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| Src | Date (GMT) | Titre | Description | Tags | Stories | Notes |
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2023-12-04 07:10:47 | Arrêt de cybersécurité du mois: Utilisation de l'IA comportementale pour écraser le détournement de la paie Cybersecurity Stop of the Month: Using Behavioral AI to Squash Payroll Diversion (lien direct) |
This blog post is part of a monthly series exploring the ever-evolving tactics of today\'s cybercriminals. Cybersecurity Stop of the Month focuses on the critical first steps in the attack chain – stopping the initial compromise-in the context of email threats. The series is designed to help you understand how to fortify your defenses to protect people and defend data against emerging threats in today\'s dynamic threat landscape. The first three steps of the attack chain: stop the initial compromise. In our previous posts, we have covered these attack types: Supplier compromise EvilProxy SocGholish E-signature phishing QR code phishing Telephone-oriented attack delivery (TOAD) In this installment we examine a payroll diversion threat that Proofpoint detected during a recent threat assessment. We also cover the typical attack sequence of payroll fraud and explain how Proofpoint uses multiple signals to detect and prevent these threats for our customers. Background Business email compromise (BEC) continues to grow in popularity and sophistication. The 2022 FBI Internet Crime Report notes that BEC attacks cost U.S. businesses $2.7 billion last year. The global figure is no doubt much higher. Ransomware victims, in contrast, lost just $34 million. Payroll diversion is a form of BEC. Typically, employees who have direct access to fulfilling payroll-related requests are prime targets. In these attacks, a bad actor pretends to be an employee who needs to update their direct deposit information. The new information is for an account that the bad actor owns. Once the fraudulent request is complete, the lost funds cannot be retrieved by the business. Payroll diversion fraud isn\'t a new form of BEC, but the frequency of this type of attack is on the rise. Proofpoint continues to see this type of threat getting through the defenses of other email security tools. Across all of our October 2023 threat assessments, we found that more than 400 of these threats got past 12 other email security tools. There are a few reasons why it\'s difficult for a lot of email security tools to detect or remediate these threats. The primary reason is because they don\'t usually carry malicious payloads like attachments or URLs. They also tend to be sent from personal email services-like Google, Yahoo and iCloud-and target specific users. Notably, API-based email security tools that scan for threats post-delivery are the most susceptible to not being able to detect or remediate this type of threat. This partly comes down to how they work. In order for them to be effective, they need security and IT teams to manually populate them with a dictionary of possible display names of all employees, which is a very time-consuming effort that is hard to scale. To avoid this, many organizations simply choose to enable display name prevention for their senior executives only. But bad actors behind payroll diversion don\'t just impersonate executives, they target anyone in the organization who can access corporate funds. In our example below, an attacker took advantage of this exact weakness. The scenario Proofpoint detected a payroll diversion attempt where the attacker posed as a non-executive employee. The email was sent to the director of human resources (HR) at a 300-person company in the energy and utilities industry. The company\'s incumbent email security tool delivered the message, and its API-based post-delivery remediation tool failed to detect and retract it. The threat: How did the attack happen? Here is a closer look at how this payroll diversion scam unfolded: 1. The deceptive message: The attacker sent a request to update their direct deposit information from an account that appeared to be a legitimate employee\'s personal email account. The original malicious message delivered to the recipient\'s inbox. 2. Payroll diversion attack sequence: If the recipient had engaged, the attacker\'s goal would have been to convince them to trans | Ransomware Tool Threat | Yahoo | ★★ |
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2023-05-24 12:49:28 | Annonçant le lancement de Guac V0.1 Announcing the launch of GUAC v0.1 (lien direct) |
Brandon Lum and Mihai Maruseac, Google Open Source Security TeamToday, we are announcing the launch of the v0.1 version of Graph for Understanding Artifact Composition (GUAC). Introduced at Kubecon 2022 in October, GUAC targets a critical need in the software industry to understand the software supply chain. In collaboration with Kusari, Purdue University, Citi, and community members, we have incorporated feedback from our early testers to improve GUAC and make it more useful for security professionals. This improved version is now available as an API for you to start developing on top of, and integrating into, your systems.The need for GUACHigh-profile incidents such as Solarwinds, and the recent 3CX supply chain double-exposure, are evidence that supply chain attacks are getting more sophisticated. As highlighted by the | Tool Vulnerability Threat | Yahoo | ★★ |
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2022-09-07 15:00:00 | Anomali Cyber Watch: EvilProxy Defeats Second Factor, Ragnar Locker Ransomware Hits Critical Infrastructure, Montenegro Blames Russia for Massive Cyberattack, and More (lien direct) | The various threat intelligence stories in this iteration of the Anomali Cyber Watch discuss the following topics: Critical infrastructure, Crypto mining, Delayed execution, Phishing, Ransomware, Reverse proxy, Russia, and Steganography. The IOCs related to these stories are attached to Anomali Cyber Watch and can be used to check your logs for potential malicious activity.
