What's new arround internet
| Src | Date (GMT) | Titre | Description | Tags | Stories | Notes |
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2022-08-09 11:26:08 | The business case for security strategy and architecture (lien direct) |  The business benefits of developing an information security strategy and accompanying security architecture/design include: Being proactive, taking the lead in this area - more puppeteer than puppet; Designing a framework or structure to support the organisation's unique situation and needs; Positioning and guiding the management of information risk and security within other aspect of the organisation's architecture/design e.g. its IT and information architecture (showing information flows, networked systems, databases, services etc.), complementing and supporting various other business strategies and architectures such as cloud first, artificial intelligence, IIoT, big data, new products, new markets ...);Providing a blueprint, mapping-out and clarifying the organisational structure, governance arrangements and accountabilities for information risk and security relative to other parts of the business such as IT, physical security, Risk, legal/compliance, HR, operations, business continuity, knowledge management ...; Defining a coherent sequence or matrix of strategic initiatives (projects, investments, business and technology changes ...) over the next N years, embedding information risk management ever deeper into the fabric of the organisation and strengthening the information security arrangements in various ways (e.g. systematically phasing-out and replacing aged/deprecated security technologies while researching, piloting and then adopting new ones such as blockchain and post-quantum crypto);Driving the development and maturity of the information risk and security management function, covering its priorities, internal structure and external working relationships, governance etc.; Bringing clarity and direction (focus!), reducing complexity and uncertainty associated with myriad 'other options' that are discounted or put on hold;Seizing opportunities to align and support various departments, processes, systems, partners, projects/initiatives, budgets, plans etc., finding and exploiting points of common interest, avoiding awkward conflicts and gaps;Identifying key objectives for information risk and security |
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2022-08-06 10:46:21 | CISO workshop slides (lien direct) | A glossy, nicely-constructed and detailed PowerPoint slide deck by Microsoft Security caught my beady this morning. The title 'CISO Workshop: Security Program and Strategy' with 'Your Name Here' suggests it might be a template for use in a workshop/course bringing CISOs up to speed on the governance, strategic and architectural aspects of information security, but in fact given the amount of technical detail, it appears to be aimed at informing IT/technology managers about IT or cybersecurity, specifically. Maybe it is intended for newly-appointed CISOs or more junior managers who aspire to be CISOs, helping them clamber up the pyramid (slide 87 of 142): | Malware Vulnerability Threat Patching Guideline Medical Cloud | Uber APT 38 APT 37 APT 28 APT 19 APT 15 APT 10 APT 34 Guam | |
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2022-07-22 17:10:27 | Security in software development (lien direct) |  Prompted by some valuable customer feedback earlier this week, I've been thinking about how best to update the SecAware policy template on software/systems development. The customer is apparently seeking guidance on integrating infosec into the development process, which begs the question "Which development process?". These days, we're spoilt for choice with quite a variety of methods and approaches. Reducing the problem to its fundamentals, there is a desire to end up with software/systems that are 'adequately secure', meaning no unacceptable information risks remain. That implies having systematically identified and evaluated the information risks at some earlier point, and treated them appropriately - but how?The traditional waterfall development method works sequentially from business analysis and requirements definition, through design and development, to testing and release - often many months later. Systems security ought to be an integral part of the requirements up-front, and I appreciate from experience just how hard it is to retro-fit security into a waterfall project that has been runnning for more than a few days or weeks without security involvement.A significant issue with waterfall is that things can change substantially in the course of development: the organisation hopefully ends up with the system it originally planned, but that may no longer be the system it needs. If the planned security controls turn out to be inadequate in practice, too bad: the next release or version may be months or years away, if ever (assuming the same waterfall approach is used for maintenance, which is not necessarily so*). The quality of the security specification and design (which drives the security design, development and testing) depends on the identification and evaluation of information risks in advance, predicting threats, vulnerabilities and impacts likely to be of concern at the point of delivery some time hence.In contrast, lean, agile or rapid application development methods cycle through smaller iterations more quickly, presenting more opportunities to update security ... but also more chances to break security due to the hectic pace of change. A key problem is to keep everyone focused on security throughout the process, ensuring that whatever else is going on, sufficient attention is paid to the security aspects. Rapid decision-making is part of the challenge here. It's not just the method that needs to be agile!DevOps and scrum approaches use feedback from users on each mini-release to inform the ongoing development. Hopefully security is part of that feedback loop so that it improves incrementally at the same time, but 'hopefully' is a massive clue: if users and managers are not sufficiently security-aware to push for improvements or resist degradat |
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2022-07-10 13:41:08 | Complexity, simplified (lien direct) | Following its exit from the EU, the UK is having to pick up on various important matters that were previously covered by EU laws and regulations. One such issue is to be addressed through a new law on online safety."Online safety: what's that?" I hear you ask. "Thank you for asking, lady in the blue top over there! Kindly allow me to elaborate ... errrr ..."'Online safety' sounds vaguely on-topic for us and our clients, so having tripped over a mention of this, I went Googling for more information. First stop: the latest amended version of the Online Safety Bill. It is written in extreme legalese, peppered with strange terms defined in excruciating detail, and littered with internal and external cross-references, hardly any of which are hyperlinked e.g. | Guideline | APT 10 | |
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2022-07-05 11:41:40 | The discomfort zone (lien direct) |  Compliance is a concern that pops up repeatedly on the ISO27k Forum, just this morning for instance. Intrigued by ISO 27001 Annex A control A.18.1.1 "Identification of applicable legislation and contractual requirements", members generally ask what laws are relevant to the ISMS. That's a tough one to answer for two reasons. Firstly, I'm not a lawyer so I am unqualified and unable to offer legal advice. To be honest, I'm barely familiar with the laws and regs in the UK/EU and NZ, having lived and worked here for long enough to absorb a little knowledge. The best I can offer is layman's perspective. I feel more confident about the underlying generic principles of risk, compliance, conformity, obligations, accountabilities, assurance and controls though, and have the breadth of work and life experience to appreciate the next point ...Secondly, there is a huge range of laws and regs that have some relevance to information risk, security, management and the ISMS. The mind map is a brief glimpse of the landscape, as I see it ...That's a heady mix of laws and regs that apply to the organisation, its officers and workers, its property and finances, its technologies, its contracts, agreements and relationships with employees and third parties including the authorities, owners, suppliers, partners, prospects and customers, and society at large. There are obligations relating to how it is structured, operated, governed, managed and controlled, plus all manner of internal rules voluntarily adopted by management for business reasons (some of which concern obligations under applicable laws and regs). Noncompliance and nonconformity open the can-o-worms still wider with obligations and expectations about 'awareness', 'due process', 'proof' and more, much more.That A.18.1.1 control is - how shall I put it - idealistic:"All relevant legislative statutory, regulatory, contractual requirements and the organization's approach to meet these requirements shall be explicitly identified, documented and kept up to date for each information system and the organization."All requirements?! Oh boy! Explicit! Documented! Maintained! This is bewildering, scary stuff, especially for relatively inexperienced infosec or cybersecurity professionals who seldom set foot outside of the IT domain. We're definitely in the |
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2022-07-02 12:23:41 | Standards development - a tough, risky business (lien direct) |  News emerged during June of likely further delays to the publication of the third edition of ISO/IEC 27001, this time due to the need to re-align the main body clauses with ISO's revised management systems template. The planned release in October is in some doubt. Although we already have considerable discretion over which information security controls are being managed within our ISO/IEC 27001 Information Security Management Systems today, an unfortunate side-effect of standardisation, harmonisation, adoption, accreditation and certification is substantial inertia in the system as a whole. It's a significant issue for our field where the threats, vulnerabilities, impacts and controls are constantly shifting and often moving rapidly ahead of us … but to be honest it's equally problematic for other emerging and fast-moving fields. Infosec is hardly special in this regard. Just look at what's happening in microelectronics, IT, telecomms, robotics, environmental protection and globalisation generally for examples. One possible route out of the tar-pit we've unfortunately slid into is to develop forward-thinking 'future-proof' standards and release them sooner, before things mature, but that's a risky approach given uncertainties ahead. It would not be good for ill-conceived/premature standards to drive markets and users in inappropriate directions. It's also tough for such a large, ponderous, conservative committee as ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27. However, the smart city privacy standard ISO/IEC TS 27570 is a shining beacon of light, with promising signs for the developing security standards on Artificial Intelligence and big data security too. I wish I could say the same of 'cyber', cloud and IoT security but (IMNSHO) the committee is struggling to keep pace with these fields, despite some fabulous inputs and proactive support from members plus the likes of the Cloud Security Alliance and NIST. The floggings will continue until morale improves.Another tar-pit escape plan involves speeding-up the standards development process, perhaps also the promotion, accreditation and certification processes that follow each standard's publication – but again there are risks in moving ahead too fast, compromising the quality and value of the standards, damaging ISO/IEC's established brands. |
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2022-06-24 13:40:08 | The sadly neglected Risk Treatment Plan (lien direct) |  For some curious reason, the Statement of Applicability steals the limelight in the ISO27k world, despite being little more than a formality. Having recently blogged about the dreaded SoA, 'nuff said on that.Today I'm picking up on the SoA's shy little brother, the Risk Treatment Plan. There's a lot to say and think about here, so coffee-up, settle-down, sit forward and zone-in.ISO/IEC 27001 barely even acknowledges the RTP. Here are the first two mentions, tucked discreetly under clause 6.1.3: |
Threat Guideline | APT 19 APT 10 | ★★★★ |
