IndigoZebra APT Continues To Attack Central Asia With Evolving Tools
(published: July 1, 2021)
Researchers from Check Point have identified the Afghan Government as the latest victim in a cyber espionage campaign by the suspected Chinese group ‘IndigoZebra’. This attack began in April when Afghan National Security Council (NSC) officials began to receive lure emails claiming to be from the President’s secretariat. These emails included a decoy file that would install the backdoor ‘BoxCaon’ on the system before reaching out to the Dropbox API to act as a C&C server. The attacker would then be able to fingerprint the machine and begin accessing files. I |
Ransomware
Spam
Malware
Tool
Vulnerability
Threat
Guideline
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APT 19
APT 10
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2021-04-06 16:57:00 |
Anomali Cyber Watch: APT Groups, Data Breach, Malspam, and More (lien direct) |
The various threat intelligence stories in this iteration of the Anomali Cyber Watch discuss the following topics: APT10, Charming Kitten, China, Cycldek, Hancitor, Malspam, North Korea, Phishing, TA453, and Vulnerabilities. The IOCs related to these stories are attached to Anomali Cyber Watch and can be used to check your logs for potential malicious activity.
Figure 1 - IOC Summary Charts. These charts summarize the IOCs attached to this magazine and provide a glimpse of the threats discussed.
Trending Cyber News and Threat Intelligence
The Leap of a Cycldek-Related Threat Actor
(published: April 5, 2021)
A new sophisticated Chinese campaign was observed between June 2020 and January 2021, targeting government, military and other critical industries in Vietnam, and, to lesser extent, in Central Asia and Thailand. This threat actor uses a "DLL side-loading triad" previously mastered by another Chinese group, LuckyMouse: a legitimate executable, a malicious DLL to be sideloaded by it, and an encoded payload, generally dropped from a self-extracting archive. But the code origins of the new malware used on different stages of this campaign point to a different Chinese-speaking group, Cycldek.
Analyst Comment: Malware authors are always innovating new methods of communicating back to the control servers. Always practice Defense in Depth (do not rely on single security mechanisms - security measures should be layered, redundant, and failsafe).
MITRE ATT&CK: [MITRE ATT&CK] DLL Side-Loading - T1073 | [MITRE ATT&CK] File Deletion - T1107
Tags: Chinese-speaking, Cycldek-related
Hancitor’s Use of Cobalt Strike and a Noisy Network Ping Tool
(published: April 1, 2021)
Hancitor is an information stealer and malware downloader used by a threat actor designated as MAN1, Moskalvzapoe or TA511. Initial infection includes target clicking malspam, then clicking on a link in an opened Google Docs page, and finally clicking to enable macros in the downloaded Word document. In recent months, this actor began using a network ping tool to help enumerate the Active Directory (AD) environment of infected hosts. It generates approximately 1.5 GB of Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) traffic.
Analyst Comment: Organizations should use email security solutions to block malicious/spam emails. All email attachments should be scanned for malware before they reach the user's inbox. IPS rules need to be configured properly to identify any reconnaissance attempts e.g. port scan to get early indication of potential breach.
MITRE ATT&CK: [MITRE ATT&CK] Remote System Discovery - T1018 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Remote Access Tools - T1219 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Rundll32 - T1085 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Standard Application Layer Protocol - T1071 | [MITRE ATT&CK] System Information Discovery - T1082
Tags: Hancitor, Malspam, Cobalt Strike
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Malware
Tool
Vulnerability
Threat
Conference
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APT 35
APT 10
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2021-03-10 08:31:56 |
Researchers Unveil New Linux Malware Linked to Chinese Hackers (lien direct) |
Cybersecurity researchers on Wednesday shed light on a new sophisticated backdoor targeting Linux endpoints and servers that's believed to be the work of Chinese nation-state actors.