Figure 1 - IOC Summary Charts. These charts summarize the IOCs attached to this magazine and provide a glimpse of the threats discussed.
Trending Cyber News and Threat Intelligence
EvilProxy Phishing-As-A-Service With MFA Bypass Emerged In Dark Web
(published: September 5, 2022)
Resecurity researchers analyzed EvilProxy, a phishing kit that uses reverse proxy and cookie injection methods to bypass two-factor authentication (2FA). EvilProxy uses extensive virtual machine checks and browser fingerprinting. If the victim passes the checks, Evilproxy acts as a proxy between the victim and the legitimate site that asks for credentials. EvilProxy is being sold as a service on the dark web. Since early May 2022, Evilproxy enables phishing attacks against customer accounts of major brands such as Apple, Facebook, GoDaddy, GitHub, Google, Dropbox, Instagram, Microsoft, Twitter, Yahoo, Yandex, and others.
Analyst Comment: EvilProxy is a dangerous automation tool that enables more phishing attacks. Additionally, EvilProxy targeting GitHub and npmjs accounts increases risks of follow-up supply-chain attacks. Anomali platform has historic EvilProxy network indicators that can help when investigating incidents affecting 2FA. With 2FA bypass, users need to be aware of phishing risks and pay even more attention to domains that ask for their credentials and 2FA codes.
MITRE ATT&CK: [MITRE ATT&CK] Phishing - T1566 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Proxy - T1090 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Supply Chain Compromise - T1195
Tags: EvilProxy, Phishing, Phishing-as-s-service, Reverse proxy, Cookie injection, 2FA, MFA, Supply chain
Ragnar Locker Ransomware Targeting the Energy Sector
(published: September 1, 2022)
Cybereason researchers investigated the Ragnar Locker ransomware that was involved in cyberattack on DESFA, a Greek pipeline company. On August 19, 2022, the Ragnar Locker group listed DESFA on its data leak site. The group has been active since 2019 and it is not the first time it targets critical infrastructure companies with the double-extortion scheme. Their Ragnar Locker ransomware shows the typical abilities of modern ransomware including system information and location collection, deleting shadow copies, identifying processes (antiviruses, backup solutions, IT remote management solutions, and virtual-based software), and encrypting the system with the exception list in mind.
Analyst Comment: Ragnar Locker appears to be an aggressive ransomware group that is not shy attacking critical infrastructure as far as they are not in the Commonwealth of Independent States (Russia and associated countries). Always be on high alert while reading emails, in particular those with attachments, URL redirection, false sense of urgency or poor grammar. Use anti-spam and antivirus protection, and avoid opening email from untrusted or unverified senders. Additionally, it is important to have a comprehensive and teste |
Ransomware Malware Tool Threat Patching Guideline | Yahoo | |
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2022-08-30 08:00:09 | ModernLoader delivers multiple stealers, cryptominers and RATs (lien direct) |  By Vanja SvajcerCisco Talos recently observed three separate, but related, campaigns between March and June 2022 delivering a variety of threats, including the ModernLoader bot, RedLine information-stealer and cryptocurrency-mining malware to victims. The actors use PowerShell, .NET assemblies, and HTA and VBS files to spread across a targeted network, eventually dropping other pieces of malware, such as the SystemBC trojan and DCRAT, to enable various stages of their operations. The attackers' use of a variety of off-the-shelf tools makes it difficult to attribute this activity to a specific adversary.The final payload appears to be ModernLoader, which acts as a remote access trojan (RAT) by collecting system information and deploying various modules. In the earlier campaigns from March, we also observed the attackers delivering the cryptocurrency mining malware XMRig. The March campaigns appeared to be targeting Eastern European users, as the constructor utility we analyzed had predefined script templates written in Bulgarian, Polish, Hungarian and Russian.The actors are attempting to compromise vulnerable web applications to serve malware and deliver threats via files masquerading as fake Amazon gift cards. Technical detailsInitial findingsIn June 2022, Cisco Talos identified an unusual command line execution in our telemetry. The decoded base64 command is below: Initial finding: A command executed on the system.The 31.41.244[.]231 IP is a Russian IP and hosts several other URLs with similar naming conventions. Autostart commandFollowing the discovery of the initial command, we identified two other command lines. They are a result of an autorun registered executable and the execution of a scheduled task. |
Malware Tool Threat | Yahoo | |