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2022-06-19 09:54:39 | The Matrix, policy edition (lien direct) | Inspired by an insightful comment on LinkeDin from an SC 27 colleague on the other side of the world (thanks Lars!), I spent most of last week updating the SecAware security policy templates and ISO27k ISMS materials.The main change was to distinguish conformity from compliance - two similar terms that I admit I had been using loosely and often incorrectly for far too long. As I now understand them:Compliance refers to fulfilling binding (mandatory) legal, regulatory and contractual obligations; Conformity concerns fulfilling optional (discretionary) requirements in standards, agreements, codes of ethics etc. It's a fine distinction with implications for the associated information risks, given differing impacts: Noncompliance may lead to legal enforcement action (fines/penalties), other costly sanctions (such as more intrusive monitoring by the authorities and perhaps revocation of operating licenses) and business issues (such as reputational damage and brand devaluation, plus the costs of defending legal action). The consequences of nonconformity may be trivial or nothing at all if nobody even cares, but can also involve business issues such as inefficiencies, excess costs and so on, particularly if customers, business partners, the authorities or other stakeholders are seriously concerned at management's apparent disregard for good security practices.Certification of an organisation's ISMS, then, demonstrates its conformity with, not compliance to, ISO/IEC 27001 - well in most cases anyway, where management voluntarily chooses to adopt and conform to the standard. If they are obliged by some mandatory, legally-binding requirement (an applicable law or regulation, or perhaps terms in a formal contract with a supplier or customer, or perhaps a law or regulation), I guess they must comply. Putting that another way, nonconformity is an option. Noncompliance isn't.Anyway, having adjusted the terminology and tweaked the SecAware materials, I took the opportunity to prepare two new 'bulk deal' packages - a comprehensive suite of information security policy templates, and a full set of ISO27k ISMS materials. I'm hoping to persuade customers to spend invest a little more for greater returns. The SecAware policies, for instance, are explicitly designed to work best as a whole, an integrated and coherent suite as opposed to an eclectic collection of policies on various discrete topics. In recent years, I have developed a spreadsheet to track the mesh of relationships between policies: | Guideline | ||
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2022-06-06 10:06:44 | The dreaded Statement of Applicability (lien direct) |  Subclause 6.1.3 of ISO/IEC 27001:2013 requires compliant organisations to define and apply an information security risk treatment process to:a) select appropriate information security risk treatment options, taking account of the risk assessment results;The 'risk treatment options' (including the information security controls) must be 'appropriate' and must 'take account of ' (clearly relate to) the 'risk assessment results'. The organisation cannot adopt a generic suite of information security controls simply on the basis that they have been recommended or suggested by someone - not even if they are noted in Annex A.b) determine all controls that are necessary to implement the information security risk treatment option(s) chosen;NOTE Organizations can design controls as required, or identify them from any source.This requirement clearly specifies the need to determine all the controls that the organisation deems necessary to mitigate unacceptable information risks. Note, however, that it doesn't actually demand they are fully implemented: see point d) below.c) compare the controls determined in 6.1.3 b) above with those in Annex A and verify that no necessary controls have been omitted; NOTE 1 Annex A contains a comprehensive list of control objectives and controls. Users of this International Standard are directed to Annex A to ensure that no necessary controls are overlooked. NOTE 2 Control objectives are implicitly included in the controls chosen. The control objectives and controls listed in Annex A are not exhaustive and additional control objectives and cont |
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2022-05-14 17:22:46 | Managing professional services engagements (lien direct) |  In relation to professional services, management responsibilities are shared between client and provider, except where their interests and concerns diverge. Identifying and exploiting common interests goes beyond the commercial/financial arrangements, involving different levels and types of management:Strategic management: whereas some professional services may be seen as short-term point solutions to specific issues ("temping"), many have longer-term implications such as the prospect of repeat/future business if things work out so well that the engagement is clearly productive and beneficial to both parties. Establishing semi-permanent insourcing and outsourcing arrangements can involve substantial investments and risks with strategic implications, hence senior management should be involved in considering and deciding between various options, designing and instituting the appropriate governance and management arrangements, clarifying responsibilities and accountabilities etc. Organisations usually have several professional services suppliers and/or clients. Aside from managing individual relationships, the portfolio as a whole can be managed, perhaps exploiting synergistic business opportunities (e.g. existing suppliers offering additional professional services, or serving other parts of the client organisation or its business partners). Tactical and operational management: planning, conducting, monitoring and overseeing assignments within a professional services engagement obviously involves collaboration between client and provider, but may also affect and be affected by the remainder of their business activities. A simple example is the provision and direction of the people assigned to assignments, perhaps determining their priorities relative to other work obligations. If either party's management or workforce becomes overloaded or is distracted by other business, the other may need to help out and perhaps take the lead in order to meet agreed objectives - classic teamwork.Commercial management: negotiating and entering into binding contracts or agreements can be a risky process. Getting the best value out of the arrangements includes not just the mechanics of invoicing and settling the bills accurately and on time, but getting the most out of all the associated resources, including the information content. Relationship management: anyone over the age of ten will surely appreciate that relationships are tough! There are just so many dimensions to this, so much complexity and dynamics. In respect of professional services, there are both organisational and personal relationships to manage, while 'manage' is more about guiding, monitoring and reacting than directing and controlling. Despite the formalities of laws, contracts and policies, relationships seemingly play by their o |
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2022-05-11 10:30:05 | How many metrics? (lien direct) | While perusing yet another promotional, commercially-sponsored survey today, something caught my beady eye. According to the report, "On average, organizations track four to five metrics". Four to five [cybersecurity] metrics?!! Really? Oh boy.Given the importance, complexities and breadth of cybersecurity, how on Earth can anyone sensibly manage it with just four to five metrics? It beggars belief, particularly as the report indicates that three quarters of the 1,200 surveyed companies had at least a $billion in revenue, and more than half of them have at least 10,000 employees. With a total cybersecurity expenditure of $125billion (around 80% of the total global estimate), these were large corporations, not tiddlers.The report indicates the corresponding survey question was "Q30. Which of the following cybersecurity metrics does your organization track, and which metrics are the most important?". Well OK, that's two questions in one, and 'the following cybersecurity metrics' are not stated.Having been quietly contemplating that one remarkable, counter-intuitive finding for about an hour, I've thought up a bunch of potential explanations so far:The four to five cybersecurity metrics are just those considered 'key' by the CISOs and other senior people surveyed.The four to five are just the respondents' choices from the 16 metrics presumably offered in the question (we aren't told what metrics were offered in the question, but there are 16 listed in the report).Cybersecurity is not being managed sensibly.Cybersecurity is not being managed.Cybersecurity is not what I think it is - a neologism for IT security or more specifically Internet security protecting against deliberate, malicious attacks by third parties. CISOs and the like haven't got a clue what they are doing.Most CISOs and the like chose not to answer the question (of the 1,200 companies surveyed, we aren't told how many respondents answered this or indeed any other question: perhaps they were getting bored by question 30 of an unknown total).CISOs and the like simply lied, for some reason, or their responses were inaccurately/ineptly recorded.The word 'track' in the question strongly implies that the four to five metrics are measured and reported regularly, showing trends over time. Other metrics that are not 'tracked' in this way were not noted.The survey was ineptly designed, conducted, analysed and/or reported.The survey was non-scientific, biased towards the interests of the commercial sponsors (who, presumably, offer 'solutions' measured by the chosen metrics ...).The survey company is | Guideline | ★★★ | |
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2022-05-11 09:24:18 | Data masking and redaction policy (lien direct) |  Last evening I completed and published another SecAware infosec policy template addressing ISO/IEC 27002:2022 clause 8.11 "Data masking":"Data masking should be used in accordance with the organization's topic-specific policy on access control and other related topic-specific, and business requirements, taking applicable legislation into consideration."The techniques for masking or redacting highly sensitive information from electronic and physical documents may appear quite straightforward. However, experience tells us the controls are error-prone and fragile: they generally fail-insecure, meaning that sensitive information is liable to be disclosed inappropriately. That. in turn, often leads to embarrassing and costly incidents with the possibility of prosecution and penalties for the organisation at fault, along with reputational damage and brand devaluation.The policy therefore takes a risk-based approach, outlining a range of masking and redaction controls but recommending advice from competent specialists, particularly if the risks are significant.The $20 policy template is available here.Being a brand new policy, it hasn't yet had the benefit of the regular reviews and updates that our more mature policies enjoy ... so, if you spot issues or improvement opportunities, please get in touch.As usual, I have masked/redacted the remainder of the policy for this blog and on SecAware.com by making an image of just the first half page or so, about one eigth of the document by size but closer to one quarter of the policy's information value. So I'm giving you about $5's worth of information, maybe $4 since the extract is just an image rather than an editable document. On that basis, similar partial images of the 80-odd security policy templates offered through SecAware.com are worth around $320 in total. It's an investment, though, a way to demonstrate the breadth, quality, style and utility of our products and so convince potential buyers like you to invest in them. |