Dubbed "RedXOR" by Intezer, the backdoor masquerades as a polkit daemon, with similarities found between the malware and those previously associated with the Winnti Umbrella (or Axiom) threat group such as PWNLNX, |
Malware
Threat
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APT 17
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2020-12-07 20:46:46 |
Ever Evolving: Katie Nickels on Incident Response in a Remote World (lien direct) |
We spent some time with Katie Nickels - current Director of Intelligence at Red Canary and formerly MITRE ATT&CK Threat Intelligence Lead - to discuss applied threat intelligence, prioritizing threats for impact, and working incident response in remote environments - check it out... |
Threat
Guideline
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APT 15
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2020-11-18 20:27:53 |
China-linked APT10 leverages ZeroLogon exploits in recent attacks (lien direct) |
Researchers uncovered a large-scale campaign conducted by China-linked APT10 targeting businesses using the recently-disclosed ZeroLogon vulnerability. Symantec’s Threat Hunter Team, a Broadcom division, uncovered a global campaign conducted by a China-linked APT10 cyber-espionage group targeting businesses using the recently-disclosed ZeroLogon vulnerability. The group, also known as Cicada, Stone Panda, and Cloud Hopper, has been active at […]
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Threat
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APT 10
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2020-09-29 14:00:00 |
Weekly Threat Briefing: Federal Agency Breach, Exploits, Malware, and Spyware (lien direct) |
The various threat intelligence stories in this iteration of the Weekly Threat Briefing discuss the following topics: APT, Cyber Espionage, FinSpy, Magento, Taurus Project and Vulnerabilities. The IOCs related to these stories are attached to the Weekly Threat Briefing and can be used to check your logs for potential malicious activity.
Figure 1 - IOC Summary Charts. These charts summarize the IOCs attached to this magazine and provide a glimpse of the threats discussed.
Trending Cyber News and Threat Intelligence
German-made FinSpy Spyware Found in Egypt, and Mac and Linux Versions Revealed
(published: September 25, 2020)
Security Researchers from Amnesty International have identified new variants of FinSpy, spyware that can access private data and record audio/video. While used as a law enforcement tool, authoritarian governments have been using FinSpy to spy on activists and dissidents. Spreading through fake Flash Player updates, the malware is installed as root with use of exploits, and persistence is gained by creating a logind.pslist file. Once a system is infected with the malware, it has the ability to run shell scripts, record audio, keylogging, view network information, and list files. Samples have been found of FinSpy for macOS, Windows, Android, and Linux.
Recommendation: Defense-in-depth (layering of security mechanisms, redundancy, fail-safe defense processes) is the best way to ensure safety from threat actors, including a focus on both network and host-based security. Prevention and detection capabilities should also be in place. Furthermore, all employees should be educated on the risks of spearphishing and how to identify such attempts.
MITRE ATT&CK: [MITRE ATT&CK] Logon Scripts - T1037 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Standard Application Layer Protocol - T1071
Tags: Amnesty, Android, Backdoor, Linux, macOS, FinSpy, Spyware
Magento Credit Card Stealing Malware: gstaticapi
(published: September 25, 2020)
Security researchers, at Sucuri, have identified a malicious script, dubbed “gstaticapi,” that is designed to steal payment information from Magento-based websites. The script first attempts to find the “checkout” string in a web browser URL and, if found, will create an element to the web pages header. This allows the JavaScript to handle external code-loading capabilities that are used to process the theft of billing and payment card information.
Recommendation: Sometimes webmasters discover that one of their sites has been compromised months after the initial infection. Websites, much like personal workstations, require constant maintenance and upkeep in order to adapt to the latest threats. In addition to keeping server software up to date, it is critical that all external-facing assets are monitored and scanned for vulnerabilities. The ability to easily restore from backup, incident response planning, and customer communication channels should all be established before a breach occurs.
MITRE ATT&CK: [MITRE ATT&CK] Command-Line Interface - T1059 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Input Capture - T1056 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Data Encoding - T1132
T |
Data Breach
Malware
Vulnerability
Threat
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APT 19
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★★★★★
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2020-06-18 22:10:28 |
Spear-phishing campaign tricks users to transfer money (TTPs & IOC) (lien direct) |
We are publishing the following information in order to help organisations to identify this threat before attackers will perform successful phishing on their employees. Attackers are targeting companies which have foreign trading partners, i.a. in Asia, to perform a wire transfer to a wrong bank account number.We found that domains registered using muhammad.appleseed1@mail.ru e-mail address are actively used in a spear phishing campaign that aims to trick targets to transfer money into bank accounts controller by the attacker using social engineering.Most likely attack scenario looks like following:There is an ongoing e-mail communication between company X and YAn attacker has gained access to an e-mail account of one of the parties |
Threat
Guideline
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APT 15
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2020-01-07 14:00:00 |
Healthcare cybersecurity for 2020 and beyond (lien direct) |
An independent guest blogger wrote this blog.