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2022-08-23 11:57:26 | Charming Kitten APT Wields New Scraper to Steal Email Inboxes (lien direct) | Google researchers say the nation-state hacking team is now employing a data-theft tool that targets Gmail, Yahoo!, and Microsoft Outlook accounts using previously acquired credentials. | Tool | Yahoo APT 35 | |
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2022-08-23 11:00:00 | Google researchers expose Iranian hackers\' tool to steal emails from Gmail, Yahoo and Outlook (lien direct) | Security researchers linked the program to the so-called Charming Kitty Iranian hacker group known to carry out intelligence operations. | Tool | Yahoo Yahoo | |
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2022-08-23 07:50:00 | Google Uncovers Tool Used by Iranian Hackers to Steal Data from Email Accounts (lien direct) | The Iranian government-backed actor known as Charming Kitten has added a new tool to its malware arsenal that allows it to retrieve user data from Gmail, Yahoo!, and Microsoft Outlook accounts. Dubbed HYPERSCRAPE by Google Threat Analysis Group (TAG), the actively in-development malicious software is said to have been used against less than two dozen accounts in Iran, with the oldest known | Malware Tool Threat Conference | Yahoo APT 35 | |
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2022-06-21 15:03:00 | Anomali Cyber Watch: GALLIUM Expands Targeting Across Telecommunications, Government and Finance Sectors With New PingPull Tool, DragonForce Malaysia OpsPatuk / OpsIndia and More (lien direct) | The various threat intelligence stories in this iteration of the Anomali Cyber Watch discuss the following topics: APT35, CrescentImp, Follina, Gallium, Phosphorous, and Sandworm. The IOCs related to these stories are attached to Anomali Cyber Watch and can be used to check your logs for potential malicious activity.
Figure 1 - IOC Summary Charts. These charts summarize the IOCs attached to this magazine and provide a glimpse of the threats discussed.
Trending Cyber News and Threat Intelligence
Update: The Phish Goes On - 5 Million Stolen Credentials and Counting
(published: June 16, 2022)
PIXM researchers describe an ongoing, large-scale Facebook phishing campaign. Its primary targets are Facebook Messenger mobile users and an estimated five million users lost their login credentials. The campaign evades Facebook anti-phishing protection by redirecting to a new page at a legitimate service such as amaze.co, famous.co, funnel-preview.com, or glitch.me. In June 2022, the campaign also employed the tactic of displaying legitimate shopping cart content at the final page for about two seconds before displaying the phishing content. The campaign is attributed to Colombian actor BenderCrack (Hackerasueldo) who monetizes displaying affiliate ads.
Analyst Comment: Users should check what domain is asking for login credentials before providing those. Organizations can consider monitoring their employees using Facebook as a Single Sign-On (SSO) Provider.
MITRE ATT&CK: [MITRE ATT&CK] Phishing - T1566 | [MITRE ATT&CK] User Execution - T1204
Tags: Facebook, Phishing, Facebook Messenger, Social networks, Mobile, Android, iOS, Redirect, Colombia, source-country:CO, BenderCrack, Hackerasueldo
F5 Labs Investigates MaliBot
(published: June 15, 2022)
F5 Labs researchers describe a novel Android trojan, dubbed MaliBot. Based on re-written SOVA malware code, MaliBot is maintaining its Background Service by setting itself as a launcher. Its code has some unused evasion portions for emulation environment detection and setting the malware as a hidden app. MaliBot spreads via smishing, takes control of the device and monetizes using overlays for certain Italian and Spanish banks, stealing cryptocurrency, and sometimes sending Premium SMS to paid services.
Analyst Comment: Users should be wary of following links in unexpected SMS messages. Try to avoid downloading apps from third-party websites. Be cautious with enabling accessibility options.
MITRE ATT&CK: [MITRE ATT&CK] System Network Configuration Discovery - T1016 | [MITRE ATT&CK] User Execution - T1204
Tags: MaliBot, Android, MFA bypass, SMS theft, Premium SMS, Smishing, Binance, Trust wallet, VNC, SOVA, Sality, Cryptocurrency, Financial, Italy, target-country:IT, Spain, target-country:ES
Extortion Gang Ransoms Shoprite, Largest Supermarket Chain in Africa
(published: June 15, 2022)
On June 10, 2022, the African largest supermarket chain operating in twelve countries, Shoprite Holdings, announced a possible cybersecurity incident. The company notified customers in E |
Ransomware Malware Tool Vulnerability Threat Guideline Conference | Yahoo APT 35 | |
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2020-02-10 14:05:43 | OWASP Amass – DNS Enumeration, Attack Surface Mapping & External Asset Discovery (lien direct) |  The OWASP Amass Project is a DNS Enumeration, Attack Surface Mapping & External Asset Discovery tool to help information security professionals perform network mapping of attack surfaces and perform external asset discovery using open source information gathering and active reconnaissance techniques.