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2022-04-24 12:23:00 | Professional services - concluding phase (lien direct) |  Having introduced this blog series and covered information risks applicable to the preliminary and operational phases of a professional services engagement, it's time to cover the third and final phase when the engagement and business relationship comes to an end.Eventually, all relationships draw to a close. Professional services clients and providers go their separate ways, hopefully parting on good terms unless there were unresolved disagreements, issues or incidents (hinting at some information risks).It is worth considering what will/might happen at the end of a professional services engagement as early as the preliminary pre-contract phase. Some of the controls need to be predetermined and pre-agreed in order to avoid or mitigate potentially serious risks later-on. Straightforward in principle ... and yet easily neglected in the heady rush of getting the engagement going. This is not unlike a couple drawing up their "pre-nup" before a wedding, or a sensible organisation making suitable business continuity arrangements in case of severe incidents or disasters ahead. A potentially significant information risk in the concluding phase stems from the inappropriate retention by either party of [access to] confidential information obtained or generated in the course of the engagement - whether commercially sensitive or personal information. Imagine the implications of, say, a law firm being hit by a ransomware attack, office burglary or insider incident, giving miscreants access to its inadequately-secured client casework files and archives. Meta-information about the engagement, assignment/s and contracts may also be commercially-sensitive, for instance if the supplier deliberately under-priced the contract to secure the business and gain a foothold in the market, only to find it uneconomic to deliver the contracted services - a decidedly embarrassing situation if disclosed.Information risks in this phase are amplified if the relationship e |
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2022-04-23 18:06:15 | Topic-specific policy 11/11: secure development (lien direct) | The final topic-specific policy example from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 is another potential nightmare for the naïve and inexperienced policy author. Policy scoping Despite the context and presumed intent, the title of the standard's policy example ("secure development") doesn't explicitly refer to software or IT. Lots of things get developed - new products for instance, business relationships, people, corporate structures and so on. Yes, even security policies get developed! Most if not all developments involve information (requirements/objectives, specifications, plans, status/progress reports etc.) and hence information risks ... so the policy could cover those aspects, ballooning in scope from what was presumably intended when the standard was drafted.Even if the scope of the policy is constrained to the IT context, the information security controls potentially required in, say, software development are many and varied, just as the development and associated methods are many and varied, and more poignantly so too are the information risks. Policy development Your homework challenge, today, is to consider, compare and contrast these five markedly different IT development scenarios:Commercial firmware being developed for a small smart actuator/sensor device (a thing) destined to be physically embedded in the pneumatic braking system of commercial vehicles such as trucks and coaches, by a specialist OEM supplier selected on the basis of lowest price. A long-overdue technical update and refresh for a German bank's mature financial management application, developed over a decade ago by a team of contractors long since dispersed or retired, based on an obsolete database, with fragmentary documentation in broken English and substantial compliance implications, being conducted by a large software house based entirely in India. A cloud-based TV program scheduling system for a global broadcaster, to be delivered iteratively over the next two years by a small team of contractors under the management of a consultancy firm for a client that freely admits it barely understands phase 1 and essentially has no idea what might be required next, or when.A departmental spreadsheet for time recording by home workers, so their time can be tracked and recharged to clients, and their productivity can be monitored by management.Custom hardware, firmware and autonomous software required for a scientific exploration of the Marianas trench - to be deployed in the only two deep-sea drones in existence that are physically capable of delivering and recovering the payload at the extreme depths required.You may have worked in or with projects/initiatives vaguely similar to one, maybe even two or three of these, but probably not all five - and th | Patching Guideline | ||
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2022-04-23 12:40:00 | Professional services - operational (lien direct) |  Following-on from the preliminary phase I covered yesterday, the longest phase of most professional services engagements is the part where the services are delivered. With the contractual formalities out of the way, the supplier starts the service, providing consultancy support or specialist advice. The client receives and utilises the service. Both 'sides' are important to both parties, since a professional service that isn't delivered and used doesn't generate value for the client, and is unlikely to lead to repeat business - such as additonal assignments: Deliberately taking a simplistic view once again, I have represented 'assignments' (which may be projects, jobs, tasks or whatever) as discrete pieces of work, each with a beginning, middle and end:  Things are never so neat and tidy in practice. Some assignments may never really get off the ground, and some gradually diminish or peter out rather than coming to an abrupt end. On-again-off-again assignments are challenging to plan and resource. Assignments may blend into each other or split apart. If the same supplier resources (mostly people) are involved in multiple assignments, possibly for multiple clients, t |
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2022-04-23 11:09:24 | EU to standardise on ISO 31000 and ISO/IEC 27005? (lien direct) |  "Risk management procedures are fundamental processes to prepare organisations for a future cybersecurity attack, to evaluate products and services for their resistance to potential attacks before placing them on the market, and to prevent supply chain fraud" says ENISA in the report "RISK MANAGEMENT STANDARDS - Analysis of standardisation requirements in support of cybersecurity policy" published in March 2022. Not to be left behind, ENISA - originally the European Network and Information Security Agency (an official agency of the EU) - leapt aboard the cyber bandwagon, rebranding itself "The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity" when it became a permanent EU agency under the European Cybersecurity Act, regulation (EU) 2019/881. Despite the vague title, RISK MANAGEMENT STANDARDS in fact primarily concerns "risk management [and] security of ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes" where 'risk' means "any reasonably identifiable circumstance or event having a potential adverse effect on the security of network and information systems." Apparently, "The main goal of risk management is (in general) to protect ICT products (software, hardware, systems, components, services) and business assets, and minimise costs in cases of failures. Thus it represents a core duty for successful business or IT management." In other words, the ENISA document revolves around IT risks, primarily, although it does casually mention 'enterprise risk management' which takes in operational, market, supply chain, project, strategic and other risks. Unfortunately, I haven't dug deep enough yet to reveal actual defiinitions of key terms such as "cybersecurity" or "sector". Evidently, we are supposed to just know what they mean. It doesn't help that the cited "Methodology for Sectoral Cybersecurity Asssessments 2021" official download appears to be broken, but consulting another source I see that it doesn't even define those terms anyway. Furthermore, an embedded diagram suggests an unconventional interpretation of 'risk' and 'exposure', while 'threat' seemingly disregards unintentional and untargeted threats such as generic malware, accidents and storms: |
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2022-04-22 09:26:38 | Professional services - preliminaries (lien direct) | Yesterday I proposed a guideline on the information risk, security and privacy aspects of professional services. I introduced a simplistic 3-phase model for the business relationship through which one or more professional services assignments are delivered and consumed.  Today, I'm exploring the preliminary phase.Before professional services are delivered, client and provider form a business relationship. They determine the professional services required and offered, and of course negotiate the commercial arrangements. They also have the opportunity to decide how the services are to be provided, and how both the assignment/s and the business relationship are to be managed.Contracting is an important control in its own right with significant information and commercial risks associated. The contract may for instance: Be inappropriate for either organisation, the relationship and/or the professional service/s; Be informal, undocumented, invalid and hence unenforceable;Bypass or shortcut due process;Be uneconomic for either party; Be unfair, biased and perhaps unethical;Lead to problems if an assignment fails or the whole relationship turns sour, perhaps as a result of an incident. Contracting is a chance for both organisations to think forward, discuss and agree the governance, management, compliance, security/privacy, control and assurance needed for the remainder of the professional services lifecycle (both phases!). It may be infeasible, later on, to modify the terms or specify additional requirements and the associated arrangements for integrity, confidentiality, incident management etc., especially if relationship issues arise.Also at this stage, client and provider conduct some form of due diligence checks on each other, exploring factors such as solvency, competence, qualifications, certifications and reputations. The manner in which both parties participate in this phase can be a valuable predictive indicator - a big clue as to how things are likely to pan out later e.g.:Appreciation of the each party's capabilities and concerns, plus their common interests in making a commercial success of the planned assignment/s and the business relationship as a whol |
Vulnerability Guideline | ||
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2022-04-21 17:39:36 | Information risk and security for professional services (lien direct) | When you acquire or provide professional services, how do you address the associated information risks? I have in mind consultancy, advisory and other specialist services such as:Building and construction services e.g. architecture, surveying;Business services e.g. marketing and sales, strategy and management consulting, auditing, quality consulting;Engineering services e.g. electrical and electronic design, materials science, measurement and calibration;Financial services e.g. book-keeping and accounting, investment, tax and insurance advice, credit-checking;Human resources services e.g. recruitment, employment disputes, mentoring and training;IT and telecommunications services e.g. Internet services, cloud computing, technical support and advice, outsourced development, datacentre facilities;Legal services e.g. commercial and family law, contracting, disputes, compliance, forensics, prosecution and defence, intellectual property protection;Security services e.g. information risk and security consulting, IT auditing, digital forensics, identity and background checking, surveillance;... and others. Professional services are information-centric: information is the work product, the purpose, the key deliverable. Through assignments, jobs, projects or tasks, professional services clients and providers exchange, generate and utilize information. | Guideline | ||
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2022-04-15 09:09:24 | Value-based infosec (lien direct) |  This week in an ISO27k Forum thread about selecting information security controls from ISO/IEC 27002, Ross told us "cost is always A factor, however more accurately, the "Cost-Benefit Ratio" may become a deciding factor. A general principle is that the cost of implementing a risk treatment should never exceed the value of the asset being protected. Determining the 'value' of the 'asset' might be tricky (eg. impact to brand value when considering consequential reputational risk), however someone within an organisation often has an existing view on this value."Clearly security controls should save more than they cost, hence in theory organisations should only invest in, operate and maintain controls that are valuable ... but in reality, value-based information risk and security management is far from straightforward.For starters, we have no choice with some controls: even in a greenfield situation such as a high-tech startup, the very act of designing and building the company depends on a raft of governance and managment controlsNext consider the costs. Controls have lifecycles incurring costs at every stage, starting even before we develop or procure them since someone has to determine the requirements, then specify and search for solutions, then implement and configure them. Once operational, there are costs associated with using controls, plus generally they need to be monitored, managed and maintained, and perhaps eventually retired or replaced. Being tricky to measure, it is tempting to ignore these costs, lumping them in with all the other costs of doing business ... which may explain the failure of some kinds of control. Complex controls require significant care and attention to keep them operating efficiently and effectively. Thirdly, consider the benefits. Information security controls rarely eliminate information risks: usually, the best we can hope for is partial mitigation - reducing the probability and/or impact of certain types of incident - and even that is uncertain without associated controls such as monitoring, compliance and assurance. What is the $ value of reducing information risks? If a given control had not been selected and put into operation, how costly would any corresponding incidents |