These days, effective cybersecurity in healthcare is as critical as ever. Last year, more than 32 million patients had their personal and medical information stolen in data breaches across the United States. While moves are being made, the fact remains that healthcare providers still have many holes to plug when it comes to the illegal or accidental outpouring of patient data.
The issue is that current problems need to be solved now before hackers move on to new, more advanced attack strategies. The good news is that there are many methods currently available to mitigate the chances of data leakage if medical professionals are proactive enough to enforce them.
HIPAA on the front lines
When patients visit the doctor, they expect to go to a safe place where their best interests are always the top priority. To foster that confidence, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act was created to protect patient data while also giving the patients control over who can see their information. Along with HIPAA, the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, encourages medical practices also to ensure that all technology they use is protected to eliminate wrongful data leakage.
Medical records contain an abundance of private information that can be used for any number of malicious means. Full medical records can often go for $1000 on the black market where the addresses, social security numbers, and financial information within can be used to create fake identification or take out large loans that can leave the patient in debt. If a hacker catches wind of a patient’s surgery date, they can even attempt to shut down hospital functions until a ransom is paid, like the $14K one paid by Columbia Surgical Specialists.
For these security reasons and to retain the trust of the patients, proper data security is essential, and it starts on the front lines. Nurse leaders should train their staff on how to retain patient confidentiality properly. When discussing the patients near the front desk, only use first names, and conversations should be had behind a closed door or as quietly as possible. Hard copies of patent data should never be left lying around, and your printer should be set to print pages facing down. The last thing you need is to have security precautions in place but still allow a criminal to simply walk up and take private information out of the office.
Proper record keeping
Because hackers have so much to gain from stealing patient data, proper record-keeping is essential. Per HIPAA, medical records are required to be kept between five to 10 years, based on the state and the patient’s last treatment or discharge. If paperwork is to be discarded, it must be properly shredded. If you keep paper records, they must be stored in locked cabinet |
Threat
Guideline
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APT 10
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2019-08-14 21:45:48 |
Threat hunting using DNS firewalls and data enrichment (lien direct) |
After seeing a few advertisements about DNS firewalls and how expensive they are, I want to share my experience with blue teamers about how DNS firewalls work and how that knowledge can be used for in-house threat hunting solutions and/or building your own DNS firewall (aka do it yourself). These are examples of an approach to detect malicious behaviour, not a tailor made solutions.At the beginning I would like to highlight that it's a good practice to monitor not only logs but also DNS traffic in real time. Such traffic isn't encrypted and if you only check DNS server logs then you can miss direct requests to other DNS servers. Additionally you can also use recently published version of Sysmon [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon] which supports DNS queries in event ID 22 (DNSEvent).The DNS queries used below that end with |
Spam
Malware
Threat
Guideline
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APT 18
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2019-07-25 13:00:00 |
Can you trust threat intelligence from threat sharing communities? | AT&T ThreatTraq (lien direct) |
Every week the AT&T Chief Security Office produces a series called ThreatTraq with helpful information and news commentary for InfoSec practitioners and researchers. I really enjoy them; you can subscribe to the Youtube channel to stay updated. This is a transcript of a recent feature on ThreatTraq. The video features Jaime Blasco, VP and Chief Scientist, AlienVault, Stan Nurilov, Lead Member of Technical Staff, AT&T, and Joe Harten, Director Technical Security.
Stan: Jaime. I think you have a very interesting topic today about threat intelligence.
Jaime: Yes, we want to talk about how threat intelligence is critical for threat detection and incident response, but then when this threat intelligence and the threat actors try to match those indicators and that information that is being shared, it can actually be bad for companies. So we are going to share some of the experiences we have had with managing the Open Threat Exchange (OTX) - one of the biggest threat sharing communities out there.
Stan: Jaime mentioned that they have so many threat indicators and so much threat intelligence as part of OTX, the platform.
Jaime: We know attackers monitor these platforms and are adjusting tactics and techniques and probably the infrastructure based on public reaction to cyber security companies sharing their activities in blog posts and other reporting.
An example is in September 2017, we saw APT28, and it became harder to track because we were using some of the infrastructure and some of the techniques that were publicly known. And another cyber security company published content about that and then APT28 became much more difficult to track.
The other example is APT1. If you remember the APT1 report in 2013 that Mandiant published, that made the group basically disappear from the face of earth, right? We didn't see them for a while and then they changed the infrastructure and they changed a lot of the tools that they were using, and then they came back in 2014. So we can see that that threat actor disappeared for a while, changed and rebuilt, and then they came back. We also know that attackers can try to publish false information in this platform, so that's why it's important that not only those platforms are automated, but also there are human analysts that can verify that information.