Information Gathering Techniques Used by OWASP Amass for DNS Enumeration and More
The main functionality of Amass is as follows:
DNS: Basic enumeration, Brute forcing (optional), Reverse DNS sweeping, Subdomain name alterations/permutations, Zone transfers (optional)
Scraping: Ask, Baidu, Bing, DNSDumpster, DNSTable, Dogpile, Exalead, Google, HackerOne, IPv4Info, Netcraft, PTRArchive, Riddler, SiteDossier, ViewDNS, Yahoo
Certificates: Active pulls (optional), Censys, CertSpotter, Crtsh, Entrust, GoogleCT
APIs: AlienVault, BinaryEdge, BufferOver, CIRCL, CommonCrawl, DNSDB, GitHub, HackerTarget, IPToASN, Mnemonic, NetworksDB, PassiveTotal, Pastebin, RADb, Robtex, SecurityTrails, ShadowServer, Shodan, Spyse (CertDB & FindSubdomains), Sublist3rAPI, TeamCymru, ThreatCrowd, Twitter, Umbrella, URLScan, VirusTotal, WhoisXML
Web Archives: ArchiveIt, ArchiveToday, Arquivo, LoCArchive, OpenUKArchive, UKGovArchive, Wayback
Usage of Amass for DNS Enumeration, Attack Surface Mapping & External Asset Discovery
The Amass tool has several subcommands shown below for handling your Internet exposure investigation.
Read the rest of OWASP Amass – DNS Enumeration, Attack Surface Mapping & External Asset Discovery now! Only available at Darknet.
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Tool Guideline | Yahoo | |
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2019-04-11 13:00:00 | DNS cache poisoning part 2 (lien direct) |
My last blog on DNS cache poisoning only covered the superficial aspects of this long-standing issue. This installment aims to give a bit more technical detail, and expose some of the tactics used by the "bad-actors" looking to leverage a poisoned DNS cache against you and your network. In a worst-case scenario, the results of a poisoned DNS cache could lead to more than just a headache: civil liability, phishing, increased DNS overhead, and other kinds of nightmares are too easy to overlook with this type of 'attack'.
So, you may be wondering, "What exactly makes a DNS cache poisoning attack so dangerous, and what can we do to prevent it?" Well, as outlined in my first article, not answering DNS requests on the web is a great place to start. If you're only running an internal DNS infrastructure, your attack-surface is much lower. However, this comes with a caveat; "internal-only" DNS attacks are much harder to detect, and can often go weeks or months before even the keenest of sysops recognize them. This has to do with the fundamental structure of DNS. Let me explain.
Fundamental structure of DNS
In a typical DNS server (e.g. Windows DNS, or BIND) there is little mechanism (e.g. NONE) to provide any sanity checking. In its simplest form, a DNS query will look to its local database (the 'cache') first, upon finding no answer for the request it will then send a lookup request to its configured DNS server (the one you hopefully manage) and see if it can find an answer for the request.
If this lookup fails a 2nd time, there is a 'forwarder' configuration that kicks in, and the request goes to a list of pre-specified DNS hosts that your server will send the request to, looking for a resolution to the name. If this final 'forward' lookup fails, the final lookup happens out on the internet, on one of the 'Root' nameservers that share a distributed list of all the DNS hosts that make up the TCP/IPv4 internet. If this final lookup fails, the original requesting client is returned with a 'DNS Name not found' answer, and the name will not resolve. At any point during this journey, a "faked" response can be issued, and the initiator will accept it. No questions asked.
Problems with the model
This model is good when we can trust each one of the segments in the process. However, even during the early days of the web - there were some issues that became apparent with the way DNS works. For example, what if the root servers are unavailable? Unless your local DNS server has a record of ALL of the domains on the web, or one of your 'forwarders' does - the DNS name will not resolve. Even if it is a valid domain, DNS will simply not be able to lookup your host.
There was an "attack" on several of the root servers in the late 1990's. Several of the root servers were knocked offline, effectively taking down the internet for a large portion of the USA. It was during this outage that many network operators realized a large oversight of the DNS system, and a push was made to distribute control of these systems to a variety of trustworthy and capable internet entities. At the time of this attack, much of the internet name resolution duties fell to a single entity: Yahoo. A DDoS of Yahoo effectively killed the internet. Sure, we could still get to our desired hosts via IP, but e-mail, for example, was not as resilient. It was a great learning lesson for the web community at-large.
This was just a denial-of-service at the highest level of the infrastructure. What would happen if the localized database on every computer in your organization had different "answers" for DNS lookups? Instead of consistent |
Tool Guideline | Yahoo |
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