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2022-03-15 16:36:29 | The nine controls ISO/IEC 27002 missed (lien direct) |  Despite the excellent work done to restructure and update the standard, I still feel some commonplace 'good practice' information security controls are either Missing In Action or inadequately covered by ISO/IEC 27002:2022, these nine for example:Business continuity controls, covering resilience, recovery and contingency aspects in general, not just in the IT security or IT domains. ISO 22301 is an excellent reference here, enabling organisations to identify, rationally evaluate and sensibly treat both high probability x low impact and low probability x high impact information risks (the orange zone on probability impact graphics), not just the obvious double-highs (the reds and flashing crimsons!). Therefore, '27002 could usefully introduce/summarise the approach and refer readers to '22301 and other sources for the details.Availability and integrity controls supporting/enabling the exploitation of high-quality, up-to-date, trustworthy business information and opportunities for legitimate purposes within the constraints of applicable policies, laws, regulations etc., even when this means deliberately taking chances (accepting risks!) to secure business opportunities. Also, I'd like to see, somewhere in the ISO27k series, clearer advice on how to tackle the trade-off between control and utility: information that is too tightly secured loses its value, just as it does if inadequately secured ... and that in turn leads to the idea of at least mentioning financial and general business controls relating to information risk and security (e.g. budgeting, project investments, resourcing, cost accounting, incident and impact costing, valuing intangible assets, directing and motivating specialists: these are all import but tricky areas, so advice would help improve the effectiveness and efficiency of information security). [Some of this is covered, albeit quite academically rather than pragmatically, in ISO/IEC 27014 and '27016, and outside the ISO27k realm.]Health and safety controls protecting 'our most valuable assets', providing a supportive work environment that is conducive to getting the most out of our people, and ensuring the safety of our customers using our products. As with business continuity, H&S is pretty well covered by other standards plus laws and regs ... although, arguably, there's much more left to say, yet, on mental health (e.g. the long-term adverse health effects of excessive stress, both on and off the job), with significant implications for information risks |
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2022-03-01 20:18:41 | Infomation security control attributes (lien direct) |  Today I completed and published a 20-page white paper about 'control attributes', inspired by those used in ISO/IEC 27002:2022The concept behind the paper has been quietly brewing for a couple of months or more, taking the past few weeks to crystallise into words in a form that I'm happy to share publicly.In a nutshell, 'attributes' are characteristics or features that can be used to categorise, sort or rank information security controls by various criteria. That simplistic concept turns out to unlock some powerful possibilities, described pragmatically in the paper. It's a more innovative and valuable technique than it may appear.Along the way, I regret inadvertently upsetting the team of JTC 1/SC 27 editors working on ISO/IEC 27028 by sharing an incomplete draft with them in the hope it might become the basis of the initial draft of the new standard. During a Zoom meeting. At 3:00am, NZ time. I wasn't at my best. Ooops.Anyway, now the paper is 'finished' and published, I'm hoping to prompt debate and insightful comments, gathering useful feedback and especially improvement suggestions from readers, leading in turn to a better document to submit (through the proper process, this time!) to the SC 27 project team. We may unfortunately have missed our opportunity to deliver a complete 'donor document' to use as the first working draft of the new standard but all is not lost. The paper's suggestions on how to use attributes will, I hope, make a substantial contribution to the second working draft, and in time inform the issued standard. It is published under a Creative Commons licence. Exposure, discussion and insightful comment is what I'm after so, in addition to this blog, I have notified the 4,500 members of the ISO27k Forum about the paper and released it to an unknown number of LinkeDinners.Care to join the gang? Download the paper here.Share and discuss it with your peers and colleagues.Rip it to shred |
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2021-11-27 09:26:57 | Weaving strategies with policies (lien direct) | I mentioned recently here on the blog that there can be strategic elements to policies, just as there are operational aspects to the supporting procedures and guidelines. With the new year fast approaching, I'd like to explore that further today.Warning: your blinkers are coming off. Prepare for the glare.Take for instance the corporate responses to COVID-19. Out of necessity, organisations in lockdown shifted rapidly from on-site office work and in-person meetings to home-working, using video conferencing, email and collaborative approaches. Although that may have been a purely reactive, un-pre-planned response to the global crisis that erupted (despite prior pandemics and warnings arising from increasing international travel), it was facilitated by longer-term planned, strategic changes and investments in a resilient workforce with flexible working practices and positive attitudes, strong relationships within and without the organisation, plus appropriate tools and technologies - in particular the cloud (since about 2000) and, of course, IT (since about 1970). Thinking about it, the very concept of 'office work', or indeed 'work', stretches back still further, along with 'business', 'commerce', 'profit' and 'money'. Gradual shifts in human society on an almost evolutionary scale have led to where we are right now ... and will continue going forward, presenting strategic challenges and opportunities to those who are awake to the possibilities ahead (both positive and negative), sufficiently resilient to cope with adversity yet resourceful, strong enough and well-positioned to surge forward when it makes sense. In some organisations, policies and practices for home/virtual working were hastily developed and adopted during and in response to the COVID outbreak. In others, either the policies and practices were already in place, or there was no specific need for them since flexible, tech-enabled working was very much the norm already. A few laggards are still struggling to catch up even today, and failing to thrive in adversity may mean failing to survive in perpetuity. [Aside: how on Earth can today's politicians justify holding a climate change conference as a physical, in-person event, during COVID no less, rather than virtually, on-line? Are we even on the same planet? Shakes head in disbelief.]The relation goes both ways: policies can prompt strategic changes, and vice versa. Thinking forward, virtual working presents opportunities for global collaboration on an unprecedented scale, with reduced costs, increased efficiencies, access to a global talent pool and of course global markets. 'Globalization' is not just about establishing a widespread physical presence and brands: it's also about harnessing a widely distributed and culturally diverse workforce, harnessing technology to link, leverage and exploit the very best of the best. | Guideline | ||
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2021-10-23 16:00:00 | Topic-specific example 11/11: secure development (lien direct) | The final topic-specific policy example from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 is another potential nightmare for the naïve and inexperienced policy author. Despite the context, the title of the standard's policy example ("secure development") doesn't explicitly refer to software or IT. Lots of things get developed - new products for instance, business relationships, corporate structures and so on. Yes, even security policies get developed! Most if not all developments involve information (requirements/objectives, specifications, plans, status/progress reports etc.) and potentially substantial information risks ... so the policy could cover those aspects, ballooning in scope from what was presumably intended when the standard was drafted.Even if the scope of the policy is constrained to the IT context, the information security controls potentially required in, say, software development are many and varied, just as the development and associated methods are many and varied, and more poignantly so are the information risks. Your homework challenge, today, is to consider, compare and contrast these five markedly different IT development scenarios:Commercial firmware being developed for a small smart actuator/sensor device (a thing) destined to be physically embedded in the pneumatic braking system of commercial vehicles such as trucks and coaches, by a specialist OEM supplier selected on the basis of lowest price. A long-overdue technical update and refresh for a German bank's mature financial management application, developed over a decade ago by a team of contractors long since dispersed or retired, based on an obsolete database, with fragmentary documentation in broken English and substantial compliance implications, being conducted by a large software house based entirely in India. A cloud-based TV program scheduling system for a global broadcaster, to be delivered iteratively over the next two years by a small team of contractors under the management of a consultancy firm for a client that freely admits it barely understands phase 1 and essentially has no idea what might be required next, or when.A departmental spreadsheet for time recording by home workers, so their time can be tracked and recharged to clients, and their productivity can be monitored by management.Custom hardware, firmware and autonomous software required for a scientific exploration of the Marianas trench - to be deployed in the only two deep-sea drones in existence that are physically capable of delivering and recovering the payload at the extreme depths required.You may have worked in or with projects/initiatives vaguely similar to one, maybe even two or three of these, but probably not all five - and these are just a few random illustrative examples plucked from the millions of such activities going on right now. The sheer number and variety of possibilities is bewildering, so how on earth can one draft a sensible policy?As is the way with ISO27k, the trick is to focus on the information | Patching Guideline | ||