Joe: It seems like you have to have a process of validating the intelligence, right? I think part of it is you don't want to take this intelligence at face value without having some expertise of your own that asks, is this valid? Is this a false positive? Is this planted by the adversary in order to throw off the scent?
I think it's one of those things where you can't automatically trust - threat intelligence. You have to do some of your own diligence to validate the intelligence, make sure it makes sense, make sure it's still fresh, it's still good. This is something we're working on internally - creating those other layers to validate and create better value of our threat intelligence.
Jaime: The other issue I wanted to bring to the table is what we call false flag operations - that's when an adversary or a threat actor studies another threat actor and tries to emulate their behavior. So when companies try to do at |
Malware
Threat
Studies
Guideline
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APT 38
APT 28
APT 1
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2019-07-24 03:07:00 |
(Déjà vu) China-Linked APT15 group is using a previously undocumented backdoor (lien direct) |
ESET researchers reported that China-linked cyberespionage group APT15 has been using a previously undocumented backdoor for more than two years. Security researchers at ESET reported that China-linked threat actor APT15 (aka Ke3chang, Mirage, Vixen Panda, Royal APT and Playful Dragon) has been using a previously undocumented backdoor for more than two years. APT15 has been active […]
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Threat
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APT 15
APT 25
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2019-07-23 14:31:00 |
China-Linked Threat Actor Using New Backdoor (lien direct) |
The China-linked threat actor known as APT15 has been using a previously undocumented backdoor for more than two years, ESET's security researchers have discovered.
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Threat
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APT 15
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2019-07-19 14:35:01 |
Malware that waits for three mouse clicks before running. (lien direct) |
An elusive hacking operation is using a previously unreported backdoor in a malware campaign targeting diplomats and government departments around the world. The Ke3chang advanced persistent threat group is thought to operate out of China and has conducted cyber-espionage campaigns using remote access trojans and other malware since at least 2010. Now cybersecurity researchers at ESET have identified […]
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Malware
Threat
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APT 15
APT 25
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★★
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2019-07-18 07:03:00 |
New Okrum Malware Used by Ke3chang Group to Target Diplomats (lien direct) |
Updated malware implants and a new backdoor named Okrum connected with the Ke3chang threat group operating from China have been found by ESET researchers while monitoring their operations between 2015 and 2019. [...] |
Malware
Threat
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APT 15
APT 25
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2019-01-31 17:24:00 |
APT10 Group Targets Multiple Sectors, But Seems to Really Love MSSPs (lien direct) |
Threat Actors That Don’t Discriminate
When it comes to threat actors and the malware variants they use, let’s talk dating — or rather, the way people date — because one could argue there are marked similarities between the two. You see, there are criminal groups who have a “type,” i.e. using malware that targets specific industries or even organizations — say, financial services (ever-popular and oh-so debonair) or perhaps critical infrastructure (spicy and daring!), or even healthcare for those who prefer staid and demure. Yet other groups are the free lovin’ types who go after multiple sectors using many different malware variants and approaches to accomplish their goal — no discriminating with this bunch.
Let’s look at one such example, APT10 / Cloud Hopper, which is likely the group behind a long running, sophisticated campaign that uses multiple malware variants to target many different sectors in many different countries. You can check out some of the pulses relating to APT10 / Cloud Hopper on the Open Threat Exchange (OTX).
The U.S. National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) reports the campaign started in May 2016, and NCCIC last updated its alert in December 2018 — so it’s not going away yet.
The group known as APT10 / Cloud Hopper has hit quite a few victims over the last few years in many different sectors, such as: information technology, energy, healthcare and public health, communications, and critical manufacturing. However, their “date of choice” seems to be MSSPs due to the fact a that credential compromises within those networks could potentially be leveraged to access customer environments. From OTX pulse “Operation Cloud Hopper”:
The espionage campaign has targeted managed IT service providers (MSSPs), allowing the APT10 group unprecedented potential access to the intellectual property and sensitive data of those MSSPs and their clients globally. This indirect approach of reaching many through only a few targets demonstrates a new level of maturity in cyber espionage – so it’s more important than ever to have a comprehensive view of all the threats your organization might be exposed to, either directly or through your supply chain.