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2021-10-18 20:19:51 | Topic-specific policy 6/11: information security incident management (lien direct) | I'm intrigued by the title of this topic-specific policy from the [draft] 3rd edition of ISO/IEC 27002, being the only one of eleven example titles in the standard that explicitly states "information security". I ask myself why? Is there something special about the management of events classed as 'information security incidents', as opposed to other kinds? Hmmmm, yes there are some specifics but I'm not entirely convinced of a need for a distinct, unique policy. I feel there is more in common with the management of all kinds of incident than there are differences in respect of infosec incidents, hence "Incident management policy" makes more sense to me.Here's one I prepared earlier. Organisations deal with events and incidents all the time. Aside from the humdrum routines of business, things don't always go to plan and unexpected situations crop up. Mature organisations typically have incident management policies already, plus the accompanying procedures and indeed people primed and ready to respond to 'stuff' at the drop of a hat. Wouldn't it make sense, therefore, to ensure that "information security incidents" are handled in much the same way as others?That's fine for mature organisations. For the rest, the SecAware information security policy template on incident management concentrates on the specifics of infosec incidents and outlines incident management in general. A workable infosec policy can prompt the development and maturity of incident management by:Documenting and formalising things - particularly the process, expressing management's expectations and requirements in clear terms (e.g. striking the right balance between investigating and resolving incidents, especially where business continuity is a factor).Stabilising the working practices, de-cluttering things, making them more consistent and hence amenable to management control.Enabling reviews and audits, leading to systematic process improvement where appropriate.Discouraging inappropriate shortcuts (e.g. ineptly investigating serious issues, compromising important forensic evidence) while facilitating escalation and management decisions where appropriate (e.g. determining whether forensic investigation is justified). |
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2021-10-15 12:40:00 | Topic-specific policy 4/11: information transfer (lien direct) |  "Information transfer" is another ambiguous, potentially misleading title for a policy, even if it includes "information security". Depending on the context and the reader's understanding, it might mean or imply a security policy concerning:Any passage of information between any two or more end points - network datacommunications, for instance, sending someone a letter, speaking to them or drawing them a picture, body language, discussing business or personal matters, voyeurism, surveillance and spying etc.One way flows or a mutual, bilateral or multilateral exchange of information.Formal business reporting between the organisation and some third party, such as the external auditors, stockholders, banks or authorities.Discrete batch-mode data transfers (e.g. sending backup or archival tapes to a safe store, or updating secret keys in distributed hardware security modules), routine/regular/frequent transfers (e.g. strings of network packets), sporadic/exceptional/one-off transfers (e.g. subject access requests for personal information) or whatever. Transmission of information through broadcasting, training and awareness activities, reporting, policies, documentation, seminars, publications, blogs etc., plus its reception and comprehension. Internal communications within the organisation, for example between different business units, departments, teams and/or individuals, or between layers in the management hierarchy."Official"/mandatory, formalised disclosures to authorities or other third parties.Informal/unintended or formal/intentional communications that reveal or disclose sensitive information (raising confidentiality concerns) or critical information (with integrity and availability aspects). Formal provision of valuable information, for instance when a client discusses a case with a lawyer, accountant, auditor or some other professional. Legal transfer of information ownership, copyright etc. between parties, for example when a company takes over another or licenses its intellectual property.Again there are contextual ramifications. The nature and importance of information transfers differ between, say, hospitals and health service providers, consultants and their clients, social media companies and their customers, and battalion HQ with operating units out in the field. There is a common factor, however, namely information risk. The in |
General Information Guideline | APT 17 | |
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2021-10-14 17:20:00 | Topic-specific policy 3/11: asset management (lien direct) |  This piece is different to the others in this blog series. I'm seizing the opportunity to explain the thinking behind, and the steps involved in researching and drafting, an information security policy through a worked example. This is about the policy development process, more than the asset management policy per se. One reason is that, despite having written numerous policies on other topics in the same general area, we hadn't appreciated the value of an asset management policy, as such, even allowing for the ambiguous title of the example given in the current draft of ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The standard formally but (in my opinion) misleadingly defines asset as 'anything that has value to the organization', with an unhelpful note distinguishing primary from supporting assets. By literal substitution, 'anything that has value to the organization management' is the third example information security policy topic in section 5.1 ... but what does that actually mean?Hmmmm. Isn't it tautologous? Does anything not of value even require management? Is the final word in 'anything that has value to the organization management' a noun or verb i.e. does the policy concern the management of organizational assets, or is it about securing organizational assets that are valuable to its managers; or both, or something else entirely? Well, OK then, perhaps the standard is suggesting a policy on the information security aspects involved in managing information assets, by which I mean both the intangible information content and (as applicable) the physical storage media and processing/communications systems such as hard drives and computer networks?Seeking inspiration, Googling 'information security asset management policy' found me a policy by Sefton Council along those lines: with about 4 full pages of content, it covers security aspects of both the information content and IT systems, more specifically information ownership, valuation and acceptable use:1.2. Policy Statement The purpose of this policy is to achieve and maintain appropriate protection of organisational assets. It does this by ensuring that every information asset has an owner and that the nature and value of each asset is fully understood. It also ensures that the boundaries of acceptable use are clearly defined for anyone that has access to |
Tool Guideline | APT 17 | |
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2021-07-29 16:36:24 | Pinball management (lien direct) |  It could be argued that 'management' of all kinds (including information risk and security management) is or rather shouldbe a rational process, meaning that managers should systematically gather and evaluate information, take account of sound advice, make sensible decisions, put in place whatever is necessary to implement the decisions etc., all the time acting in the organization's best interests, furthering its business objectives, strategies, policies etc. In practice, there are all manner of issues with that approach that complicate matters, frustrate things, and lead to 'suboptimal' situations that may be - or at least appear to be - irrational, inappropriate or unnecessary. In particular, there are numerous paradoxes. For examples:The obvious core objective of a typical commercial company to make a substantial profit for its owners may conflict with various ethical and legal objectives to spend money on protecting and furthering the wider interests of society and individuals - including their privacy. There's a fine line between motivating/supporting/encouraging/directing and demotivating/micro-managing/exploiting employees. Efficiency in most matters comes at the cost of effectiveness, and vice versa. They say quality is free, but is that a lie? |
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2021-06-26 17:27:23 | Are our infosec controls sufficient? (lien direct) |  ^ Although it's tempting to dismiss such questions as rhetorical, trivial or too difficult, there are reasons for taking them seriously*. Today I'm digging a little deeper into the basis for posing such tricky questions, explaining how we typically go about answering them in practice, using that specific question as an example. OK, here goes.The accepted way of determining the sufficiency of controls is to evaluate them against the requirements. Adroitly sidestepping those requirements for now, I plan to blabber on about the evaluation aspect or, more accurately, assurance.Reviewing, testing, auditing, monitoring etc. are assurance methods intended to increase our knowledge. We gather relevant data, facts, evidence or other information concerning a situation of concern, consider and assess/evaluate it in order to:Demonstrate, prove or engender confidence that things are going to plan, working well, sufficient and adequate in practice, as we hope; andIdentify and ideally quantify any issues i.e. aspects that are not, in reality, working quite so well, sufficiently and adequately. Assurance activities qualify as controls to mitigate risks, such as information risks associated with information risk and security management e.g.: Mistakes in our identification of other information risks (e.g. failing to appreciate critical information-related dependencies of various kinds); Biases and errors in our assessment/evaluation of identified information risks (e.g. today's obsessive focus on “cyber” implies down-playing, perhaps even ignoring other aspects of information security, including non-cyber threats such as physical disasters and hum |
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2021-04-24 09:47:20 | Pre-shocks and after-shocks (lien direct) |  Just a brief note today: it's a lovely sunny Saturday morning down here and I have Things To Do.I'm currently enjoying another book by one of my favourite tech authors: Yossi Sheffi's |
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2021-04-23 15:58:38 | KISS or optimise your ISO27k ISMS? (lien direct) | From time to time as we chat about scoping and designing Information Security Management Systems on the ISO27k Forum, someone naively suggests that we should Keep It Simple Stupid. After all, an ISO27k ISMS is, essentially, simply a structured, systematic approach for information risk management, isn't it? At face value, then, KISS makes sense. In practice, however, factors that complicate matters for organizations designing, implementing and using their ISMSs include different: Business contexts – different organization sizes, structures, maturities, resources, experiences, resilience, adaptability, industries etc.; Types and significances of risks – different threats, vulnerabilities and impacts, different potential incidents of concern; Understandings of 'information', 'risk' and 'management' etc. – different goals/objectives, constraints and opportunities, even within a given organization/management team (and sometimes even within someone's head!); Perspectives: the bungee jumper, bungee supplier and onlookers have markedly different appreciations of the same risks; Ways of structuring things within the specifications of '27001, since individual managers and management teams have the latitude to approach things differently, making unique decisions based on their understandings, | Guideline | ||
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2021-04-13 11:17:11 | Policy development process: phase 1 (lien direct) |  On Sunday I blogged about preparing four new 'topic-specific' information security policy templates for SecAware. Today I'm writing about the process of preparing a policy template.First of all, the fact that I have four titles means I already have a rough idea of what the policies are going to cover (yes, there's a phase zero). 'Capacity and performance management', for instance, is one requested by a customer - and fair enough. As I said on Sunday, this is a legitimate information risk and security issue with implications for confidentiality and integrity as well as the obvious availability of information. In my professional opinion, the issue is sufficiently significant to justify senior management's concern, engagement and consideration (at least). Formulating and drafting a policy is one way to crystallise the topic in a form that can be discussed by management, hopefully leading to decisions about what the organisation should do. It's a prompt to action.At this phase in the drafting process, I am focused on explaining things to senior management in such a way that they understand the topic area, take an interest, think about it, and accept that it is worth determining rules in this area. The most direct way I know of gaining their understanding and interest is to describe the matter 'in business terms'. Why does 'capacity and performance management' matter to the business? What are the strategic and operational implications? More specifically, what are the associated information risks? What kinds of incident involving inadequate capacity and performance can adversely affect the organization?Answering such questions is quite tough for generic policy templates lacking the specific business context of a given organisation or industry, so we encourage customers to customise the policy materials to suit their situations. For instance:An IT/cloud service company would probably emphasise the need to maintain adequate IT capacity and performance for its clients and for its own business operations, elaborating on the associated IT/cyber risks.A healthcare company could mention health-related risk examples where delays in furnishing critical information to the workers who need it could jeopardise treatments and critical care.A small business might point out the risks to availability of its key workers, and the business implications of losing its people (and their invaluable knowledge and experience i.e. information assets) due to illness/disease, resignation or retirement. COVID is a very topical illustration. An accountancy or law firm could focus on avoiding issues caused by late or incomplete information - perhaps even discussing the delicate balance between those two aspects (e.g. there a |
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2021-04-11 14:52:31 | Infosec policy development (lien direct) |  We're currently preparing some new information risk and security policies for SecAware.com. It's hard to find gaps in the suite of 81 policy templates already on sale (!) but we're working on these four additions:Capacity and performance management: usually, an organization's capacity for information processing is managed by specialists in IT and HR. They help general management optimise and stay on top of information processing performance too. If capacity is insufficient and/or performance drops, that obviously affects the availability of information ... but it can harm the quality/integrity and may lead to changes that compromise confidentiality, making this an information security issue. The controls in this policy will include engineering, performance monitoring, analysis/projection and flexibility, with the aim of increasing the organisation's resilience. It's not quite as simple as 'moving to the cloud', although that may be part of the approach.Information transfer: disclosing/sharing information with, and obtaining information from, third party organisations and individuals is so commonplace, so routine, that we rarely even think about it. This policy will outline the associated information risks, mitigating controls and other relevant approaches.Vulnerability disclosure: what should the organisation do if someone notifies it of vulnerabilities or other issues in its information systems, websites, apps and processes? Should there be mechanisms in place to facilitate, even encourage notification? How should issues be addressed? How does this relate to penetration testing, incident management and assurance? Lots of questions to get our teeth into!Clear desks and screens: this is such a basic, self-evident information security issue that it hardly seems worth formulating a policy. However, in the absence of policy and with no 'official' guidance, some workers may not appreciate the issue or may be too lazy/careless to do the right thing. These days, with so many people working from home, the management oversight and peer pressure typical in corporate office settings are weak or non-existent, so maybe it is worth strengthening the controls by reminding workers to tidy up their workplaces and log off. It's banale, not hard! The next release of ISO/IEC 27002 will call these "topic-specific information security policies" focusing on particular issues and/or groups of people in some detail, whereas the organisation's "information security policy" is an overarching, general, |
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2021-01-10 10:34:21 | Y2k + 20: risk, COVID and "the Internet issue" (lien direct) |  It feels like 'just the other day' to me but do you recall "Y2k" and all that? Some of you reading this weren't even born back then, so here's a brief, biased and somewhat cynical recap.For a long time prior to the year 2000, a significant number of software programmers had taken the same shortcut we all did back in "the 90s". Year values were often coded with just two decimal digits: 97, 98, 99 ... then 00, "coming ready or not!"."Oh Oh" you could say. "OOps".When year counters went around the clock and reset to zero, simplistic arithmetic operations (such as calculating when something last happened, or should next occur) would fail causing ... well, potentially causing issues, in some cases far more significant than others.Failing coke can dispensers and the appropriately-named Hornby Dublo train sets we could have coped with but, trust me, you wouldn't want your heart pacemaker, new fangled fly-by-wire plane or the global air traffic control system to decide that it had to pack up instantly because it was nearly 100 years past its certified safe lifetime. Power grids, water and sewerage systems, transportation signalling, all manner of communications, financial, commercial and governmental services could all have fallen in a heap if the Y2k problems wasn't resolved in time, and this was one IT project with a hard, immutable deadline, at a time when IT project slippage was expected, almost obligatory. Tongue-in-cheek suggestions that we might shimmy smoothly into January 1st [19]9A were geekly-amusing but totally impracticable. In risk terms, the probability of Y2k incidents approached 100% certain and the personal or societal impacts could have been catastrophic under various credible scenarios - if (again) the Y2k monster wasn't slain before the new year's fireworks went off ... and, yes, those fancy public fireworks display automated ignition systems had Y2k failure modes too, along with the fire and emergency dispatch systems and vehicles. The combination of very high probability and catastrophic impact results in a risk up at the high end of a tall scale. So, egged-on by information security pro's and IT auditors (me, for instance), management took the risk seriously and invested significant resources into solving "the Y2k issue". Did you spot the subtle shift from "Y2k" to "the Y2k issue"? I'll circle back to that in just a moment. Individual Y2k programming updates were relatively straightforward on the whole (with some interesting exceptions, mostly due to prehistoric IT systems still in use well past their best-before dates, with insurmounta |
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2020-10-08 05:41:06 | NBlog Oct 8 - is Facebook an asset? (lien direct) |  Yet another good question came up on the ISO27k Forum today*. Someone asked whether to add the company's Facebook page to their information asset register (implying that it would need to be risk-assessed and secured using the Information Security Management System processes), or whether the asset should be the Facebook account (ID and password, I guess)**.From the marketing/corporate perspective, good customer relations are perhaps the most valuable information assets of all, along with other external relations (e.g. your suppliers, partners, prospective and former customers, regulators/authorities and owners) and internal relations (the workforce, including staff, management, contractors, consultants and temps, plus former and prospective workers). It's tempting to think of these as just categories or faceless corporations, but in reality the interactions are between individual human beings, so social relationsin general are extremely important in business. There are numerous mechanisms that generate, support and maintain good customer relations, Facebook for example. Likewise for other relations (e.g. ISO27k Forum!). You might think of them as simply apps or information services, often cloud based, often commercial services provided by third parties hence limiting what is on offer and your options or influence over the infosec, privacy and other requirements. There are also related processes and activities, some of which have infosec, privacy and other implications e.g. I have a bank pestering me right now for identification info which they need from me as part of the anti money laundering regs: it's a pain for me and for them, but they have to comply with the laws and regs. Workforce relationship management and 'industrial relations' is a huge part of 'management', with governance, compliance and other implications and risks. Overall, relationship management is, clearly, an important part of business success, or indeed failure when things go horribly wrong (e.g. look up the Ratners jewelers fiasco in the UK, and just look around at the difficulties arising from COVID-19: our people and myriad relationships are under extreme stress this year, not just our organisations). Summing up, I encourage everyone to think big in terms of the scope of information assets, with a strong emphasis on the information that matters most to the business, the organization, and its strategic objectives. The IT systems and services are merely business tools: what matters most is the business information generated/processed by them.* As I've said before, it's funny how often a simple, seemingly basic or naive question on ISO27k Forum leads to something more revealing when the answers and debate sta |
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2020-09-27 17:59:17 | NBlog Sept 27 - 2021 infosec budget (lien direct) |  Are you responsible for your organisation's information security or cybersecurity budget? Are you busily putting the finishing touches to your 2021 budget request, still working on it, just thinking about it, or planning to do it, honestly, when you next come up for breath?Budgeting is generally a dreaded, stressful management task. Not only do we have to figure out the figures but we typically anticipate a tough battle ahead leading (probably) to a disappointing outcome and yet more problems.On top of that, 2020 has been an exceptional year thanks to COVID. The business and information security implications of knowledge workers suddenly working from home, en masse, are still playing out now, while the economic impacts of COVID do not bode well for any of next year's budgets except perhaps for the manufacture of vaccines, masks, gloves, sanitiser and respirators.A substantial part of information security expenditure is (whatever we may believe as professionals) discretionary. The decision to go for ISO/IEC 27001 certification, for instance, flows largely from management's appreciation of the business value of investing in information risk and security management good practices. There may be specific drivers such as incidents, compliance pressures or demands from business owners, partners and prospective customers, but even then there are numerous options and factors to consider such as:The objectives for the Information Security Management System - what it is expected to achieve;How broadly or narrowly to scope the ISMS;At what pace to implement the standard, and how precisely;What resources to assign to the implementation, not least a suitable implementation project manager/consultant and project team;Priorities for this work relative to other business activities, objectives and requirements, making adjustments as necessary (both initially and as the project proceeds when stuff comes up - as COVID did, for instance);Alignment with other corporate projects and initiatives e.g. exploiting strategic opportunities to update various systems, policies and processes for security and other reasons, at the same time;Change management aspects: does the organisation have the capacity and appetite first to adopt and assimilate the ISMS, and secondly to get the most out of it; Project risks e.g. the possibility that things probably w |
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2020-08-28 15:19:43 | NBlog Aug 28 - NZ Stock Exchange DDoS continues (lien direct) |  The New Zealand Stock Exchange is having a rough week. Under assault from a sustained DDoS attack, its web servers have crumpled and fallen in an untidy heap again today, the fourth day of embarrassing and costly disruption.DDoS attacks are generally not sophisticated hacks but crude overloads caused by sending vast volumes of data to overwhelm the servers. The Host Error message above shows "RedShield" which appears to be a security service remarkably similar to a Web Application Firewall (although the company claims to be producing something far better) ... If so, RedShield appears to be passing DDoS traffic to the stock exchange web servers which can't cope. Presumably, this particular DDoS attack does not fit the profile of the attacks that RedShield is designed to block, in other words RedShield is patently not preventing the DDoS.I don't know whether RedShield is supposed to block DDoS traffic and is failing to do so, or if DDoS protection is simply not part of the RedShield service. Either way, it appears a DDoS attack is causing business impacts. |