As any clever serial dater would do, APT10 / Cloud Hopper doesn’t use just one approach. The NCCIC reports they have deployed multiple malware families and variants, some of which are currently not detected by anti-virus signatures — for example, PLUGX / SOGU and REDLEAVES. And although the observed malware is based on existing malware code, APT10 / Cloud Hopper modifies it to improve effectiveness and avoid detection by existing signatures.
How Can APT10 Group Impact You?
If these free lovin’ bad guys decide to come after you, they’re likely looking for your data (perhaps to steal intellectual property). At a high level, they’re accomplishing this by leveraging stolen administrative credentials (local and domain) and certificates to place sophisticated malware implants on critical systems (such as PlugX and Redleaves). Depending on the defensive mitigations in place, they then gain full access to networks and data in a way that appears legitimate to existing your monitoring tools. Voila! They’ve gone from first date to a home run!
Wired Maga |
Malware
Vulnerability
Threat
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APT 10
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2019-01-16 17:00:00 |
The Advanced Persistent Threat files: APT10 (lien direct) |
While security companies are getting good at analyzing the tactics of nation-state threat actors, they still struggle with placing these actions in context and making solid risk assessments. So in this series, we're going to take a look at a few APT groups, and see how they fit into the larger threat landscape-starting with APT10.
Categories:
Cybercrime
Hacking
Tags: advanced persistent threatadvanced persistent threatsaerospaceAPTAPT10APTschinaChinese Ministry of State SecurityconstructionengineeringFireEyeMSSPlugXPoison Ivyscanboxsogutelecomsthreat actors
(Read more...)
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Threat
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APT 10
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2018-12-21 15:51:02 |
Industry Reactions to U.S. Charging APT10 Hackers: Feedback Friday (lien direct) |
The United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan have pointed the finger at China for sophisticated cyberattacks launched by a threat group known as APT10 against organizations around the world. The U.S.
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Threat
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APT 10
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2018-12-21 07:24:01 |
\'Five Eyes\' Nations Blame China for APT10 Attacks (lien direct) |
The United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand officially blamed China on Thursday for the cyberattacks launched by a threat group known as APT10 against organizations around the world.
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Threat
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APT 10
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2018-12-20 14:00:00 |
Let\'s Chat: Healthcare Threats and Who\'s Attacking (lien direct) |
Healthcare is under fire and there’s no sign of the burn slowing.
Look, it’s no secret that hackers have been targeting hospitals and other healthcare providers for several years — and probably no surprise that healthcare is one of the top target industries for cybercrime in 2018. In the US alone, in fact, more than 270 data breaches affecting nearly 12 million individuals were submitted to the U.S. HHS Office for Civil Rights breach portal (as of November 30, 2018). This includes the likes of unauthorized access or disclosures of patient data, hacking, theft of data, data loss and more.
Bottom line, if you’re tasked with protecting any entity operating in the healthcare sector, you’re likely experiencing some very sleepless nights — and may just need a doctor yourself.
So . . . who’s wreaking all this havoc and how? According to AlienVault Labs, opportunistic ransomware is still a preferred method of attack. However, researchers are reporting a rise in the number of targeted ransomware attacks in the healthcare sector. These attacks are often backed by organized criminals who see opportunities for making money from healthcare providers and other similar entities who must protect and keep assets, systems, and networks continuously operating.
One such criminal group operating the SamSam ransomware is thought to have earned more than $5 million dollars by manually compromising critical healthcare networks (see below for more info). The group behind SamSam has invested heavily in their operations (likely an organized crime syndicate) and has won the distinction of being the subjects of two FBI Alerts in 2018.
And, according to AlienVault Labs, the methods used by SamSam are more akin to a targeted attack than typical opportunistic ransomware. SamSam attacks also seem to go in waves. One of the most notable was a spring 2018 hit on a large New York hospital which publicly declined to pay the attacker’s $44,000 ransomware demand. It took a month for the hospital’s IT system to be fully restored.