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2020-08-27 18:50:44 | NBlog Aug 27 - creative teamwork post-lockdown (lien direct) |  A couple of days ago I blogged about MURAL, just one of many creative tools supporting collaborative working. If you missed it, please catch up and contemplate about how you might use tools such as that right now for teamworking during the COVID19 lockdowns.Today I've been thinking about 'the new normal' as the world emerges from the pandemic, inspired by the intersection of two threads.Firstly, thanks to a Zoom session with participants and presenters from Queensland, I've been reading-up on "industry 4.0". I'm not totally au fait with it yet but as I see it the key distinguishing features are:Ever-increasing automation of manufacturing, with smart devices and robotics supplementing the capabilities of both manual and knowledge workers;Industrial IoT, coupling sensors and actuators on the production line with each other, allowing workers to interact with the machinery through screens and keyboards etc. and a growing layer of automation smarts and networking;Ever-increasing reliance on IT, data, analytics, systems and artificial intelligence (with implications for risk, resilience, reliability and security);New capabilities, particularly in the specification and design areas - such as virtual reality simulations and rapid prototyping of jigs, machines and products by "additive manufacturing" (industrial 3D printers);An increasing focus on adding value through knowledge work in research and development plus product service/support, de-emphasising the manufacturing production core activities (which, I guess, started with the off-shoring of manufacturing to low-wage economies, and is now leading to both on- and off-shore automated manufacturing); Rapid innovation and change, leading to difficulties in strategic corporate planning (with credible planning horizons falling to just a couple of years!) and personal career planning (e.g. how can workers learn to use tools and techniques that either aren't refined enough to be taught, perhaps not even invented yet?);Shortages of people with the requisite skills, knowledge and adaptability, able to thrive despite the challenges and seize opportunities as they arise. |
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2020-08-21 05:23:45 | NBlog Aug 20 - creative teamwork in lockdown (lien direct) | Inspired by a heads-up from a colleague on LinkeDin, I bumped into MURAL today.MURAL is a 'digital workspace for visual collaboration' by virtual teams. The animated demonstration on their home page caught my beady eye. Here's a static snapshot as a small group of people are busy placing/moving blobs on a graphic, presumably while discussing what they are doing on a parallel channel (e.g. Zoom): | Guideline | ||
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2020-08-19 19:48:48 | NBlog Aug 19 - IAAC Directors\' Guides (lien direct) |  Some time back I bumped into a handy management guide on information risk - a double-sided leaflet from the Information Assurance Advisory Council. In 2015, it inspired a security awareness briefing explaining that colourful process diagram, which has now morphed into a further 5-page briefing on Information Risk Management, soon to join the SecAware ISMS templates.Googling for the IAAC guide led me to a cluster of FREE Directors' Guides from the IAAC offering useful, relevant guidance for senior management:Why Information Risk is a Board Level Issue - is a backgrounder including this apt and succinct explanation:"Information Risk encompasses all the challenges that result from an organisation's need to control and protect its information."Governance and Structures - describes directors' governance responsibilities relating to information risk:"Directors need to put in place the arrangements and processes by which responsibilities are distributed and significant information risk decisions are to be made and reviewed."Information Risk Management Approach - encourages directors to support the remainder of the organisation in fulfilling their responsibilities for information risk, ensuring strategic alignment between risk management and business objectives.Realising the Benefits - outlines the business benefits of good information risk management in terms of: efficiency; agility; manageability; exploitation of new opportunities (more confidently expanding into new areas of business); customer retention; brand strengthening; cost-efficient compliance; and dealing efficiently with incidents."Good information risk mitigation supports organisational strategies and tactical agil |
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2020-08-10 11:44:49 | NBlog Aug 8 - musing on ISO/IEC 27014 & infosec governance (lien direct) |  This morning I've been studying the final draft of the forthcoming second edition of ISO/IEC 27014 "Governance of information security", partly to update ISO27001security.com but mostly out of my fascination with the topic.Section 8.2.5 of the standard specifies the governance objective to "Foster a security-positive culture":"Governance of information security should be built upon entity culture, including the evolving needs of all the interested parties, since human behaviour is one of the fundamental elements to support the appropriate level of information security. If not adequately coordinated, the objectives, roles, responsibilities and resources can conflict with each other, resulting in the failure to meet any objectives. Therefore, harmonisation and concerted orientation between the various interested parties is very important. To establish a positive information security culture, top management should require, promote and support coordination of interested party activities to achieve a coherent direction for information security. This will support the delivery of security education, training and awareness programs. Information security responsibilities should be integrated into the roles of staff and other parties, and they should support the success of each ISMS by taking on these responsibilities."Not bad that although, personally, I would have mentioned senior management setting 'the tone at the top', in other words influencing the entire corporate culture through their leadership, decisions, direction and control, particularly in the way they behave.For example, even though management may formally insist upon ethical behaviour as a policy matter, if managers in fact act unethically, push the boundaries of ethicality through their decisions and priorities, or simply tolerate (turn a blind eye to, fail to address) unethical/dubious activities, that can severely erode if not destroy the value of the policy. Workers observant enough to spot the disconnect between theory and practice are, in effect, enabled or even encouraged to decide for themselves whether to comply with the policy. In a disciplinary situation, management's failure to enforce compliance with |
Guideline | ||
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2020-07-17 16:53:31 | NBlog July 17 - an appetite for risk (lien direct) |  Today we've been chatting about this on the ISO27k Forum: "Let's assume that the company is willing to accept risks with a potential financial impact less than $50k. Obviously after performing risk assessment, we need to decide which treatment option we should follow. In case when the potential impact of the risk is below $50k - (risk appetite), we should accept the risk, right? My question is: what happens if for some reason, multiple Low Risks (below risk appetite value/already accepted) occur at the same time? Should the Risk Appetite represent an aggregation of all low risks or just reflect the appetite for a single risk?"I suggested considering 'coincident risks' as another entire category or class of risks, some of which may well be above the risk appetite/acceptance threshold even if the individual risks fall below it. It gets worse. There are many other coincidences, errors, failures, issues and exceptional circumstances that could occur - in extremis, it's an infinite set of possibilities given all the permutations and combinations.Our collective failure to identify and take seriously the possibility of a pandemic landed us in the poo we're in now. Even those organisations that did have pandemic controls in place have found the going tougher than anticipated, some discovering that their stockpile of sanitizer and masks had not been properly stored and maintained, and hence was next to useless when called upon. Trust me, it can be a sobering exercise to run a risk workshop focused on rare but extremely impactful events, the outliers that we tend to ignore in routine risk management because it's hard enough dealing with the commonplace extreme events, let alone the rarities. Every well-managed organisation needs to deal sensibly with the scarily vague “something else happens and lands us in serious trouble” situations, when classical scenario planning runs out of steam. There are far too many possibilities to even enumerate, let alone evaluate and treat individually: a more general-purpose approach is required. |
Guideline | ||
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2020-07-16 13:45:31 | NBlog July 16 - tips on preparing successful proposals (lien direct) |  "The Winning Business Case: how to create a compelling conceptual, analytical and pitch model that your audience will love" is a free eBook from OCEG - more than 20,000 words of advice about generating and pitching a business case for investment in some sort of risk-based project or initiative.The Open Compliance and Ethics Group identifies as: "a global nonprofit think tank that helps organizations reliably achieve objectives, address uncertainty and act with integrity ... We inform, empower, and help advance our 85,000+ members on governance, risk management, and compliance (GRC). Independent of specific professions, we provide content, best practices, education, and certifications to drive leadership and business strategy through the application of the OCEG GRC Capability Model™ and Principled Performance®. An OCEG differentiator, Principled Performance enables the reliable achievement of objectives while addressing uncertainty and acting with integrity. Our members include c-suite, executive, management, and other professionals from small and midsize businesses, international corporations, nonprofits, and government agencies. Founded in 2002, OCEG has locations around the globe."The eBook lays out and explains 15 activities or steps in the process. The sequence and of course the details within each step may vary according to circumstances but it's a comprehensive, well-written document, worth studying if you need to justify investment in risk or security management projects or related areas such as compliance, assurance, cybersecurity, business continuity and ISO27k. With some adjustments, the process could also be valuable for operational budgets too: securing next year's budget for a business department or function is similar to getting approval for a project, especially if management takes a longer-term, strategic view rather than being solely annual in focus. Thinking more broadly still, it could be useful for other kinds of proposal, such as when bidding for consultancy work. Maybe if prospective clients had a bet |
Guideline | ★★★ | |