SamSam attackers are known to:
Gain remote access through traditional attacks, such as JBoss exploits
Deploy web-shells
Connect to RDP over HTTP tunnels such as ReGeorg
Run batch scripts to deploy the ransomware over machines
SamSam isn’t going away either. AlienVault Labs has seen recent variants. You might want to read more about the threat actors behind SamSam, their methods of attacks, and recommendations for heading |
Threat
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Wannacry
APT 19
APT 18
APT 22
APT 23
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2018-10-19 15:30:05 |
(Déjà vu) Oceansalt Cyberattack Wave Linked To Defunct Chinese APT Comment Crew (lien direct) |
News broke today that newly discovered first-stage implant targeting Korean-speaking victims borrows code from another reconnaissance tool linked to Comment Crew, a Chinese nation-state threat actor that was exposed in 2013 following cyber espionage campaigns against the United States. Dubbed Oceansalt, the threat has been spotted on machines in South Korea, the United States, and Canada. …
The ISBuzz Post: This Post Oceansalt Cyberattack Wave Linked To Defunct Chinese APT Comment Crew |
Tool
Threat
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APT 32
APT 1
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2018-10-19 07:06:03 |
Attackers behind Operation Oceansalt reuse code from Chinese Comment Crew (lien direct) |
Security researchers from McAfee have recently uncovered a cyber espionage campaign, tracked as Operation Oceansalt, targeting South Korea, the United States, and Canada. The threat actors behind Operation Oceansalt are reusing malware previously associated with China-linked cyberespionage group APT1. “McAfee Advanced Threat Research and Anti-Malware Operations teams have discovered another unknown data reconnaissance implant targeting Korean-speaking users.” reads the report. “We […]
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Malware
Threat
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APT 32
APT 1
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2018-10-18 00:01:00 |
New Reconnaissance Tool Uses Code from Eight-Year-Old Comment Crew Implant (lien direct) |
A newly discovered first-stage implant targeting Korean-speaking victims borrows code from another reconnaissance tool linked to Comment Crew, a Chinese nation-state threat actor that was exposed in 2013 following cyber espionage campaigns against the United States. [...] |
Tool
Threat
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APT 1
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2018-09-14 17:23:01 |
China-linked APT10 Hackers Update Attack Techniques (lien direct) |
Recently attacks launched by the China-linked threat actor APT10 against the Japanese media sector revealed the use of updated tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), FireEye says.
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Threat
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APT 10
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2018-09-10 18:59:03 |
Chinese LuckyMouse APT has been using a digitally signed network filtering driver in recent attacks (lien direct) |
Security experts observed the LuckyMouse APT group using a digitally signed 32- and 64-bit network filtering driver NDISProxy in recent attacks. Security experts from Kaspersky have observed the LuckyMouse APT group (aka Emissary Panda, APT27 and Threat Group 3390) using a digitally signed 32- and 64-bit network filtering driver NDISProxy in recent attacks. The APT group […]
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Threat
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APT 27
APT 1
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★★★
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2018-09-03 12:49:03 |
APT10 Under Close Scrutiny as Potentially Linked to Chinese Ministry of State Security (lien direct) |
An advanced threat actor has been associated with China's Ministry of State Security via two individuals and a Chinese firm. |
Threat
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APT 10
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2017-04-06 14:00:00 |
APT10 (Menupass Group): Nouveaux outils, la dernière campagne de la campagne mondiale de la menace de longue date APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat (lien direct) |
APT10 Background
APT10 (Menupass Group) est un groupe de cyber-espionnage chinois que Fireeye a suivi depuis 2009. Ils ont historiquement ciblé la construction et l'ingénierie, l'aérospatiale et les sociétés de télécommunications et les gouvernements aux États-Unis, en Europe et au Japon.Nous pensons que le ciblage de ces industries a soutenu les objectifs de sécurité nationale chinoise, notamment l'acquisition de précieuses informations militaires et de renseignement ainsi que le vol de données commerciales confidentielles pour soutenir les sociétés chinoises.Pwc et Bae ont récemment publié un blog conjoint >
APT10 Background
APT10 (MenuPass Group) is a Chinese cyber espionage group that FireEye has tracked since 2009. They have historically targeted construction and engineering, aerospace, and telecom firms, and governments in the United States, Europe, and Japan. We believe that the targeting of these industries has been in support of Chinese national security goals, including acquiring valuable military and intelligence information as well as the theft of confidential business data to support Chinese corporations. PwC and BAE recently issued a joint blog detailing extensive APT10 activity. |