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2020-07-10 19:01:37 | NBlog July 11 - the small but perfectly formed ISMS (lien direct) |  Consulting for small organisations lately to design and implement their ISO/IEC 27001 Information Security Management Systems, resourcing constraints often come to light, particularly the lack of information security expertise and knowledge in-house. I have previously taken this to indicate lack of understanding, support and commitment from senior management, insufficient priority relative to all the other important stuff going on, hence my abiding interest in elaborating on the business case for investing in information risk and security management. Currently, though, I'm gaining a new-found appreciation of the realities of running a small business where even IT may be done on a shoestring, leaving information security way out on a limb. With barely enough cash-flow to sustain the business during COVID-19 and the obvious need to focus on core business activities, it's no surprise if ISO27k implementation and certification projects take a back seat for now. That delaying tactic, however, leaves the business more exposed meanwhile, increasing the probability and impacts of incidents that should have been avoided, prevented or mitigated. It can lead to missed business opportunities and customer defections as they turn to certified competitors rather than waiting for the assurance an ISO/IEC 27001 compliance certificate would bring. It reduces trust and devalues brands. All in all, it's a risky approach.Putting the ISMS implementation on hold is not the only option, however. With some creative thinking, it is possible to keep the project moving along, albeit at a slower pace:A bare-bones minimalist ISMS, barely adequate to satisfy the standard's mandatory requirements, may not deliver all the business benefits of good practice information risk and security management ... but it is both certifiable and better than nothing. A small but perfectly formed ISMS demonstrates the organisation's genuine commitment to information risk and security management, gaining the assurance value of the certificate to third parties without the investment necessary for a full-blown ISMS. Furthermore it is a perfectly valid and sensible starting point, a platform or basis from which to mature the organization's information risk and security management practices as and when it proves its value. It's a pragmatic approach. Being a pragmatist, I like that. Partnering with consultants reduces the pressure on employees, demonstrates management's support (more than just the intention to resume the ISMS project 'at some point'), and keeps up the momentum. Based on our practical experience and knowledge of the standards, we can generally help clients navigate the process by the shortest and most direct route, perhaps making small diversions only where it makes business sense. Speaking for myself, I'm happy to regulate m |
Guideline | ||
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2020-06-18 07:58:14 | NBlog June 17 - phishing evolution (lien direct) | The Interweb drums have been beating out news of an upsurge in phishing attacks over the past month or so. I've certainly had more than the normal number of things along these lines lately: [if gte vml 1]> [if !vml]-->[endif]--> As usual, these are relatively crude and (for most reasonably alert people) easy to spot thanks to the obvious spelling and grammatical errors, often using spurious technobabble and urgency as well as the fake branding and sender email address in an attempt to trick victims. The 'blocked emails' and 'storage limit' memes are popular in my spam box right now, suggesting that these are basic phishing-as-a-service or phishing-kit products being used by idiots to lure, hook, land and gut other idiots. They are, however, using my first name in place of “Dear subscriber” or “Hello, how are you doing?” that we used to see, implying the use of mailmerge-type content customisation with databases of email addresses and other info on potential victims*.Moving up the scale, some current phishing attempts are more sophisticated, more convincing. Sometimes it's just a lucky coincidence e.g. when the lure glints alluringly because it just happens to mention something I am currently doing - for example if I am dealing with American Express o |
Ransomware Spam Guideline | ||
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2020-05-25 08:14:25 | NBlog May 25 - gap-and-fill (lien direct) |  Aside from the conventional 'gap analysis', it is possible to do a 'fill analysis' to discover the things that the organization is doing successfully already – its strengths, foundations on which to build. The analytical processes are almost the same but a fill analysis aims to identify, learn from and expand upon the strengths - the positives - whereas a gap analysis involves hunting down and addressing the weaknesses - the negatives.These are complementary not alternative approaches.So, for instance, if the organization is poor at compliance, OK at policies and excellent at impact assessment: A gap analysis would focus on closing the compliance gaps; |
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2020-05-03 13:19:31 | NBlog May 3 - COVID-19 is like infosec because ... (lien direct) |  ... Despite the history and the experts' warnings that a pandemic was likely to happen again at some point, it turns out we were ill-prepared for it, not as resilient as we thought and should have been... Experts disagree on the details, sometimes even the fundamentals, and love their models... Commentary and advice is plentiful, but sound, reasoned, appropriate advice by competent advisors is at a premium and partly lost in the noise... Whereas information is important, information integrity, quality and trustworthiness are vital, hence there is also value in assurance and other information controls, including the pundits' reputations and credibility... Most of us are non-experts, hence it is tricky for us to distinguish fact from fiction and make sense of conflicting advice ... Perfect, complete information is seldom available, so there are bound to be compromises and errors - and we should be ready to spot and deal with them too... Controls against COVID-19 are imperfect, at best; some are purely for appearance sake; some are as much use as a bubble level in space; others are literally worse than useless (the cure really can be worse than the disease!); in most cases, we simply don't know how well they will work in practice... Many people and organizations struggle to cope with a serious crisis, whereas some shine and thrive - but even the best may crumble at some point... They are all about risk and risk management, not just protection, control, safety and security: we are where we are partly as a result of our prior decisions about priorities, resources etc. ... We are mutually dependent and hence collectively vulnerable since total isolation is impract |
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2020-03-31 19:48:03 | NBlog March 31 - NZ lockdown day 6 of N (lien direct) |  The NZ politicians and news media are updating us daily on selected COVID-19 statistics (metrics), particularly concerning NZ of course but also the global situation. Countries with the largest numbers (regardless of which metric) are naturally media-fodder.It's fair to ask, though, what all these numbers mean, why we should care about them, and why they are being reported rather than others.As with information risk and security metrics, there are various audiences of the metrics with numerous concerns, objectives, purposes, uses for or interests in them e.g.:Those actually managing the national response, day-by-day, need to know how they are doing relative to their plans and intentions, and how they might improveCentral and local government politicians giving oversight and direction to the response ... with a keen eye on their popular standing, given that an election is in the offing (unless deferred) ... plus administrators in the civil serviceThe Treasury and Inland Revenue, overseeing the financial aspects of NZ's impacts from COVID-19, not least the costs of the controls and handouts intended to keep businesses and other organizations afloat, the national debt and tax burden on those who make it through The stock market and financial industry generally - interested for the same reasonsThe NZ general public with a personal, familial and general interest in the situation, mostly concerned non-specialistsThe news media - specifically journalists, editors and proprietors The social media - specifically bloggers, Twits, Facebookers, community members and influencers, commentators and assorted 'interested parties' ... including me Specialists in public health, infectious disease, virology, epidemiology, genetics, risk and incident management etc.Healthcare professionals - in particular those planning for, leading and administering the public health response to COVID-19The police and justice system, largely responsible for administering the lockdown and dealing with noncompliance |
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2020-03-25 08:31:13 | NBlog March 25 - coping with the COVID crisis (lien direct) |  I bumped into an insightful piece by Jeff Immelt 'Lead through a crisis' yesterday. This paragraph really caught my eye:  I agree there are material differences between us in how we react under pressure, differences that are exaggerated during a crisis. The same applies to social groups and families as well as work teams: some of us are (or at least give the appearance of being) fully on top of things, some are 'coping', some are struggling, and some are in turmoil, overwhelmed by it all.The current situation reminds me of the Kübler-Ross grieving curve. Here's a version I've used to help explain our emotional responses to traumatic events such as information security incidents and changes: |
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2020-03-23 13:19:46 | NBlog March 20 - COVID-19 PIG update (lien direct) | Here's today's update to my COVID-19 information risk Probability Impact Graphic: I've slightly shifted and revised the wording of some of the risks but there's nothing really new (as far as I know anyway). Reports of panic buying from the UK and US are concerning, given the possible escalation to social disorder and looting … but hopefully sanity will soon return, aided by the authorities promoting “social distancing” and “self-isolation”. Meanwhile, I hope those of you responsible for physically securing corporate premises have appropriate security arrangements in place. Remotely monitored alarms and CCTV are all very well, but what if the guards that would be expected to do their rounds and respond to an incident are off sick or isolated at home? Do you have contingency arrangements for physical security?'Sanity' is a fragile condition: there is clearly a lot of anxiety, stress and tension around, due to the sudden social changes, fear about the infectious disease etc., which is my rationale for including 'mental health issues' in the middle of the PIG. There is some genuinely good news in the medical world concerning progress on coronavirus testing, antiviral drugs and vaccines, although it's hard to spot among the large volume of dubious information and rumours sloshing around on social media (another information risk on the PIG). There's even some good news for infosec pro's. COVID-19 is a golden opportunity for those of us with an interest in security awareness and business continuity. Essentially, we are in the midst of a dramatic case study. |
Patching Guideline | ||
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2020-03-21 06:49:12 | NBlog March 13 - COVID-19 information risk analysis (lien direct) | I'll kick off with a disclaimer: IANAV*. I have a scientific background in microbial genetics but left the field more than 3 decades ago. I have far more experience in information risk management, so what follows is my personal assessment of the information risks ('risks pertaining to information') associated with the Coronavirus pandemic.Here's my initial draft of a Probability-Impact-Graphic showing what I see as the main information risk aspects right now, today, with a few words of explanation below: Top left, the reported shortages of toilet rolls, facemasks, hand sanitiser and soap qualify as information incidents because they are the result of panic buying by people over-reacting to initial media coverage of shortages. The impacts are low because most people are just not that daft. Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt, however, is largely what drives those panic buyers. To an extent, I blame the media (mostly social media but also the traditional news media, desperate for their next headline) for frenziedly whipping up a storm of information. There are potentially significant personal and social consequences arising from FUD that I'll cover later.In amongst the frenzied bad news, there are a few good things coming out of this incident. The global scientific, medical and public services communities are quietly sharing information about the virus, infections, symptoms, morbidity, treatments, contributory factors, social responses etc. There is excellent work going on to characterise the virus, understand its morphology and genetics, understand the disease progression, understand the modes of transmission etc. It's a shame this isn't as widely reported as the bad news but I think I understand why that is: scientists, generally, are reluctant to publish information they aren't reasonably sure about, and "reasonably sure" means if a reporter asks for a categorical statement of fact, most scientists will at least hesitate if not refuse. An example of this is the face mask issue: good quality face masks are designed to trap small particles but not as small as viruses. They help by impeding airborne particles and so reducing the spread of airborne viruses, but do not total |
Guideline |
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