Threat
Technical
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APT 10
APT 10
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★★★★
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2015-07-13 08:31:00 |
Démontrant Hustle, les groupes de l'APT chinois utilisent rapidement une vulnérabilité zéro-jour (CVE-2015-5119) après une fuite d'équipe de piratage Demonstrating Hustle, Chinese APT Groups Quickly Use Zero-Day Vulnerability (CVE-2015-5119) Following Hacking Team Leak (lien direct) |
Le Fireeye en tant qu'équipe de service a détecté des campagnes de phishing indépendantes menées par deux groupes de menace persistante avancés chinois (APT) que nous suivons, APT3 et APT18.Chaque groupe de menaces a rapidement profité d'une vulnérabilité zéro-jour (CVE-2015-5119), qui a été divulguée dans la divulgation des données internes de l'équipe de piratage.Adobe a publié un patch pour la vulnérabilité le 8 juillet 2015. Avant ce patcha été publié, les groupes ont lancé des campagnes de phishing contre plusieurs sociétés de l'aérospatiale et de la défense, de la construction et de l'ingénierie, de l'éducation, de l'énergie
The FireEye as a Service team detected independent phishing campaigns conducted by two Chinese advanced persistent threat (APT) groups that we track, APT3 and APT18. Each threat group quickly took advantage of a zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2015-5119), which was leaked in the disclosure of Hacking Team\'s internal data. Adobe released a patch for the vulnerability on July 8, 2015. Before that patch was released, the groups launched phishing campaigns against multiple companies in the aerospace and defense, construction and engineering, education, energy |
Vulnerability
Threat
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APT 18
APT 3
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★★★★
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2014-10-27 03:00:42 |
Malware APT28: une fenêtre sur les opérations de cyber-espionnage de la Russie? APT28 Malware: A Window into Russia\\'s Cyber Espionage Operations? (lien direct) |
Le rôle des acteurs de l'État-nation dans les cyberattaques a peut-être été le plus largement révélé en février 2013 lorsque mandiant href = "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/mandiant-expose-apt1-chinas-cyber-espionage-units" cible = "_ Blank"> Rapport APT1, en Chine.Aujourd'hui, nous publions un nouveau rapport: apt28:Une fenêtre sur les opérations de cyber-espionnage de la Russie?
Ce rapport se concentre sur un groupe de menaces que nous avons désigné comme APT28.Alors que les logiciels malveillants d'APT28 \\ sont assez connus dans la communauté de la cybersécurité, notre rapport détaille des informations supplémentaires exposant des opérations en cours et ciblées qui, selon nous, indiquent un sponsor gouvernemental basé à Moscou.
dans
The role of nation-state actors in cyber attacks was perhaps most widely revealed in February 2013 when Mandiant released the APT1 report, which detailed a professional cyber espionage group based in China. Today we release a new report: APT28: A Window Into Russia\'s Cyber Espionage Operations?
This report focuses on a threat group that we have designated as APT28. While APT28\'s malware is fairly well known in the cybersecurity community, our report details additional information exposing ongoing, focused operations that we believe indicate a government sponsor based in Moscow.
In |
Malware
Threat
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APT 28
APT 28
APT 1
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★★★★
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2013-02-19 07:00:45 |
Mandiant expose APT1 & # 8211;L'une des unités de cyber-espionnage de Chine et libère 3 000 indicateurs Mandiant Exposes APT1 – One of China\\'s Cyber Espionage Units & Releases 3,000 Indicators (lien direct) |
Aujourd'hui, le Mandiant & Reg;Intelligence Center ™ a publié un rapport sans précédent Exposer la campagne d'espionnage informatique de l'APT1 \\ à l'échelle de l'entreprise.APT1 est l'une des dizaines de groupes de menaces, des pistes mandiantes du monde entier et nous le considérons comme l'un des plus prolifiques en termes de quantité d'informations qu'elle a volée.
Les faits saillants du rapport incluent:
Preuve liant APT1 au 2e Bureau de la Chine de la Chine du Département général de l'Armée de libération (PLA) \'s (GSD) 3e département (désignateur de couverture militaire 61398).
Une chronologie de l'espionnage économique de l'APT1 réalisée depuis 2006
Today, The Mandiant® Intelligence Center™ released an unprecedented report exposing APT1\'s multi-year, enterprise-scale computer espionage campaign. APT1 is one of dozens of threat groups Mandiant tracks around the world and we consider it to be one of the most prolific in terms of the sheer quantity of information it has stolen.
Highlights of the report include:
Evidence linking APT1 to China\'s 2nd Bureau of the People\'s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department\'s (GSD) 3rd Department (Military Cover Designator 61398).
A timeline of APT1 economic espionage conducted since 2006 |
Threat
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APT 1
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★★★★
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